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Kamehameha III’s struggle for sovereign control of his kingdom began in earnest in 1842 when 
he sent his diplomats on their long journey to confront the world’s greatest maritime powers in 
their own capitals. His struggle began several years before that, however, when as a young boy 
he pronounced that his rule would be characterized by literacy, and he ordered his people to learn 
to read and write. Without literacy, Kauikeaouli could not have defended his sovereign rights and 
privileges in the public forums of his opponents—and without literacy, there would be no record 
from the king himself how he chose to meet the threats that confronted his kingdom. 
Although Kamehameha III (r. 1825-1854) secured guarantees of territorial sovereignty in 
1843-1844 from Great Britain, France and the United States, those guarantees did not preclude 
western agents’ attempts to limit the king’s ability to exercise his sovereign powers by imposing 
extraterritorial restrictions over key economic and juridical functions. Kamehameha III 
recognized that his loss of authority to exercise functional powers threatened the Hawaiian 
kingdom’s ability to retain its territorial sovereignty. Western opponents already had a foothold 
in the kingdom, and the king needed innovative tactics and strategies to prevail in his struggle. 
This dissertation examines the comprehensive strategy that Kamehameha III devised to 
retake full sovereign control of Hawaiian kingdom governance. Documentary evidence 
demonstrates that the king collaborated with his chiefs, ministers and legislators to implement 
specific governance, political and diplomatic measures. Kamehameha III’s tactics worked in 
tandem to structure the kingdom’s political interactions with western nation-states in ways that 




This dissertation explores kingdom governance records and other contemporary evidence 
about each of the measures taken, the king’s rationale for selecting the specific measure, its 
implementation, and its effectiveness. These records easily disprove accusations contemporary to 
his times that Kamehameha III’s ministers ruled in his stead. This examination contributes to a 
reevaluation of Kamehameha III’s leadership role and an expanded understanding of the threats 
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ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLATIONS 
 
Members of the Sandwich Islands Mission (SIM) created the Hawaiian orthography in 1822 with 
linguistic guidance from members of the London Missionary Society (LMS) who had created the 
Tahitian orthography in 1805, and members of the Church Mission Society (CMS) who had 
created the Māori orthography in 1820. The alphabet contains five vowels—a, e, i, o, and u—and 
seven consonants—h, k, l, m, n, p, and w. Other consonants are frequently used to render non-
Hawaiian names: Farani, for French, for example, and Batimea, for Bartimus. 
 Noted Hawaiian language scholar and translator M. Puakea Nogelmeier writes of the 
harm resulting to historical authenticity from the loss of scholarly understanding of the Hawaiian 
language, and he urges that scholars revisit “every form of history written, every cultural study 
undertaken, and every assumption made over most of the last century” in order to include 
knowledge from neglected archival records.1 James Belich calls records like these ‘embalmed 
evidence,’ apposite points of view to the dominant historical interpretation, which have suffered 
an historiographic defeat.2 Nogelmeier offers the same remedy that Belich had offered years 
earlier: even if embalmed evidence has been tucked away and forgotten, it can nonetheless be 
brought out and consulted.3 But Bryan K. Kuwada finds that a sizeable number of native 
Hawaiian-language speakers are opposed to the use of translations. Kuwada participated in 
collaborative efforts to translate legacy texts, and he wrote of the concerns voiced by native 
linguists. Difficulties arise when outsiders misinterpret historical texts, they told Kuwada. 
                                                 
1 M. Puakea Nogelmeier, Mai Paʻa i Ka Leo: Historical Voice in Hawaiian Primary Materials, Looking Forward 
and Listening Back (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 2010), xi.  
2 James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland: Auckland 




Because the Hawaiian worldview and epistemology are wrapped up in the way the language is 
expressed, unschooled translators can fail to perceive idioms and/or misunderstand cultural 
connotations. Additionally, the Hawaiian language is replete with kaona (polysemy) words 
which have several meanings. Kuwada cautions that potential translators should abandon the 
idea of producing so-called “literal” translations and focus instead on producing interpretive 
translations.4 
For example, does the salutation “Auhea oukou” mean literally “Where are you?”  or 
does it have an idiomatic meaning that calls the listeners’ attention to what is about to be said? 5 
Does “ke alii” refer to some unnamed person who is a chief, or is it a cultural reference to the 
king?6 Does “Aole ia oe ka olelo o keia wahi” literally mean “You don’t speak at this place,” or 
is the linguistic meaning of olelo such that the sentence should be translated “You don’t give the 
orders here”?7 
Other translation challenges arise from stylistic writing conventions. Letters invariably 
begin with “Ke hai aku nei au ia oe (I am telling you),” as if speaking to the recipient. This 
merging of oral and written manners also appeared in nineteenth-century Māori and Tahitian 
writings.8 Translators Charles Langlas and Jeffrey Kapali Lyon also note that punctuation in 
                                                 
4 Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada, “To Translate or Not to Translate: Revising the Translating of Hawaiian Language 
Texts,” Biography 32, no. 1 (Winter 2009):54-65.  
5 G. P. Judd, “Kingʼs speech,” 27 February 1843, Broadside Collection, HHS; see also M. Kekūanāoʻa to John 
Robson, December 8, 1841, trans. E. H. Hart, Series 402-7-167, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA.  
6 Paulo Kānoa to Timoteo Haʻalilio and William Richards, 06 May 1843, Letters Miscellaneous Correspondents, 
Hawaiian Chiefs, M-59, Manuscript Collection, HSA.   
7 M. Kekūanāoʻa memorandum of conversations with French whaling captain and British and American Consuls in 
which he refused to countermand Hawaiian law regarding rebellious sailors, 31 August 1838, Box 140, 
Miscellaneous, Interior Department, HSA.  
8 Scholars note that Māori and Tahitian writers used an oratorical writing style to elicit an emotional response. See 
Lyndsay Head, “Kupu Pai, Kupu Kino: Good and Bad Words in Māori Political Writing” in Rere atu, taku manu! 
Discovering history, language and politics in Maori-language newspapers, ed. Jenifer Curnow, Ngapare Hopa & 
Jane McRae (Auckland: Auckland Univ. Press, 2002), 135; Jane McRae, “Oral Tradition in Newspaper Writing” in 
Rere atu, 42-53; For an example of Tahitian writing reflecting speech habits, see Pōmare, Queen of Tahiti, “The 
xi 
 
nineteenth-century Hawaiian writings reflected the habits of spoken language, and capitalization, 
word division, spelling and grammar appear to have depended on the impulse of the writer.9 
Although my dissertation relies heavily on Hawaiian and English texts taken from official 
records and other nineteenth-century sources, I have made no attempt to rewrite or retranslate 
any official or contemporary records into modern styles and usages when there are contemporary 
bilingual sources available. As with any handwritten or printed materials, occasionally the reader 
will find the sorts of spelling, grammar and punctuation errors in the Hawaiian text as described 
by Langlas and Lyon. The ink in some of the documents is faded, and sometimes the pages are 
torn, making the handwriting difficult to read. There are also omitted words, cumbersome 
language, and minor textual differences in both the Hawaiian and English texts. However, both 
the Hawaiian and the English texts were used to inform participants and readers contemporary to 
the events. For that reason, I have chosen to cite material in both languages exactly as it appears 
in the official records or other contemporary sources. 
Bilingual privy and cabinet council meeting minutes appear together in bound ledger 
volumes as recorded by a secretary appointed to that task. When I cite these texts, I cite the 
Hawaiian text immediately followed by the English text, with the two texts separated by ellipses, 
thusly: “[Hawaiian text] . . . . [English text].” Together the two texts form one citation from a 
particular record, and my footnotes show from which official record the texts are taken. Where 
the official texts are taken from two different contemporary documents, I separate the two with a 
semi-colon, thusly: “[Hawaiian text]” ; “[English text].” Footnotes to those citations give the two 
                                                 
Queen of Tahiti to the Queen of England,” The Freeman’s Journal, 31 August 1843, where the letter was printed in 
English without a Tahitian text.  
9 Charles Langlas and Jeffrey Lyon, eds. and trans., The Moʻolelo Hawaiʻi of Davida Malo: Vol. 2, Text and 




records from which the citations are taken. Modern translations of nineteenth-century texts are 
shown in traditional fashion, thusly: “[Hawaiian text]” (English translation), and I note the 
identity of the translator in footnotes. 
A conversation that Kauikeaouli had in 1847 provides insight as to why there may be 
what seem to be inaccurate renderings from English to Hawaiian, or vice versa in the official 
government records from his administration. Foreign Affairs Minister Robert C. Wyllie asked 
the king what his opinion was of the terms of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria’s message 
to him that had accompanied the ratified copy of the 1846 treaty between the two nations. 
Kauikeaouli responded in Hawaiian, and William Richards interpreted: 
ua nana au i na hua a ke Alii Wahine i oleloai i kona hooko ana i ke 
kuikahi, ua ikaika, a  na nui ke ano ma ka io. Aole kau pono ka makou 
olelo i ka hoakaka loa i ka manao ma ke ano ikaika e like me ia, aole hoi e 
hiki ke hoakaka loa i ko makou manao iho. Nolaila ua makemake au, e 
huli oia ma ka oukou olelo a loaa na hua i oi aku ka ikaika a me ke 
kupono, a ma ia mau hua e hoakaka aku i ku’u olioli nui i ke ano o kela 
mau olelo a ke Alii Wahine i kona hooko ana ia kuikahi; e hoohana like 
hoi oia i ke ano o na hua o kana olelo me ka ke Alii Wahine i olelo ai.  
. . . .  
I perceive the terms in which the Queen has ratified the Treaty are strong 
and exceedingly significant. Our language is not adapted to express ideas 
in so strong a manner, and often fails to express in full even our own 
feelings. I wish him [meaning Wyllie] therefore to search the English 
language for the strongest and most appropriate terms in which to express 
my high satisfaction at the form in which the Queen has ratified that 
Treaty, and let him use language which shall correspond in its character 
with that which the Queen has used.10 
                                                 
10 Minutes, 19 April 1847, Series 421, vol. 2, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees were the king, the kuhina nui, Wyllie, 
Judd, Richards, Ricord, Kekūanāoʻa, Kānehoa, Pākī, Kanaʻina, ʻĪʻī, and Keohokālole. This passage is the exception 
to the rewriting rules I stated earlier. The Hawaiian text needed to be emended by Dr. Lyon from the official text 
which was clearly copied by someone who did not read Hawaiian well. In the minutes, the Hawaiian text reads “ua 
nana au i na hua a ke Alie Wahine i oleloai i hona hooko ana i ke kaikahi, na ikaika, a na nui ke ano malotio. Aole 
ka pono ka makonolelo i ka kaakakaloa i ka manao nea ke ano ikaika e like me ia, aole hoi e hiki ke hoaka loa i 
kamakou manoo iho nolaila na makemakeau, e huli oia ma ka oukou olelo a loaa na hua i oi aka ka ikaika a me ke 
kupono, a ma ia mauhua e hoakaka akui hoie olioli nui ikeano o kela manolelo a ke alie Wahine e kona hooko ana ia 




Not all governance and contemporary records were translated at the time they were 
recorded. For that reason, I also sought the assistance of Hawaiian language scholar Jeffrey 
Kapali Lyon for translations of Hawaiian letters and documents not contemporaneously 
translated, and for texts from other sources, such as Ka Mooolelo Hawaii and S. M. Kamakau’s 
newspaper articles either as they originally appeared in Ka Nupepa Kuokoa and Ke Au Okoa or 
as compiled in Ke Aupuni Mōʻī: Ka Moʻolelo Hawaiʻi no Kauikeaouli Keiki Hoʻoilina a 
Kamehameha a me ke Aupuni āna i Noho Mōʻī Ai. In all cases, I accredited the translator or 
translation source in footnotes. My own translations are so noted. 
When citing Hawaiian language texts, I did not add the diacritical marks ʻokina (glottal 
stop) and kahakō (macron) to texts that did not use them or to the names of publications that are 
not from the modern era. However, I did use the modern spellings with diacritical marks for the 
names of nineteenth-century individuals, which I took from Nogelmeier’s editorial work in Ke 
Aupuni Mōʻī. In those cases where an individual’s name does not appear in Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, I 
did not use diacritical marks. Having first introduced a Hawaiian word or term and given its 
English meaning, I thereafter used the English word: aupuni, government or kingdom, for 
example, and aliʻi, chief. There are exceptions: I retained the title kuhina nui, chief advisor or 
premier, throughout, and used the Hawaiian word makaʻāinana for commoner. Attached is a 
glossary of the Hawaiian words used most frequently. In some cases, I also regularized 
punctuation for nineteenth-century texts by inserting commas where needed to enhance 
comprehension. My footnotes reflect those texts where I inserted a punctuation mark.   







There is a plaque affixed to a stone at Keauhou, Kona that identifies its important role in the 
birth of the king. Named the Kauikeaouli Stone, it is a rounded, dark, volcanic boulder which 
was originally somewhat saucer-shaped. A pili grass structure where the birth actually took place 
stood nearby. No remains of the structure or its foundations are visible today. The Keauhou, 
North Kona site is registered with the National Parks Service as an historic place and is 
maintained by the Daughters of Hawaiʻi.  
Kauikeaouli’s high-ranking chiefly mother Keōpūolani had chosen the aliʻi Kuakini to 
raise her baby as his hānai (adopted) child. Kuakini was notified that the queen had entered the 
pili birthing hut, and he arrived accompanied by Davida Malo. At birth the baby appeared to be 
stillborn, however, and Kuakini refused to accept him. The aliʻi (chief) Kaikioʻewa stepped in, 
took the child, and handed him into the care of a kahuna named Kapihe. Kapihe washed the 
apparently lifeless infant, then took him out to a nearby boulder protruding from the earth. 
Kapihe placed Kauikeaouli in a depression in the stone’s top, fanned him, sprinkled him with 
water, and chanted a “chant of the living.” Before long the baby began to stir and was soon 
completely revived. The kahuna named him Keaweaweʻula, “the Red Trail,” for the path by 
which a god descends from heaven. Keōpūolani gave Kaikioʻewa custody of the child, and the 
chief took Kauikeaouli to ʻOʻoma in the North Kona district where he was cared for until his 
fifth year.1 
                                                 
1 Statement of Significance, “Kamehameha III’s Birthplace,” National Register of Historic Places Inventory – 
Nomination Form, 20 January 1978. See also Samuel Mānaiakalani Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī: Ka Moʻolelo 
Hawaiʻi no Kauikeaouli Keiki Hoʻoilina a Kamehameha a me ke Aupuni āna i Noho Mōʻī Ai (Honolulu: 
Kamehameha Schools Press, 2001), 12-3.  
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The month and day of Kauikeaouli’s birth are uncertain, but most scholars favor March 
17, and that is the date that the king celebrated as his birthday. There is confusion over the year, 
however. The year given at his funeral services was 1813; the memorial plaque affixed to the 
Kauikeaouli Stone lists the birth year as 1814.2 Even Hawaiian historian S. M. Kamakau 
vacillated, claiming first it was 1814, then that it was 1813.3 Malo believed that 1813 was the 
correct year, but he placed the birth in December, not March.4  
Keōpūolani bore Kamehameha I two other surviving children: the eldest, a son named 
Liholiho who ruled as Kamehameha II, was born at Hilo in 1797; and the youngest, a daughter 
named Nāhiʻenaʻena was born at Keauhou, North Kona in 1815.5 An ʻahaʻōlelo (chiefly council) 
affirmed Kauikeaouli as the ruling chief Kamehameha III following the death of Liholiho in 
London in 1824. Kaʻahumanu served as regent for the young king until her death in 1832.  
Born into the old traditions of the ancient kapu, Kauikeaouli entered adulthood heady 
with the knowledge that he no longer acted in the shadow of his regent and determined to rule on 
his own. Addressing the crowd that had gathered in 1832 to learn who the chiefly council had 
selected as the king’s new kuhina nui (chief advisor, frequently translated as premier), 
Kauikeaouli emphatically retook control of his royal prerogatives over the laws and land 
distributions that Kaʻahumanu had assumed while regent and initially refused to acknowledge 
                                                 
2 “Funeral of His Late Majesty, Kamehameha III,” Polynesian, 13 January 1855. 
3 In an article published on 14 March 1868 in Ke Au Okoa, Kamakau gives the year as 1814, and in an article he 
published on 30 September 1869 in Ke Au Okoa, he gives the year as 1813. Biographer P. Christiaan Klieger also 
vacillated. See Klieger, Mokuʻula: Maui’s Sacred Island (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1998), 23 where he 
gives the year as 1814, and Klieger, Kamehameha III: He Moʻolelo no ka Mōʻī Lokomaikaʻi (San Francisco: Green 
Arrow Press, 2015), 35 where he gives the year as 1813. See also W. D. Alexander, A Brief History of the Hawaiian 
People (New York: American Book Company, 1891), 320 where Alexander cited the birthdate as August 11, 1813. 
Differences in the month and day appear to stem from interpretations of the Hawaiian calendar. Differences in 
opinion about the year are not explained. 
4 Davida Malo, “Na Makahiki o Kauikeaouli,” Ka Nonanona, 23 July 1844. 
5 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 7. 
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the chiefly council’s choice of Kīnaʻu as Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu II.6 A year later, twenty-year-
old Kauikeaouli brashly declared “I shall rule with justice over all the land, make and promulgate 
all laws: neither the chiefs nor the foreigners have any voice in making laws for this country. I 
alone am the one.”7 Refusing counsel from the new kuhina nui or the chiefly council, 
Kauikeaouli rescinded the 1826 liquor laws and vacillated between enjoying his riotous 
amusements and performing his royal duties.8 The Hawaiian polity would tolerate having a 
ruling chief enjoy his pleasures, but members of the chiefly council were shocked by the king’s 
unilateral rescission of the laws. When Kauikeaouli continued to insist that he held sole control 
over the laws and the land, the chiefs considered carrying the young king off to Maui—willingly 
or unwillingly—and keeping him there, unable to exercise power on his own cognizance.9 Their 
plan failed, however, and matters continued along the same unsteady course for several more 
months.10 
Maturity tempered his brash and disruptive behavior, however, and Kauikeaouli soon 
developed into a king who engaged in discussions with the kuhina nui, chiefs and ministers, and 
who preserved the sovereignty of his kingdom through the selective adaptation of western 
institutions.11 In 1838, Kauikeaouli sat among his chiefs while together they studied western 
                                                 
6 “He Mau Olelo Hoakaka no ko Mana Lohe Ana,” Series 402-3-42, FO&EX, HSA. 
7 Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I, 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation (Reprint: 
Honolulu: Univ. Press of Hawaii, 1938), 1:135, citing a letter from Henry A. Pierce to J. Hunnewell dated April 8, 
1833. 
8 Levi Chamberlain, Journal, 06 August 1832, 9-19 March 1833, Journal Collection, HMHA; John Papa ʻĪʻī, “He 
Mooolelo,” Ke Kumu Hawaii, 22 May 1839. 
9 Chamberlain, Journal, 17, 23 June 1833, HMHA. 
10 Marshall Sahlins characterized the king’s behavior as “personal disorderliness” akin to the behavior exhibited 
following the death of a ruling chief when the laws were suspended for a period of time. Kauikeaouli’s removal of 
the laws was a manifestation of that state, Sahlins explained, and his series of rebellions were calculated to result in 
a return to a lawful state through the restoration of his royal powers. See Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and 
Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan 
Press, 1981), 65-6. 
11 Chief Justice A. F. Judd, Evening Bulletin, 03 February 1896. Judd was one of G. P. Judd’s nine children. 
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political economy and collaborated on the writing of a constitution that changed the form of their 
government. William Richards watched while the king led the chiefs in discussion. He exhibited 
reasoning skills, Richards reported, “worthy of a King. . . . [who] appeared to understand 
perfectly the subject on which he was conversing and to have a mind of his own.”12 When 
Kauikeaouli presented new statutes in his opening speech at the 1846 legislative session, he drew 
the legislators into the same sort of collaborative process that he had used with the chiefs, 
encouraging them to “hoolohe paha oukou i ka olelo a kanaka, a e hana hou, a e hoano e, a e 
hoopau e like me ka mea e pomaikai ai na kanaka malalo o’u. . . .listen to the public voice, and 
alter, modify or repeal, as the interests of my faithful subjects shall require.”13 
Everyone who knew Kauikeaouli commented on his basic goodness. S. M. Kamakau, for 
example, extolled the king’s humble nature and love for his people.14 Robert C. Wyllie reported 
in 1844 that he had heard nothing unfavorable about Kauikeaouli, and that “none profess to 
doubt the soundness of his intentions.”15 Kauikeaouli’s leadership skills and modernizing 
reforms continued to earn so much respect that when filibusters from California threatened to 
invade the kingdom in 1854 and join with foreign residents to depose Kauikeaouli, British 
Consul General William Miller assured the king that he had nothing to fear from the foreign 
residents: “there is no person safer in Your Kingdom than Your Majesty, under any 
                                                 
12 Mary Atherton Richards, ed., The Hawaiian Chiefs’ Children’s School 1839-1850: A Record Compiled from the 
Diary and Letters of Amos Starr Cooke and Juliette Montague Cooke, rev. ed. (Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Co. 
1970), 74. 
13 King’s Speech, 31 July 1846, Series 221, vol. 2, Journal of the Legislative Council, 1845-1847, Legislature, HSA. 
Official texts. See also Polynesian, 01 August 1846, for the English text, HSA. 
14 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 14. 
15 Robert C. Wyllie, “68. King and Court,” in “Notes on the Shipping, Trade, Agriculture, Climate, Diseases, 
Religious Institutions, Civil and Social Condition, Mercantile and Financial Policy of the Sandwich or Hawaiian 
Islands, Viewed in Relation to Other Groups of Islands, and to the Natural and Acquired Advantages of the 
Sandwich or Hawaiian Islands,” Friend, 01 November 1844. Wyllie’s Notes were serialized over several issues 




circumstances whatever. You require neither soldiers nor guns for your personal protection and 
above all there is not a foreigner who would touch a hair of your head.”16 
Kauikeaouli died unexpectedly in December 1854 after a brief illness. Spectators lined 
the streets of Honolulu to view the king’s funeral procession as it passed by on January 10, 1855. 
A royal feather cloak that had belonged to Kamehameha I covered the coffin. A dense throng of 
Hawaiians eight and ten deep followed behind the cortege, and a long, low wail arose from the 
thousands who crowded at the sepulcher when he was interred. In a sense, his people’s great love 
for Kauikeaouli and his successful defense of the kingdom’s sovereignty were the fulfillment of 
the prayers chanted at his birth. Speaking to the crowd of Hawaiians in their own language, 
Kamehameha IV paid tribute to his predecessor’s legacy: “The age of Kamehameha III was that 
of progress and of liberty–of schools and of civilization. He gave us a Constitution and fixed 
laws; he secured the people in the title to their lands, and removed the last chain of oppression. 




                                                 
16 British Consul General Miller’s notes of his remarks to the King, 18, 21 September 1854, Series 410, Box 3, vol. 
16, Letters No. 116, Consular Correspondence, HSA. 





INTRODUCTION: A NATION IMPERILED 
 
Flush from his June 20 victory over Queen Pōmare at Tahiti, French Commander Cyrille P. T 
LaPlace sailed his man-of-war l’Artemise into Honolulu harbor on July 9, 1839 and proclaimed 
that he had come to put an end “soit par la force, soit par la persuasion” (by force or by 
persuasion) to the “ill-treatment” of French citizens at the Sandwich Islands. Like Queen 
Pōmare, LaPlace announced, the King of the Sandwich Islands must be compelled to sign a 
Manifesto agreeing to permit the free exercise of Roman Catholicism in his kingdom. In 
addition, the king must pay $20,000 to LaPlace as surety that he would meet that obligation. If 
Kamehameha III refused, LaPlace warned, then “la guerre serait commencée sur-le-champ” (war 
will begin immediately).1 Demonstrating his resolve, LaPlace’s gunboat blockaded Honolulu 
harbor, and he sent warning letters ashore to the British and American consuls to shelter their 
citizens from his ship’s cannon-fire.2 
The king’s representatives signed and handed over the money.3 
A few days later, LaPlace presented the king with a non-negotiable document drawn up 
as a treaty of amity and commerce. LaPlace reportedly told the king to sign the treaty by 
“breakfast time” the following day, or France would send even more ships and take control of 
                                                 
1 M. LaPlace, Campagne de Circumnavigation de la frigate l’Artemise, pendant les années 1837, 1838, 1839 et 
1840 sous le commandement de M. LaPlace (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1853), 440, 529, 531, 533. My own 
translations. The islands were named “Sandwich Islands” by British Captain James Cook when he happened on 
them in 1778. Unless the text requires it, I will refer to the islands as “Hawaiʻi.” Kamehameha III was better known 
by his personal name, Kauikeaouli. 
2 J. J. Jarves, “Art. VI Account of the Visit of the French Frigate l’Artemise,” Hawaiian Spectator 2, no. 3 (July 
1839):352-5. Hawaiian Spectator was an English language magazine published quarterly.in Honolulu in 1838-1839.  
3 Jarves, “l’Artemise Account,” 355; The receipt for the $20,000 named Kekūanāʻoa, Haʻalilio, and Kanaʻina as the 
representatives, see Series 402-5-103, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA; LaPlace, l’Artemise, 531-4.  
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Oʻahu. James Jackson Jarves was an on-the-scene American journalist, and he reported in 
Hawaiian Spectator that “there was bitter sarcasm in the inquiry His Majesty made to Capt. 
LaPlace—when he asked him, ‘If this was the friendship promised? If he called this peace?’”4 
The king signed the treaty of amity and commerce.5 
On June 7 the following year, another French man-of-war arrived at Honolulu harbor, La 
Pylade, under the command of Captain Felix Bernard.6 Missionary wife Juliette Montague 
Cooke learned details of the meeting between the king and the captain from the Rev. William 
Richards, and she repeated them in a letter to her sister. Bernard had inquired deeply into the 
actions of LaPlace a year earlier, she wrote, and Bernard offered his opinion to the king that the 
French government “would do justice” and that the money “would doubtless be returned.” At 
that, reported Mrs. Cooke, “the King told him that the money was a thing of small moment in his 
estimation, but justice was not so. He did not even wish to talk about the money. He wished to 
know whether this nation had a standing among the kingdoms of the earth.”7 
Beyond the obvious displays of kingly ire, both anecdotes evidence Kauikeaouli’s 
intellectual reach above the facts of the events to understand the nature of Hawaiʻi’s vulnerability 
to imperialist assaults on its sovereign rights. Simply by posing his question to Captain Bernard, 
Kauikeaouli turned the discussion away from France’s grievances to a discussion about 
Hawaiʻi’s rights under international law as an independent state.8 Is Hawaiʻi a member of the 
                                                 
4 Jarves, “l’Artemise Account,” 361-2. 
5 LaPlace, l’Artemise, 534-6. 
6 “Marine News,” Polynesian, 27 June 1840. 
7 Juliette Montague Cooke to My dear Sister, begun 12 January 1840 and completed 03 July 1840, “Amos Starr 
Cooke, Missionary Letters 1840-1842 to Juliette Cooke’s Family,” Missionary Letters Collection, HMHA. It was 
common practice to begin a letter, then add to it every few days until a ship was ready to carry the next packet of 
letters home. The king spoke English, but his usual practice was to have a translator in attendance, and Richards 
must have attended the meeting in that capacity.  
8 Kauikeaouli was familiar with Emer de Vattel’s treatise on the rights of sovereign states under international law. 
See Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations 
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international community of nation-states, or is it not, the King asked. Taking a realistic look at 
the prospects of the Hawaiian kingdom remaining independent, Kauikeaouli no doubt 
remembered the policy advice of chiefly advisor Davida Malo, who had already warned about 
the atavistic instincts which propel large nations to overpower and consume small nations.9 
After much deliberation, Kauikeaouli dispatched his own emissaries to Great Britain, 
France and the United States and charged them that their “grand, ultimate object. . . is to secure 
the acknowledgment, by those governments, of the independence of this nation.”10 The task is 
urgent, emphasized the king in his letter of instruction to William Richards and Sir George 
Simpson, for “we feel it to be our final struggle for existence.”11 
The king’s emissaries carried with them a variety of papers and documents which 
depicted Hawaiʻi as a well-organized, literate nation with western-style educational and 
governance structures sufficient to regulate its domestic and foreign affairs.12 The emissaries 
overcame the last British objections when they produced documents concerning the conduct of 
negotiations with the Belgian king for a joint-stock contract creating a colonization enterprise at 
Kauaʻi. That showing of documents evidenced the king’s ability to engage his nation with the 
global affairs of other nation-states and persuaded British Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen to 
withdraw his objections.13 On November 28, 1843, by joint Declaration the monarchs of Great 
                                                 
and Sovereigns, trans., New Edition (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1797). Vattel’s work was first published in 
1758. 
9 Davida Malo to Kaahumanu 2 and Mataio, 18 August 1837, Series 402-4-76, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA. 
This is Malo’s oft-cited letter with its warning that ‘big fish eat little fish.’ 
10 Exhibit: “Instructions from Kamehameha III to Richards and Simpson, 08 April 1842,” Report of the Proceedings 
and Evidence in the Arbitration between the King and Government of the Hawaiian Islands and Messrs. Ladd  & 
Co. (Honolulu: Government Press, 1846), 41. 
11 “Instructions from Kamehameha III to Richards and Simpson,” 08 April 1842, Ladd Arbitration, 42. 
12 “Examination of Mr. Richards,” Ladd Arbitration, 76. 
13 “To His Majesty from T. Haʻalilio, W. Richards, and J. F. B. Marshall, 18 August 1843,” Appendix, Ladd 
Arbitration, 118-20.  
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Britain and France agreed to “consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State.” 14 On July 
6, 1844, President John Tyler assured the “full recognition on the part of the United States of the 
independence of the Hawaiian Government.”15 
Kauikeaouli had sought recognition so that the kingdom would be free from outside 
interference; instead, however, he found that assaults on its sovereignty continued. The formal 
state of independence conferred on the kingdom by the three maritime powers should have 
brought what Robert H. Jackson termed “negative sovereignty,” where nonintervention in 
domestic affairs is the reciprocal duty of the affirming states.16 But agents of the three maritime 
powers continued to use strong-arm threats and forced unequal treaty terms on Kauikeaouli in an 
on-going attempt to privilege the personal and commercial interests of their own citizens. Both 
the French treaty of 1839 and the British Treaty of Lahaina of 1844 imposed extraterritorial 
provisions which limited the king’s authority over the functions of the courts and the levying of 
import restrictions and duties, and the American consul demanded that the same terms apply for 
U. S. citizens.17 Clashes continued between the private interests of foreign traders and merchants 
and the kingdom’s interest in maintaining its exclusive right as an independent state to exercise 
its sovereign powers and authority. 
The 1840s were a period of intense transformation in Hawaiian society.18 Hawaiians of 
all classes were on the cusp of political and cultural change, and opinions differed among them 
as to how to proceed. Intellectuals like Davida Malo saw the same dangers that Kauikeaouli saw, 
                                                 
14 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:203. 
15 J. C. Calhoun to Haʻalilio and William. Richards, 06 July 1844, Polynesian, 29 March 1845.  
16 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), 27. 
17 “Convention between Great Britain and the Sandwich Islands,” Friend, 20 February 1844. 
18 Noelani Arista, “Part 2: Davida Malo, A Hawaiian Life by Noelani Arista” in The Moʻolelo Hawaiʻi of Davida 




but the two of them posed different solutions. Malo advocated that historical knowledge and 
precedent should inform the choices of the present, and the chiefs should seek appropriate 
courses of action among themselves.19 But Kauikeaouli ruled in a kingdom threatened by the 
geopolitical trade rivalries between Great Britain and France, complicated by the emergent 
Pacific ambitions of the United States, and beset with an influx of foreigners seeking to get rich. 
He faced western opponents who already had a foothold in the kingdom, and the king needed 
innovative tactics and strategies to prevail in his struggle to retain his hold on the kingdom’s 
functional sovereign powers. 
 
The solution 
Kauikeaouli put into place an active, affirmative defense of his kingdom’s prerogatives designed 
to prevent conflicts with foreigners from overwhelming his ability to govern. He spoke bluntly 
about the dangers to the kingdom posed by the clashes with foreign interests. In June 1846, for 
example, Kauikeaouli announced to visiting U. S. Commodore Robert F. Stockton that “the 
march of my Government [cannot] be steady and uniform if my jurisdiction is to be resisted, my 
laws to be infringed, and my policy influenced today by one nation, one way and tomorrow, by 
another nation, in another way.”20 It was in his September 1846 letter to U. S. President James K. 
Polk (1845-1849), however, that Kauikeaouli moved beyond identifying the harm that would 
result to the kingdom and made a bold strategic argument about the harm that would result to 
international states should his sovereign rights not be maintained: “I look to your Excellency to 
support me in all the rights of sovereignty. . . . Any interference with my jurisdiction or my laws 
                                                 
19 Arista, “Part 2,” 2:114. 
20 King’s speech to Commodore Robert F. Stockton, 20 June 1846, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Local, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. There is no Hawaiian text in the file for this letter. 
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would endanger my Sovereignty, and the neutral position of my Islands.”21 Put very simply, 
Kauikeaouli’s argument carried an implied threat if support was not forthcoming: ‘if I lose 
sovereignty to one of your rivals, then you lose trade.’ The crux of the king’s argument played 
on the international jealousies rampant in the kingdom and the heavy investment by foreign 
interests in its lucrative trade markets as well as the kingdom’s central location along global 
trade networks.22 
I was struck by the intellectual depth and political acumen that the king revealed in his 
letters and speeches. Kauikeaouli’s conversation with Bernard, for example, evidenced the king’s 
understanding that only international recognition could prevent international assaults on the 
kingdom’s sovereign rights and privileges. And the very courteous manner in which the king 
delivered his threat to Polk of potential commercial losses should his sovereignty not be 
respected showed a mastery of diplomatic skills. 
As I researched further into kingdom records, evidence of a deliberate strategy emerged. 
 
The strategy 
Kingdom documents showed that Kauikeaouli presented variations of the threat he used with 
Polk at several other critical junctures. At the same time, he put in place specific political and 
diplomatic measures to contain international jealousies and to trade on the kingdom’s global 
importance to international commerce. Viewed together, these measures provided tactical 
                                                 
21 Kamehameha III to President of the United States Polk, 30 September 1846, Series 410, Box 3, Book 2, Hawaiian 
Officials Abroad, Consular Correspondence, HSA. There is no Hawaiian text in the file for this letter. 
22 R. C. Wyllie to Archibald Barclay, 14 March 1846, Series 410, Box 3, Book 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
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support for a strategy to maintain freedom from outside interference by restructuring the 
kingdom’s political interactions with the three maritime powers.  
 Hawaiian chiefs lacked the technical skills of western statecraft necessary to make strong 
diplomatic and legal defenses of the kingdom’s rights and privileges, and so the king sought 
tactical advantage by hiring western-educated ministers to interact with diplomatic, naval, and 
consular agents of foreign powers. That decision proved to be a necessary first step to implement 
the strategic initiatives that followed. Reform of judicial processes by western-educated legal 
professionals reduced foreign animosities by implementing familiar western-style law codes and 
court systems. Western-educated ministers negotiated treaties with the maritime powers to 
remove the extraterritorial restrictions. When the danger of another foreign assault resurfaced, 
Kauikeaouli turned his kingdom’s military weakness into a political strength by stepping up the 
threat he had used with Polk to voluntarily surrender sovereignty to a rival power. Throughout, 
the king exploited the international reach of print media as a diplomatic tool to defend his 
statecraft decisions in foreign metropoles. 
None of these statecraft and diplomatic measures could have been implemented, 
however, without literacy, and the acquisition of literacy would not have become a state directive 
without Kauikeaouli’s endorsement. At the beginning of his reign in 1825, Kauikeaouli declared 
that his rule would be characterized by literacy, and he repeated the 1823 command of 
Kamehameha II (Liholiho) that the people learn to read and write.23 The kingʼs decision to 
embed literacy into the fabric of the kingdom was the first of his strategic initiatives and the key 
to his overall success. 
                                                 
23 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 2.  
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 While other historians have focused on the political accommodations Kauikeaouli made 
when faced with foreigners’ demands backed by military threats, I examined the means the king 
took in the 1840s to implement a targeted strategy designed to secure his ability to govern free 
from international interference. What sets my analysis apart from other studies of statecraft 
during Kauikeaouli’s reign is the fact that I used the king’s own politically authoritative speech 
recorded in his own language in kingdom governance records as evidence for statecraft 
decisions. Linking statecraft actions directly to Kauikeaouli’s personal orders removes the 
historiographic marginalization of Kauikeaouli as a leader because the official records easily 
disprove accusations begun during his lifetime that the king’s white ministers ruled in his stead. 
Instead, I have redrawn a picture of Kauikeaouli backed by his chiefs as the leaders who were 
structuring change to provide the legal foundation necessary to negate international interference 
yet still meet the kingdom’s treaty obligations. 
Kauikeaouli’s strategy succeeded. When his reign ended in 1854, the king’s functional 
powers were largely intact and diplomatic relations with Great Britain, France and the United 
States were cordial. Treaties had been revised,24 and western forms of jurisprudence delivered 
justice to foreigners and Hawaiians alike. Fee simple land rights had been created for persons at 
all levels of society. While unintended consequences flowed in later years from some of his 
policies (land distribution and white ministers, for example), critics of his decisions argue from 
hindsight. What is clear is that Kauikeaouli’s decisions kept the kingdom territorially and 
functionally independent during a very perilous time.  
                                                 
24 Conditions were not favorable in 1853 and 1854 for renewed treaty negotiations with France, however, and the 
French consul postponed discussions until the reign of Kamehameha IV. Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:407. 
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My analysis will contribute to an expanded understanding of the threats and opportunities 
faced by Kauikeaouli during his reign, but other contentious issues remain to be explored. 
Implementation of the oath of allegiance and the code of etiquette served important kingdom 
needs but stimulated strong pushback from resident foreigners and consular agents. The post-
1844 development of western-style jurisprudence and the underlying rationale for land 
distribution decisions require further historiographic analysis. 
 
Sources 
My evidence comes from the Hawai’i State Archives (HSA) collection of the kingdom’s 
Hawaiian, English and French language administrative and foreign office records, public and 
private letters, consular correspondence, treaties, manuscript collections, and legislative files. I 
relied on politically authoritative speech in Hawaiian wherever possible. Kingdom governance 
documents (such as privy council meeting minutes) often recorded politically authoritative 
speech by the king and his chiefs in Hawaiian and English language texts written side-by-side. 
Hawaiian Mission Houses Historic Site and Archives (HMHA) and the Hawaiian 
Historical Society (HHS) both contain extensive archival collections of American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) correspondence and reports, journals, 
missionaries’ personal correspondence, and ships’ logs. 
Supporting evidence of the king’s authoritative speech comes from newspapers of the 
period printed both in Hawaiian (Ke Kumu Hawaii, Ka Elele Hawaii, Ka Nonanona) and in 
English (the Friend, the Polynesian, Sandwich Island Gazette, Sandwich Isles News). The editors 
of the Friend and the Polynesian also printed some articles in Hawaiian, usually with the English 
translation immediately following.  
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I discovered, however, that few modern scholars consulted primary sources in the 
Hawaiian language. Instead, scholars relied on translations and on sources written in English, 
French and Spanish to explain the governance changes made while Kauikeaouli ruled. The 
exclusion of sources in their native language precludes an apposite point of view that aids 
historical understanding of the threats and opportunities confronting Hawaiian rulers in the 
1840s. 
The first history of the Hawaiian kingdom was printed in the Hawaiian language in 1838 
under the title Ka Mooolelo Hawaii. Ka Mooolelo is an arrangement by the Rev. Sheldon Dibble 
of accounts collected by Lahainaluna Seminary students from interviews with older Hawaiians. 
The accounts present an amalgam of native and foreign cultural and historical narratives along 
with Dibble’s critical commentary about Hawaiʻi’s pre-Christian culture. The magazine 
Hawaiian Spectator published an English translation of Ka Mooolelo Hawaii in 1839, and a 
French translation printed in Paris appeared in 1862. While Dibble’s role as editor introduced a 
missionary bias to the text, historians continue to refer to Ka Mooolelo Hawaii because of the 
place it occupies as the first book on Hawaiʻi’s culture and history. A facsimile reprint of the 
original Hawaiian text was published in 2005 under the title Ka Mooolelo Hawaii: The History 
of Hawaiʻi. 
 Davida Malo is believed to have been the principal essayist for Ka Moolelo Hawaii, and 
he continued to compile notes begun in 1835 that amplified those cultural narratives into an  
ethnography of the same name. Malo’s work was not published until 1903 when it appeared in 
English translation as Hawaiian Antiquities (Moolelo Hawaii). A retranslation edited by Charles 
Langlas and Jeffrey Lyon entitled The Moʻolelo Hawaiʻi of Davida Malo is forthcoming from 
University of Hawaiʻi press. Sheldon Dibble’s History of the Sandwich Islands published in 1843 
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is also an important period piece, but it lacks historiographic authority because he injected 
Christian morality into his analyses.25 James J. Jarves’ factual History of the Hawaiian Islands 
first printed in 1843 provides important background details that Jarves drew from many 
contemporary sources, including kingdom archival documents. 
Samuel Mānaiakalani Kamakau’s extensive chronological history of the kingdom that 
Kamehameha I founded appeared in serialized form in two Hawaiian-language newspapers (Ka 
Nupepa Kuokoa and Ke Au Okoa) from 1866 to 1869. A heavily edited and redacted English 
language version of the series entitled Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii was published in book form in 
1961, and the original articles were reprinted under the titles Ke Kumu Aupuni: Ka moʻolelo 
Hawaiʻi no Kamehameha: Ka Naʻi Aupuni a me kāna aupuni i hoʻokumu ai and Ke Aupuni 
Mōʻī: Ka Moʻolelo Hawaiʻi no Kauikeaouli keiki hoʻoilina a Kamehameha a me ke aupuni āna i 
noho mōʻī ai in 1996 and 2001. Kamakau had been at Lahainaluna when the accounts for Ka 
Mooolelo Hawaii were collected, and he interjected his own analysis of events into his serialized 
accounts along with a cultural perspective. While the original articles provide greater historic 
detail in a more ordered sequence of events than does Ruling Chiefs, most scholars prefer to 
consult the edited English-language version. Bitter controversies erupted during Kamakau’s 
lifetime over the accuracy of the legends, biographies and genealogies that he published.26 One 
critic, John Papa ʻĪʻī (who was a contemporary of Kamakau and also a memorialist), claimed that 
Kamakau’s accounts contained numerous errors, and so ʻĪʻī published his own accounts under 
the title “Na Hunahuna o ka Moolelo Hawaii” which ran in Ka Nupepa Kuokoa from 1866 to 
                                                 
25 Thos G. Thrum reported in 1917 that it was “common knowledge, though in a vague way” that Dibble used his 
students’ compositions to compile the history. See “Brief Sketch of the Life and Labors of S. M. Kamakau, 
Hawaiian Historian,” HHS Annual Report for 1917 (1918):40. 
26 Thrum, “Brief Sketch of Kamakau,” 48. 
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1870. ʻĪʻī’s articles were translated by Mary Kawena Pukui and published in 1959 under the title 
Fragments of Hawaiian History. 
Ralph S. Kuykendall’s three-volume history entitled The Hawaiian Kingdom was the first 
comprehensive historiographic treatment of events in the Hawaiian kingdom.27 Kuykendall 
relied on source materials from archives and museums in several countries as he narrativized 
westernizing influences on the kingdom from the perspective of missionaries, traders and 
governments. Harold Whitman Bradley authored another widely-cited text in 1968 entitled The 
American Frontier in Hawaii: The Pioneers 1789-1843. Relying principally on western journals 
and correspondence, Bradley analyzed how the tide of western influences presented by 
missionaries, traders, and ships’ captains transformed Hawaiian culture. The scope and depth of 
Kuykendall’s research contribute to his series’ continuing historiographic importance, and 
Bradley’s use of an economic lens adds a less-analyzed dimension. Both histories are reflective 
of the colonial school that manifests a belief in the inevitable progression of western civilization. 
 Indigenous scholars originated a post-colonial historiographic line in the 1990s which 
used native Hawaiian voices as a methodological technique to portray Hawaiians as victims of 
the political changes wrought by colonialist influences. David A. Chappell points out in “Active 
Agents versus Passive Victims: Decolonized Historiography or Problematic Paradigm?” that 
agency and victimhood are not necessarily mutually exclusive; an agent can also be a victim and 
vice versa. Such narrative choices demonstrate the complexity of both human history and its 
competing interpretations, especially during struggles over power and voice.28 Lilikalā 
Kameʻeleihiwa, for example, leverages Hawaiian language and cultural attitudes in her 1992 
                                                 
27 Volume 1 was published in 1938, Volume 2 in 1953, and Volume 3 in 1967. 
28 David A. Chappell, “Active Agents versus Passive Victims: Decolonized Historiography or Problematic 
Paradigm?” The Contemporary Pacific 7, no. 2 (Fall 1995):309-13. 
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publication of Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai? to describe the damaging 
effects of the colonizers’ culture and urge a return to a Hawaiian worldview. Other authors have 
used native voices to picture Hawaiians as passively vulnerable to cultural harm (Haunani K. 
Trask, 1999, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi ), helpless as 
western influences slowly eroded native confidence (Jonathan K. K. Osorio, 2002, 
Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887), resistant to assimilation and 
colonization (Noenoe K. Silva, 2004, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American 
Colonialism), or powerless to resist the transformative force of western law (Sally Engle Merry, 
2000, Colonizing Hawaiʻi: The Cultural Power of Law). 
Kamanamaikalani Beamer also analyzes events through the use of native voices, but he 
reaches a contrary conclusion in his 2014 publication No Mākou Ka Mana: Liberating the 
Nation. Beamer studied chiefly actions using a methodology he described as “ōiwi optics.” 
When he interprets archival materials through the lens of native agency, Beamer concludes that 
Hawaiians acted deliberately to modernize and hybridize governmental systems by selectively 
incorporating western institutions and practices. Recent scholarship by Keanu Sai and Lorenz 
Rudolph Gonschor supports Beamer’s conclusion. On the other hand, Noelani Arista seeks out 
native voices in her 2019 publication The Kingdom and the Republic: Sovereign Hawaiʻi and the 
Early United States to conclude that transformations in Hawaiian governance and law were not 
efforts to modernize, but rather were continuations of customary Hawaiian practices. 
 
Historiography 
I quickly noticed that a familiar trope dominated historiography that appeared to contradict my 
research proposition: Hawaiʻi’s indigenous culture had modernized in the nineteenth century not 
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through the agency of Hawaiians but through the inevitable progress of western civilization 
introduced by white missionaries, traders, and imperialist naval powers.29 
I found that even during Kauikeaouli’s lifetime, contemporary white observers credited 
the ABCFM missionaries for introducing western culture, institutions and governance. Dibble, 
an ABCFM teacher, historian, and translator at Lahainaluna Seminary between the years 1836 
and 1845, praised the steps taken by the missionaries to “enlighten and civilize” the chiefs and 
the people so that they could remedy “the evils of the Government.”30 Jarves, an American 
historian and Honolulu newspaper publisher between the years 1840 to 1848, credited the 
missionaries for bringing about the “gradual and increasing ascendancy of Christianity and 
civilization.” Jarves particularly noted that it was a result of the influence that the Rev. William 
Richards had with the king and his chiefs that brought about “a settled form of government.”31 
Scotsman Robert C. Wyllie, who served as Foreign Minister in Kauikeaouli’s government, 
agreed. After Richards’ death in 1847, Wyllie wrote to Henry Hill, ABCFM Secretary to the 
Board of Foreign Missions, praising Richards’ performance as teacher of the king for having 
given “the first impulse to a systematic improvement of the government in the right road to 
virtue & Beneficence.”32  
                                                 
29 See, for example, Sheldon Dibble, History of the Sandwich Islands (Lahainaluna: Press of the Mission Seminary, 
1843), 432; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom 1:157; Harold Whitman Bradley, The American Frontier in Hawaii: 
The Pioneers 1789-1843 (Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1968), 319.  
30 The ABCFM was headquartered in Boston, MA and Congregationalist in origin. The goal of the ABCFM was to 
spread Christianity worldwide. For the history of its missionary activities at the Sandwich Islands, see Dr. Rufus 
Anderson, A Heathen Nation Evangelized: History of the Sandwich Islands Mission (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1872); Dibble, History of the Sandwich Islands, 432. 
31 James Jackson Jarves, History of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands, Embracing their Antiquities, Mythology, 
Legends, Discovery by Europeans in the Sixteenth Century, Re-Discovery by Cook, with their Civil, Religious and 
Political History, from the Earliest Traditionary Period to the Present Time (Boston: Tappan & Dennet, 1843), vi, 
343-4. Jarves’ third edition published in 1847 omitted much of this discussion about Richards’ influence.  
32 R. C. Wyllie to Henry Hill, 11 December 1847, Wyllie Letters 1847-1854, HMHA. 
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 Kuykendall and Bradley built on those earlier accounts by white contemporaries. 
Kuykendall developed a narrative of progressive inevitability to explain that the minds of the 
ruling chiefs had been prepared for change by the “general enlightenment resulting from the 
teaching of the missionaries and from the contact with foreigners.”33 Conversely, Bradley refuted 
the idea that the chiefs had become enlightened. Were it not for the actions of American 
missionaries such as Richards and Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, postulated Bradley, the chiefs would not 
have been induced to consent to such far-reaching modifications in their traditional political 
institutions. Bradley enlarged on his point by asserting that “the inspiration for [the 1840 
constitution and the 1839 code of laws] came from the missionaries rather than from the chiefs. 
Inertia and self-interest combined to keep the majority of the chiefs content with the political 
institutions which they had inherited from Kamehameha and Kaahumanu. Few missionaries 
shared that complacency.”34 While Kuykendall and Bradley may have disagreed about whether 
the missionaries were instruments or drivers of change, they did agree that it was the principles 
of western enlightenment that had worked to bring about progressive institutional change in 
Kauikeaouli’s government.  
A postcolonial line of historiography emerged in the late twentieth century where 
scholars searched for indigenous authenticity in the telling of Pacific histories. Ranginui Walker, 
a native Māori, provides a compelling view of the Māori struggles to withstand the cultural 
assault perpetuated on them by the westerners’ introduction of Christianity and British 
imperialism.35 Vicente M. Diaz uses the story of the martyrdom of the seventeenth-century 
founder of the Spanish Catholic Church on Guam to peel away layers of cultural meaning and 
                                                 
33 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:157. 
34 Bradley, American Frontier, 319. 
35 Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1990). 
16 
 
reveal that present-day Chamorros use the Church’s version of events to structure their own 
modern-day indigenous cultural identity.36 Greg Dening presented several versions of the 1792 
death of William Gooch on Oʻahu to demonstrate how retelling can reshape events and alter 
present-day understandings about past events.37  
Postcolonial scholars of Hawaiian monarchial history also use indigenous voices to 
explain the sweeping legal and governance changes that occurred during Kauikeaouli’s reign, 
and they develop a picture of Kauikeaouli and his chiefs as hapless victims beset by aggressive 
colonial agents. Merry alleges that the pressures of warfare, maritime violence, and the capitalist 
economy drove the chiefs to invite missionaries and jurists to transform governmental 
institutions.38 Trask and Silva argue that the king and chiefs reluctantly assented to institutional 
change to escape foreign aggression and avoid colonization.39 Kame‘eleihiwa describes an 
erosion of confidence in their own social and political institutions that over time led to loss of 
cultural identity, land, and nationhood.40 Osorio agrees, reasoning that first, the missionaries’ 
western moral code caused Hawaiians to lose confidence in their own social and political 
institutions, and then the king and the chiefs accepted the advice of foreigners to make changes 
they only imperfectly understood.41 Osorio cites as evidence historian Henry E. Chambers’ 1896 
treatise, Constitutional History of Hawaii, in which Chambers assessed the 1840 Constitution as 
                                                 
36 Vicente M. Diaz, Repositioning the Missionary: Rewriting the Histories of Colonia (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaiʻi 
Press, 2010). 
37 Greg Dening, The Death of William Gooch:  A History’s Anthropology (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaiʻi Press, 1995). 
38 Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawaiʻi: The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000), 43, 
45-6. 
39 Haunani Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i (Honolulu: Univ. of 
Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 5-6; Noenoe K. Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism 
(Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2004), 37, 43. 
40 Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai? (Honolulu: Bishop Museum 
Press, 1992). 197. 
41 Jonathan K. K. Osorio, Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (Honolulu: Univ. of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2002), 24-26. 
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“crude and loosely drawn.” Chambers faulted Kauikeaouli for that result because—according to 
Chambers—Kauikeaouli copied political forms which he did not understand.42 
A corollary argument arose that Kauikeaouli did not actively direct public affairs.43 
Merry, for example, does not take notice of the well-documented leadership role that 
Kauikeaouli played and instead casts the chief Hoapili and William Richards as the drivers of the 
1838 movement to adopt a western system of governance and law.44 Even Kauikeaouli’s 
biographer P. Christiaan Klieger identifies Richards as the chief architect of the institutional 
changes despite Richards’ own published account to the contrary.45 Bradley characterized 
Kauikeaouli as “only mildly interested in the details of official business, and “generally 
indifferent” to affairs of state.46 State policy, Bradley alleged, was determined by a small group 
of elder chiefs who ruled as an oligarchy.47 
Although proceeding from different premises—that Hawaiians were either the 
beneficiaries or the victims of a foreign culture—both lines of historiography painted an 
unflattering picture: Kauikeaouli and his chiefs were not very bright, easily led, and the willing 
tools of American advisors. 
Another historiographic line is emerging, however, that focuses on the positive use of 
native agency to position the kingdom as an independent state. Keanu Sai and Lorenz Rudolph 
                                                 
42 Osorio, Dismembering Lahui, 29; Henry E. Chambers, Constitutional History of Hawaii, Johns Hopkins 
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Fourteenth Series, I (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
January 1896), 13, 15. 
43 Bradley, American Frontier, 321-2. 
44 Merry, Colonizing Hawaiʻi, 41, 43-4. 
45 P. Christiann Klieger, Kamehameha III :He Moʻolelo no ka Mōʻī Lokomaikaʻi, King of the Hawaiian Islands, 
1824-1854 (San Francisco: Green Arrow Press, 2015), 267-8; Bernice Judd, ed., “William Richards’ Report to the 
Sandwich Islands Mission on His First Year in Government Service, 1838-1839,” HHS Fifty-First Annual Report 
(1942), 65-9; see also “Abstract of the Laws,” Missionary Herald 36, no. 3 (1840):101-4 for its reprint of “Art. V. 
Sandwich Islands Laws,” Hawaiian Spectator, 2, no. 3 (July 1839):347. 
46 Bradley, American Frontier, 276. 
47 Bradley, American Frontier, 276-7. 
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Gonschor examine how Hawaiian leaders used the western legal concept of a nation-state to 
achieve recognition from the maritime powers as a co-equal, sovereign state.48 Beamer also finds 
that Kauikeaouli and the chiefs acted deliberately when they made institutional changes. In proof 
of his conclusion, Beamer notices that Osorio had failed to investigate the level of chiefly 
involvement in making legal changes or the chiefs’ motivation in doing so. Merry glosses over 
the purposeful involvement of the chiefs in the transformation, Beamer points out, and she 
characterizes some of the legal changes as Anglo-American when in fact the chiefs structured 
them on Hawaiian customs. In fact, Kauikeaouli’s rule was a “successful and prolonged exercise 
of aliʻi agency and ʻŌiwi leadership,’” Beamer concludes, because the king had selectively 
blended western ideas and tools with traditional elements to create a strong hybrid governance 
apparatus.49 Chappell finds a similar mix of outside influences and traditional heritage from his 
studies of Africa and Kanaky New Caledonia,50 and Beamer’s argument that the rulers had 
exercised agency to reach a middle ground is reminiscent of an argument propounded by K. R. 
Howe and Nicholas Thomas that Pacific islanders acted to creatively adapt foreign knowledge 
and skills for their own use.51 More recently, Arista has sounded a note of warning about the 
dangers of investing Hawaiian historical actors with agency. Instead, Arista recommends that 
                                                 
48 Keanu Sai, “The American Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom: Beginning the Transition from Occupied to 
Restored State” (doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, 2008), 71-4; Lorenz Rudolf Gonschor, “ ‘A 
Power in the World’: The Hawaiian Kingdom as a Model of Hybrid Statecraft in Oceania and a Progenitor of Pan-
Oceanianism” (doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, 2016), 144-5. 
49 Kamanamaikalani Beamer, No Mākou Ka Mana: Liberating the Nation (Honolulu: Kamehameha Publishing, 
2014), 122-3, 153. 
50 Chappell, “Active Agents,” 305; David A. Chappell, The Kanak Awakening (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaiʻi Press, 
2013). 
51 K. R. Howe, Where the Waves Fall: A New South Sea Islands History from First Settlement to Colonial Rule. 
(Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaiʻi Press, 1984), 348; Nicholas Thomas, Islanders: The Pacific in the Age of Empire (New 
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2010), 3. 
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scholars seek out cultural differences to explain the political and legal transformations in Hawaiʻi 
after 1820.52 
In 1836, Kauikeaouli still ruled with the same broad power and authority that his father 
Kamehameha I had exercised. Although the ruler had complete control over the government as 
its supreme head, he was expected to rely on advice and support from a chiefly council 
composed of high-ranking chiefs and knowledgeable persons selected by him.53 However, while 
the kingdom met Benedict Anderson’s modern sovereignty test because its administration was 
fully operative over all of its claimed territory, its traditional governance lacked a documented 
definition of the kingdom’s polity structure, geographic scope, or the functional power and 
authority of the ruler and other officials.54 
Kauikeaouli’s chiefly predecessors had made sweeping governance changes when 
circumstances dictated. The fifteenth-century Oʻahu chief Māʻilikūkahi enacted a broad reform 
of land tenure by dividing the people into classes, turning land holdings into organizational units, 
and replacing kinship rights to land with rights tied to chiefly relationships.55 Kūaliʻi, who ruled 
Oʻahu during the early eighteenth century, appointed a governor to administer a portion of the 
territory he held on Kauaʻi. Kahekili II of Maui continued that practice in the late eighteenth 
century when he sent his son to Maui to act as governor while he remained on Oʻahu to 
consolidate his control over his newly-conquered territory.56 Kauikeaouli’s father, Kamehameha 
                                                 
52 Noelani Arista, The Kingdom and the Republic: Sovereign Hawaiʻi and the Early United States (Philadelphia: 
Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 2019), 7-8.  
53 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 75.  
54 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso 
Press, rev. ed., 1991), 19. 
55 Patrick V. Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawaii 
(Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 2010), 102; Patrick Vinton Kirch, A Shark Going Inland is My Chief: The Island 
Civilization of Ancient Hawaii (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 2012), 138-9. 
56 Robert J. Hommon, The Ancient Hawaiian State: Origins of a Political Society (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2013), 259, 269. 
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I, appointed governors after he had united the islands under his sole rule, and his brother, 
Liholiho, established a new political and cultural order when he abrogated the traditional religion 
in 1819 and defeated the rival chiefly forces under Kekuaokalani who sought to reestablish the 
gods’ control over Hawaiian society.57 Thus the record clearly shows a long tradition of 
Hawaiian rulers who were willing to make institutional change as circumstances dictated.  
Merry, however, argues that it was acts of maritime violence that convinced Hawaiians to 
accept change. Indeed, contemporary journals and correspondence written by participants about 
the 1836 and 1837 port visits of the U.S.S. Peacock, H.M.S. Acteon, and the H.M.S. Sulphur  
document acts of violence perpetrated by naval commanders in support of efforts to secure 
property, religious, and residence rights for their resident-citizens which were denied them by 
Hawaiian law.58 Those same records, however, also document that the naval commanders’ 
efforts were unsuccessful despite their threats. U. S. Commodore Edmund P. Kennedy, U.S.S. 
Peacock, for example, failed in his September 1836 effort to convince Kauikeaouli to grant the 
American consul’s demands.59 British captain Lord Edward Russell, H.M.S. Acteon, failed also 
when he arrived the following month, despite his threat to end British diplomatic relations with 
the kingdom, and despite British trade consul Charlton’s threat to have the Acteon’s guns shell 
the town.60 In April 1837, the king refused to permit two Roman Catholic priests to debark from 
the British-registry trading brig Clementine, arguing that “one religion was abundantly sufficient 
                                                 
57 Kekuaokalani’s forces were defeated in December 1819. See Sahlins, Historical Metaphors, 76 at note 19. 
58 The incidents were not reported by Ke Kumu Hawaii because a lack of newsprint prevented publication from 
August 1836 through December 1836. 
59 Levi Chamberlain, Journal, 07 October 1836, Journal Collection, HMHA. 
60 Chamberlain, Journal, 24-31 October, 01-21 November 1836, HMHA. Chamberlain translated documents and 
translated for the king during the meetings between the parties; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:148. The treaty 
that Russell and Kauikeaouli agreed to had granted the rights Russell requested so long as the king consented. 
Nothing, however, required the king to consent.  
21 
 
for 100,000 or 150,000 inhabitants.”61 When British captain Edward Belcher, H.M.S. Sulphur, 
arrived he dispatched a squad of British marines to land the priests, and both Belcher and 
Charlton threatened physical harm to Hawaiian agents if they did not permit the priests to 
remain. As he had with Kennedy and Russell, however, Kauikeaouli prevailed in his refusal to 
permit threats from merchants to override his sovereign right to refuse residency to any 
foreigner—even when the merchants’ threats were backed by the threat of naval attack by a 
maritime power—and the priests departed.62 
Kuykendall characterized these demands as the ‘zealous pursuit’ by agents of foreign 
governments for personal rights that their traders and merchants would enjoy when in fact they 
were examples of what Robert C. Ritchie and David J. Starkey describe as a European state’s 
maritime policy to use force as a political weapon in pursuit of their own merchants’ trade 
advantage.63 According to Janice E. Thomason, a state’s defense of its merchants’ competitive 
trade positions was grounded in “the actual or threatened use of violence,” and it could be 
exercised in both the political and economic arenas, over state as well as non-state actors.64 But 
Jackson’s finding that the central principle of the law of nations is an independent state’s right to 
be free from outside interference validates Kauikeaouli’s arguments.65 In fact, Kauikeaouli’s 
                                                 
61 Théodore-Adolphe Barrot, Unless Haste is Made: A French Skeptic’s Account of the Sandwich Islands in 1836, 
trans. Rev. Daniel Dole (Kailua, Hawaiʻi: Press Pacifica, 1978), 87. This is a translation of Barrot’s Les Iles 
Sandwich originally published in Revue des deux mondes, 01 and 15 August 1839. 
62 Richard Charlton to Kamehameha III, 31 May 1837, Series 402-4-64, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA; 
Chamberlain, Journal, 10-24 July 1837, HMHA; Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 156-7; Ross H. Gast, Contentious Consul: 
A Biography of John Coffin Jones (Los Angeles: Dawson’s Book Shop, 1976), 150. 
63 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:137-8; Robert C. Ritchie, “Government Measures against Piracy and 
Privateering in the Atlantic Area, 1750-1850,” in Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in 
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Century (Exeter: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1990), 254-9. 
64 Ritchie, “Government Measures,” in Pirates and Privateers, 24; Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and 
Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 
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65 Jackson, Quasi-states, 27. 
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affirmative defense of his rights and privileges as reported by witnesses refutes the corollary 
argument that Kauikeaouli did not actively direct public affairs because he was pictured as 
engaged, able to articulate his political decisions in persuasive terms, and determined not to 
surrender his sovereign powers.  
By that time, Swiss diplomat Emer de Vattel’s (1714-1769) articulation that states and 
nations have exclusive jurisdiction, territorial integrity, and the right to be free from intervention 
in their domestic affairs had become the foundation for the doctrine of state sovereignty that 
developed into the central maxim of international law. Vattel further postulated that a nation 
which is incapable of preserving itself may procure the protection of a more powerful state.66  
Application of Vattel’s doctrine assumed greater importance to western nations as they spread 
further into the Americas and the Pacific, and imperialists used Vattel’s construction to deny 
sovereignty to indigenous peoples.67 Copies of Missionary Herald issues in 1831 and 1832 
covering the U. S. Supreme Court case in Worcester v. Georgia, 31. U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) 
which upheld Cherokee sovereignty were broadly circulated throughout ABCFM’s mission 
stations, including the Hawaiian stations.68 Jarves confirmed that the king’s meetings with 
Kennedy in 1836 had enlarged Kauikeaouli’s idea of a national polity and bettered his 
understanding of the law of nations.69 Belcher met privately with Kauikeaouli in 1837 before 
they finalized documents ending the confrontation that had begun with the arrival of French 
                                                 
66 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 21; Vattel, Law 
of Nations, Section 192, Book 1, Chapter 16. 
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priests aboard the Clementine, and he read to the king from several passages in Vattel’s treatise 
as they discussed what actions the king should take.70 Missionary Hiram Bingham also 
confirmed the king’s familiarity with Vattel’s sovereignty postulations.71 Developing an 
understanding of international governance models emerged as Kauikeaouli’s preeminent political 
goal. Even before H.M.S. Acteon sailed in 1836, Kauikeaouli had tasked Richards to locate a 
tutor for the chiefs to educate them in alternative governance models.72 The 1840 development of 
a constitutional framework to demonstrate the kingdom’s political capability to engage with 
other nation-states was the first strategic step taken by the king to secure recognition as an equal 
sovereign state.73 
I discovered support for both the progressive school of historiography and Beamer’s 
agency conclusion when I researched the circumstances and events surrounding the adoption of 
the 1839 declaration of rights and tax code (He kumu kanawai, a me ke kanawai hooponopono 
waiwai, no ko Hawaii nei pae aina, enacted on June 7, 1839) and the 1840 Constitution (Ke 
Kumu Kanawai a me na Kanawai o ko Hawaii pae aina enacted on October 8, 1840).74 Richards, 
a former missionary, guided the chiefly deliberations which produced the two documents. 
Richards based his lectures on Baptist minister Francis Wayland’s text Elements of Political 
Economy in which Christian principles align with a capitalist system to produce the greatest good 
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for a nation’s citizens.75 That would suggest that the inspiration for the two documents came 
from the missionaries, as Kuykendall and Bradley had concluded. But Richards’ own notes and 
correspondence described the keen participation of the chiefs and the strong leadership of 
Kauikeaouli as the drivers of change, supporting Beamer’s conclusion that the agency of 
Hawaiians drove the changes.76  
Cultural bias (see Kuykendall and Bradley) or righteous defense (see Kameʻeleihiwa, 
Trask, Silva, Osorio and Merry) can influence choices of emphasis and interpretations in doing 
history. But Kauikeaouli’s adoption of western governance models and his subsequent 
deployment of a strategy designed to safeguard his sovereign rights and privileges validates the 




Documentary evidence demonstrates that Kauikeaouli and the chiefs acted deliberately to 
implement a well-crafted strategy supported by targeted statecraft decisions to ensure that the 
kingdom retained the power and authority over key functional areas necessary to ensure the free 
exercise of sovereign control. While it is demonstrable that the missionaries and other foreigners 
introduced a framework for change from their own western orientation, the actions that 
Kauikeaouli and his chiefs took were predicated on their reinterpretation and adaptation of their 
                                                 
75 B. Judd, ed., “Richards Report,” 66. 
76 B. Judd, ed., “Richards Report,” 67. Richards frequently stated in his correspondence that he knew his position 
was subordinate to the king’s wishes. See William Richards to Commander Charles Wilkes, 15 March 1841, Box 1-
8, M-126, William Richards Collection, Manuscript Collection, HSA; William Richards to Kamehameha III, 03 
April [no year], Series 402-1-13.161, Chronological File, FO&EX, archival English translation, HSA; Kamehameha 




political and cultural history as informed by current events. Recognizing that the ruling chiefs’ 
decisions flowed from their own circumstances and history places Hawaiians in the central role 
as the principal agents of change and relegates the influence of missionaries and other foreigners 
to supporting roles. I have focused on those statecraft decisions and their implementing measures 
at length in succeeding chapters to identify the king’s rationale for each tactical measure, 
problems encountered during implementation, and an evaluation of each measure’s effectiveness.  
Chapter 2 “Literacy as Strategy” traces the arrival of literacy in Polynesia and the 
realization by Hawaiians that they could appropriate the Europeans’ writing system for their own 
use. Within a decade of British Captain James Cook’s arrival in 1778, Hawaiians had learned to 
make use of Europeans’ literate communications to boost their own trading advantage and to 
forge diplomatic relationships with western rulers. When the first contingent of missionaries sent 
by the ABCFM arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1820, they found a willing populace already acquainted 
with literacy and impatient to learn to read and write. Hawaiians of all classes and ranks 
enthusiastically greeted the 1822 development of the Hawaiian language alphabet, and they 
flocked to schools in large numbers. In 1825, Kauikeaouli emphatically pronounced that his rule 
would be characterized by literacy, and he ordered his people to learn to read and write. His 
people complied, and the use of literate communications became embedded in the social fabric. 
With literacy as the central tool and printing technologies as the delivery platform, an educated 
middle class arose that joined with the Hawaiian rulers to study alternative political knowledge 
based on theories of political economy. While evangelical missionaries used literacy to bring 
about religious change, Kauikeaouli and his chiefs used literacy to bring about political change 
as they shaped governance into a written framework consonant with international law. 
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Chapter 3 “Changing Hawaiʻi in the 1840s” sets the context for a reading of subsequent 
chapters. During the 1840s, Kauikeaouli and the chiefs hybridized the kingdom’s traditional 
governance structure with western-style modifications. The traditional kuhina nui role was 
codified, and new governmental roles were created to staff western-style executive ministries. 
Composition of the cabinet and privy council was fixed by statute, and procedural habits were 
established. Members of the cabinet and privy council in attendance at the first privy council 
meeting on July 29, 1845 are profiled. Measures were put into place to absorb the growing 
number of foreigners into the body politic, including a naturalization policy. Social changes 
brought commercial expansion, new agricultural opportunities, and labor shortages, while plans 
moved forward to convert the traditional land tenure system to fee simple ownership. As the king 
and his chiefs considered what actions to take to retain control over the kingdom’s territorial 
sovereignty, they also worked to restrain the westernizing influences that threatened to 
overwhelm the Hawaiian kingdom. 
Complex statecraft issues involving questions of an independent state’s right to exercise 
its functional powers arose after Hawaiʻi received international recognition of its territorial 
sovereignty. Western agents of maritime powers challenged Hawaiian legal processes, and 
extraterritorial treaty terms limited the kingdom’s juridical and economic powers. Hawaiian 
chiefs serving in the House of Nobles and Privy Council in 1844 lacked familiarity with the 
technical skills of western statecraft necessary to make strong diplomatic and legal defenses of 
the kingdom’s rights and privileges. Facing the prospect of further erosion of his functional 
control in key areas, Kauikeaouli implemented the first of several statecraft tactics by hiring 
western-educated whites to serve as ministers and engage with agents of western powers. 
Chapter 4 “Western-educated Ministers Defend Sovereign Rights” uses the king’s own words to 
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explore his rationale for the policy, his response to the hostility it generated, and his own 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the governance actions that flowed from the policy. Although 
Kauikeaouli’s decision engendered harsh criticism from white residents, foreign consular agents, 
and ordinary Hawaiians, the employment of western-educated white ministers laid the 
foundation for control of international political interactions. 
  Chapter 5 “Legal and Land Reforms” examines the king’s tactical use of reforms to 
safeguard his executive power and authority to legislate and adjudicate legal processes and land 
ownership rights. In the years following 1840, angry residents and gunboat commanders 
challenged Kauikeaouli’s ability to exercise both executive powers. When a British naval captain 
favored his own citizens by reversing Hawaiian court decisions and alienating the king’s 
ownership of a physical piece of his soil, Kauikeaouli set two processes into motion to ward off 
similar attacks in the future. The reforms were multi-year processes approved by the privy 
council, enabled by legislative enactments and carried out simultaneously under the western-
trained legal skills of the king’s white ministers. Both tactical reforms were carried to fruition, 
for by the end of the decade, Kauikeaouli held firm functional control over the judicial system, 
and the customary land tenure practices that had vested the ruling chief with allodial ownership 
of the kingdom’s lands had been changed to individual fee simple ownership.77 
In 1844, British and American diplomatic agents used their consular correspondence as 
platforms to attack the integrity and competency of Kauikeaouli and his white ministers. In order 
to counter the threat posed by their partisan criticisms, Kauikeaouli made the tactical decision to 
purchase the Polynesian newspaper and its press and implement a two-fold print media policy. 
                                                 
77 The term allodial is used in scholarly works about traditional Hawaiian land tenure practices to denote lands held 
in absolute ownership, in this case, by the ruling chief. 
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First, the press would publicize news and information about his views and policies through its 
circulation to Europe and America that would demonstrate his capability to conduct relations 
with other sovereign nations. Second, the press would publish correspondence from both sides of 
diplomatic disputes, and that full disclosure would reveal that the king rightfully exercised his 
sovereign powers. Chapter 6 “Tactical Use of Print Media” examines the international reach of 
the press, its editorial engagement in support of the king’s policies, and its aggressive defensive 
role as a platform on which to publish foreign agents’ correspondence about diplomatic disputes. 
When an opposition press run by foreign agents began publication, strong editorial pushback in 
the Polynesian exposed their political attacks. By 1849, Kauikeaouli’s two-pronged print media 
strategy had developed firm international support for his governance and defeated the efforts of 
foreign agents to destabilize his administration.  
International recognition in 1843-44 of Hawaiʻi’s sovereign independence spurred a 
significant increase in shipping traffic and trade. As the king’s ministers struggled to develop 
revenue streams to fund the need for improved government functions, new British and French 
unequal treaties imposed in 1846 perpetuated the restrictive import trade and duty levels from 
earlier treaties that depressed government revenues. When French gunboats assaulted Honolulu 
in 1849 seeking further political accommodations, Kauikeaouli and the council put together a 
multi-stage diplomatic plan crafted to lift the onerous treaty restrictions and secure guarantees of 
military protection from hostile attacks. Should achievement of the plan falter, however, then 
Kauikeaouli would signal his intent to transfer sovereignty to another state in the expectation that 
simply making the threat would either gain concessions from a negotiating partner or galvanize 
military support from the offending nation’s commercial rivals. Chapter 7 “Treaties and Secret 
Orders” examines the progress of the plan and how repeated use of the alienation threat required 
29 
 
an increasing level of subterfuge in order to maintain its credibility. Use of the threat had a 
dramatic impact on the success of the multi-stage diplomatic plan, which by 1854 had delivered 
almost universal relief from the onerous treaty terms as well as tripartite guarantees of Hawaiian 
independence. 
Kauikeaouli defeated the efforts of maritime agents to control his sovereign functional 
powers by implementing ‘new ways of doing things’ that comported with the modern social and 
political climate in which he ruled. The king possessed excellent strategic skills and a sure sense 
of how to secure tactical advantage. It was a difficult political balancing act, as Kauikeaouli 
leveraged international commercial rivalries and traded on the kingdom’s perceived value as an 
important site in global trade networks. Chapter 8 “Conclusion: Sovereignty Secured” examines 
the success of the tactics analyzed in earlier chapters as part of a cohesive strategy with three 
distinct phases. Success of his overall strategy ensured that Kauikeaouli’s heir would exercise 
full functional power and authority over an independent kingdom whose future security was 






















LITERACY AS STRATEGY  
   
Like other Polynesians, Hawaiians quickly realized that the writing system they saw Europeans 
use could be appropriated for their own economic and political use and could even replace their 
oral communications.1 When word traveled along informal networks from Tahiti to other island 
groups that Protestant Evangelicals had created an alphabet for the Tahitian language, 
Polynesians everywhere clamored for teachers and books so that they could learn to read and 
write in their own languages.2 Tahitians also brought that news to Hawaiians, so that when 
ABCFM missionaries arrived at Hawaiʻi in 1820, they found a willing populace already 
acquainted with literacy and impatient to learn to read and write.3  
But while the missionaries promoted literacy as a means to conversion, the Hawaiians 
focused on its secular uses. Under Kauikeaouli’s 1825 directive, the use of literacy soon became 
embedded in the social fabric. Schools run by the missionaries used print technology to deliver 
instructional materials to a wide swath of the Hawaiian populace. A new class of educated 
Hawaiians used their writing skills to communicate with each other, and print media created 
public forums where they could exchange information and opinions. In 1839, the king and his 
chiefs studied alternative theories of political economy reinterpreted in their own language, and 
they used their new knowledge to transform the kingdom from a state centralized under the 
authority of a ruling chief into a constitutional monarchy, where the lower house of 
representatives was elected by popular vote. 
                                                 
1 G. S. Parsonson, “The Literate Revolution in Polynesia,” The Journal of Pacific History 2 (1967):44-5. 
2 Parsonson, “Literate Revolution,” 49. 
3 Missionary Herald 19, no. 6(1823):183. 
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 While the ABCFM missionaries continued to concentrate on the use of literacy to bring 
about religious change, Kauikeaouli and his chiefs used literacy to bring about the political 
change that would position the kingdom as a member of the international community of 
independent, sovereign states. 
 
Traditional messaging methods 
Prior to 1778, Hawaiians used symbols to convey information through body tattoo motifs, kapa 
cloth designs, and petroglyphs (prehistoric pictures and symbols cut into a rock surface) that 
closely modeled the same communications media used in other areas of western Polynesia.4 
Tattoos, kapa designs and petroglyphs used geometric designs and repetitive motifs that some 
scholars have linked to the Lapita culture found elsewhere in Oceania because of their design 
similarities to the markings stamped onto Lapita pottery.5 While it is presumed that tattoo and 
kapa motifs were designed to convey information, little is known about the meaning of the 
geometric symbols or the significance of the motif design placements.6 Unlike tattoos or kapa, 
petroglyphs were clearly intended to communicate about actions or activities; however, the 
ability to decipher them has been lost.7 
                                                 
4 P. F. Kwiatkowski, The Hawaiian Tattoo (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 2012), 1. 
5 Kwiatkowski, Tattoo, 1, 21-4; Tricia Allen, Tattoo Traditions of Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 2005), 2-
3; Patrick Vinton Kirch demonstrated that the Lapita culture did not travel beyond Samoa and Tonga despite the fact 
that Polynesians dispersed from there to settle East Polynesia. See Kirch, The Lapita Peoples: Ancestors of the 
Oceanic World (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 68-74. Note that scientific findings place the dispersal of 
Polynesian peoples into New Zealand, Rapa Nui and Hawaiʻi c. 1100-1200 C.E. See Janet M. Wilmshurst, Terry L. 
Hunt, Carl P. Lipo and Atholl J. Anderson, “High-Precision Radiocarbon Dating Shows Recent and Rapid Initial 
Human Colonization of East Polynesia,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 108, no. 5 (February 2011):1815. 
6 Allen, Tattoo Traditions, 3; Kwiatkowski, Tattoo, 21; J. Halley Cox with Edward Stasak, Hawaiian Petroglyphs, 
Bernice P. Bishop Museum Special Publication 60 (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1980), 67.  
7 Likeke R. McBride, Petroglyphs of Hawaiʻi, rev. ed. (Hilo: Petroglyph Press, 1997), 23-28; Cox with Stasak, 
Petroglyphs, 65, 67.  
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 Petroglyphs, of course, were not portable. They remained in the same location in which 
they were created and presented a static message to passers-by. Another means had to be used 
when one chief wanted to deliver a timely message to another chief. Every island had an 
extensive network of trails serving as information highways along which kūkini (long-distance 
runners) or ʻelele (couriers) could swiftly carry messages between chiefs living in different 
locations.8 When Kamehameha I (r. 1795-1819) wanted to communicate with others at a 
distance, he would tell his message to a runner, or have a select class of rowers deliver the 
messenger by canoe. The courier carried Kamehameha I’s three-inch silver coin as a sign that he 
came from the king. Other people sent simple messages to each other by word-of-mouth but 
transacted important business by going in person.9 
 Literacy brought the ability for individuals of all classes to communicate complex 
messages to each other at a distance. Over time, literacy was used to supplant traditional 
messaging means, memorialize important events, and serve as the medium for instruction.  
 
Evangelism and literacy 
David Paul Nord in his studies about literacy and religion emphasizes that some American 
missionaries believed cultural change must precede conversion, and that only literacy would 
deliver the knowledge necessary to effect cultural change.10 Barry O’Connell also studied the 
relationship between literacy and religion and finds that the most important conversion tool used 
                                                 
8 Dawn Henry, “Hawaiʻi’s First Runners,” (Hilo: Univ. of Hawaiʻi, May 16, 2009).  
9 “18th. Manner of communicating at a distance before the introduction of writing,” William Richards to Capt. 
Charles Wilkes, 15 March 1841, William Richards Collection, M-126, HSA. Richards responded to questions posed 
by Wilkes with answers that had been approved by Kauikeaouli. 
10 David Paul Nord, “Benevolent Books: Printing, Religion, and Reform,” in History of the Book in America, Vol. 2, 
“An Extensive Republic Print, Culture, and Society in the New Nation, 1790-1840,” eds. Robert A Gross and Mary 
Kelley, (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina, 2010), 2:239, 246. 
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by American missionaries was giving non-Christians the ability to read religious texts.11 Other 
studies by Colin W. Newbury,12 Martin Daly,13 C. J. Parr,14 and Emily Conroy-Krutz15 of 
different missionary groups in the South Pacific, India and among Native American Indians 
demonstrate that all groups emphasized literacy as a first step to conversion. 
Whereas Martin Luther translated the Bible into vernacular languages in the sixteenth 
century so that people who were already Christians could read the texts for themselves, here the 
missionaries’ emphasis was on teaching non-Christians how to read religious texts to motivate 
them to be converted. Consequently, between 1797 and 1850, the first goal of missionaries at 
different Pacific island groups was the creation of Polynesian orthographies. As Nord’s research 
indicates would happen, literacy in their own languages became the central tool and new printing 
technologies became the delivery platform for the spreading of religious texts intended to 
energize non-Christian Polynesians to accept the customs, beliefs and behaviors of western 
civilizations.16 
But G. S. Parsonson found from his studies that it was the secular uses for literacy that 
intrigued Polynesians. And the most powerful inducement for conversion that the missionaries 
could offer was not the promise of salvation, Parsonson concludes, it was the promise of literacy. 
Islanders already had grasped from contact with eighteenth-century European maritime explorers 
                                                 
11 Barry O’Connell, “Literacy and Colonization: The Case of the Cherokees” in A History of the Book in America: 
Vol. 2: “An Extensive Republic Print, Culture, and Society in the New Nation, 1790-1840,” eds. Robert A. Gross 
and Mary Kelley (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina, 2010), 2:499. See also, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Christian 
Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2015), 87. 
12 C. W. Newbury, Tahiti Nui: Change and Survival in French Polynesia, 1767-1945 (Honolulu: Univ. Press of 
Hawaiʻi, 1980), 35, 70, where he studied the London Missionary Society (LMS). 
13 Martin Daly, “‘Another Agency in This Great Work’: The Beginnings of Missionary Printing in Tonga,” Journal 
of Pacific History 43, no. 3 (2008):368, where he studied the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (WMMS). 
14 C. J. Parr, “A Missionary Library: Printed Attempts to Instruct the Maori, 1815-1845,” Journal of the Polynesian 
Society 70, no. 4 (1961):429, where he studied the Church Missionary Society (CMS). 
15 Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism, 85, 87, where she studied the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions (ABCFM). 
16 Nord, “Benevolent Books,” 2:246. 
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that “the key to the new world with all its evident power was the written word.”17 That sudden 
insight sparked a literate revolution, claims Parsonson, and he cites a British missionary’s 
observation that “the art of writing amazed the natives as much as any novelty introduced by 
foreigners. What seems to have impressed them most was its usefulness.”18 Even though they 
could not read or write themselves, Parsonson demonstrates that Polynesians easily discerned 
from looking at different types of documents that writing and other marks could be used for 
several purposes: 
Vancouver describes the chief of Matavai in Tahiti who brought to him a portrait 
of Captain Cook ‘drawn by Mr Webber’: ‘This picture was deposited in the house 
of the chief at Matavai and is become the public register. On the back of it is 
written that the Pandora had quitted this island on the 8th of May 1791.’ In 1792 
Vancouver also inspected a letter in Spanish with an English translation presented 
by Kamehameha, and various certificates from four different commanders who 
had visited Hawaii. In 1800 Turnbull noted a chief of Hawaii pouring over some 
charts of the Pacific and imploring the captain to point out his island: ‘This was 
done and he expressed great pleasure that even their little island had not been 
omitted.’19 
 
In fact, Parsonson’s example of the letter presented to Vancouver in 1792 shows how within a 
decade of Cook’s arrival Hawaiian chiefs had learned to use European literacy to boost their own 
trading advantage. Hawaiians learned that “to whom it may concern” letters of recommendation 
written by a European had persuasive value when shown to another European, and that the more 
recommendations a chief could present, the better his chances of securing trade.20 The Spaniard 
                                                 
17 Parsonson, “Literate Revolution,” 43-4. 
18 Parsonson, “Literate Revolution,” 44. Parsonson cited Aaron Buzacott, a Congregational missionary who served 
on Rarotonga from 1828-1857. Buzacott’s reports were published in 1866.  
19 Parsonson, “Literate Revolution,” 44-5. The chief who studied the map was from Kauaʻi and described by 
Turnbull as a close relative of the ruling chief, Kaumualiʻi. 
20 John Bartlett, “A Narrative of Events in the Life of John Bartlett of Boston, Massachusetts, in the Years 1790-
1793, during Voyages to Canton, the Northwest Coast of North America, and Elsewhere,” Marine Research Society, 
Publication Number 7 (Portland, Maine: Southworth Press, 1925), 313. In this case, unbeknownst to the Hawaiians 
presenting it, the letter written by Captain Ingraham of the brig Hope out of Boston warned other captains that the 
natives at Kauaʻi were treacherous and deceitful. 
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Manuel Quimper reported that during his 1791 visit he was presented with many such letters 
from different Hawaiian chiefs.21 Quimper wrote several letters for chiefs, and Vancouver also 
wrote letters of recommendation for Kamehameha and other chiefs during his 1793 visit.22 
British supercargo John Turnbull recorded that Kamehameha had made it a rule to obtain the 
letters,23 which explains why Vancouver had been presented with several such certificates. 
Settlement of the Nootka controversy between Britain and Spain was a principal objective of 
Vancouver’s voyage; so it was an unexpected bit of irony that one of the testimonials presented 
to Vancouver was written in March 1791 by Quimper in Spanish with an English translation 
while aboard the British-registry ship Princess Royal which Spanish forces had seized from 
British trader James Colnett at Nootka.24 
Tahiti’s Pōmare I (regent: 1791-1803) also used European literacy to boost his trading 
advantage when he caused correspondence to be written to the governor of New South Wales in 
1800 about their proposed pork trade.25 The letter must have been written in English because no 
standardized written form of Tahitian existed until 1805.26 What is noteworthy about their 
correspondence is that a Polynesian king who was not literate himself engaged in written 
                                                 
21 William Harvey Minson, “The Hawaiian Journal of Manuel Quimper,” (master’s thesis, Univ. of Hawaiʻi (1952), 
39-43. The earliest date recorded by Quimper was a letter written in 1789. 
22 Minson, “Quimper Journal,” 39-43; George Vancouver to Commanders of Vessels, 09 March 1793, Series 402-2-
2, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA. 
23 John Turnbull, A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1800-1804 (Philadelphia: B. and T. Kite, 1810), 161. He 
visited from December 17, 1802 to January 21, 1803. Turnbull recorded that by 1802 Kamehameha had 
discontinued this rule because he thought his character had been well established among Europeans. 
24 George Vancouver, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, and Round the World, Vol. 1 (London: 
Robinson and Edwards, 1798), 1:157. Parsonson was mistaken: it was Keʻeaumoku (whose name Vancouver spelled 
Kahowmotoo) who presented the certificates to Vancouver, not Kamehameha. Vancouver and Kamehameha did not 
meet during his 1792 visit. Quimper seems to have prepared this letter in both languages, perhaps assisted by the 
Englishman John Kendrick who sailed with him. See Minson, “Quimper Journal.” 
25 Parsonson, “Literate Revolution,” 45. Pōmare I installed his son, Pōmare II, as ruler in 1791, but Pōmare I 
continued to rule as regent until his death in 1803. Pōmare became a dynastic name adopted by male and female 
rulers alike. All carrying the dynastic name were men, except Pōmare IV. 
26 William E. H. Tagupa, “The Tahitian Language: A Historical and Vernacular Controversy,” Pacific Studies 2, no. 
2 (1979):144.  
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negotiations in another language with a foreign power for commercial gain several years before 
Tahitians acquired literacy. 
Pōmare’s scribe likely was a missionary who was fluent in both Tahitian and English.27 
The use of bilingual foreigners to assist with commercial and political correspondence was 
replicated at other Polynesian kingdoms, including Hawaiʻi. Kamehameha’s trusted English 
advisors Isaac Davis and John Young, for example, were present during Captain George 
Vancouver’s visits in 1793-94 and acted as Kamehameha’s agents aboard ship to regulate trade 
and keep order. Vancouver inferred that Young acted as Kamehameha’s interpreter as he “was 
usually at Kamehameha’s side” in the king’s visits to Vancouver’s ships.28 Although not 
recorded, it is probable that Young read and interpreted the 1794 letter that Vancouver wrote 
documenting Britain’s protection of Kamehameha I’s kingdom. 
LMS missionaries completed their work on the first printed Polynesian orthography Te 
Abei no Taheiti (The Tahitian Alphabet) by 1807 but it was not published in London until 1810. 
In order to shorten production times, LMS missionaries at Moorea installed the first printing 
press to operate in the South Pacific in 1817, and missionary staff soon printed nearly three 
thousand copies of the forty-seven-page Te Abei no Taheiti.29 Many more Tahitian imprints 
followed, principally religious or grammatical in nature.30 
Word of this new writing technology quickly spread through informal networks beyond 
Tahiti to other island groups carried by the voyaging Polynesians that David A. Chappell 
                                                 
27 Parsonson, “Literate Revolution,” 45, fn. 48. 
28 Bern Anderson, The Life and Voyages of Captain George Vancouver, Surveyor of the Sea (Seattle: Univ. of 
Washington Press, 1960), 138. 
29 Tagupa, “The Tahitian Language,” 144. 
30 John Davies, The History of the Tahitian Mission, 1799-1830, With Supplementary Papers from the 
Correspondence of the Missionaries, ed. C. W. Newbury (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1961), xvii-xix. 
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describes in Double Ghosts.31 Vanessa Smith also studied the impact of literacy on cultural 
change in the Pacific, and like Parsonson she discovered that Polynesians viewed literacy as an 
end in itself rather than simply as the medium for conversion.32 Parsonson reported that people in 
Tonga, New Zealand, Rarotonga and Samoa sought out any foreigner who might be able to teach 
them to understand letters.33 Thus by the time missionaries established stations at different island 
groups in Polynesia, they generally found a willing populace already acquainted with written 
documents used by foreigners and impatient to supplement their oral communications by 
learning to read and write themselves. Three decades before the missionaries arrived at Hawaiʻi, 
for example, Hawaiians understood the economic value of “to whom it may concern” 
certification letters. Hawaiians also delivered letters between ships’ officers, while Vancouver’s 
1794 cession letter demonstrated to them the political worth that literacy could deliver.34  
Church Missionary Society (CMS) members created the first one-hundred page Māori 
grammar in 1820.35 Thereafter LMS and CMS mission schools in New Zealand taught literacy to 
Māori students along with religion, but C. J. Parr and J. M. R. Owens both published research 
showing that it was the Māori themselves who exhibited a universal enthusiasm for literacy and 
spread out to teach each other.36 Teacher and Māori political activist Ranginui Walker added 
insight to their acceptance of the new writing system: “The Maori readily learned the symbolling 
system of the written word since it was easily seen as an extension of their own symbolling 
                                                 
31 David A. Chappell, Double Ghosts (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997). 
32 Vanessa Smith, Literary Culture and the Pacific: Nineteenth-Century Textual Encounters (New York: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2005), 71. 
33 Parsonson, “Literate Revolution,” 49. Parsonson did not elaborate on the advent of literacy at Samoa and Tonga.  
34 Minson, “Quimper Journal,” 49-51. 
35 Entitled A Grammar and Vocabulary of the Language of New Zealand by Thomas Kendall and Samuel Lee. See 
Parr, “Missionary Library,” 429-30.  
36 C. J. Parr, “Maori Literacy,” The Journal of the Polynesian Society 72, no. 3 (1963):211; J. M. R. Owens, 
“Christianity and the Maoris to 1840,” New Zealand Journal of History 2, no. 1 (April 1968):35; see also Parsonson, 
“Literate Revolution,” 48-9, citing Samuel Marsden’s letters and journal, and O. Hadfield’s letters to the CMS.  
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system in the art of carving.”37 The Māori quickly achieved a high literacy rate and became 
prolific letter writers. 
In 1817, London physician and author Dr. John Martin edited and published an oral 
account about Tonga told to him by William Mariner, who had lived among Tongans as a 
captive from 1806 to 1810.38 Martin’s editing of Mariner’s account included the first printed 
vocabulary of Tongan words and enriched linguistic understandings about the language, but not 
until Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (WMMS) missionaries arrived in 1826 did actual 
orthographic work begin.39 Martin Daly reports that a considerable number of Tongans had 
learned to write by 1829 even with just manuscripts as guides. A printing press arrived in 1831, 
and the mission printed and distributed 17,000 schoolbooks and religious texts in the Tongan 
language in just nine months.40 
Like Pōmare I had done at Tahiti, Kamehameha had Europeans prepare written 
communications that he used for his own political and commercial purposes. Vancouver’s 1793 
letter of recommendation and his 1794 cession letter are well documented.41 Letters written for 
Kamehameha to George III on March 3 and August 6, 1810 elicited a response from the Earl of 
Liverpool on April 30, 1812 that drew Kamehameha further into a political relationship with the 
British monarch’s government.42 The identity of Kamehameha’s scribe for his letters to George 
                                                 
37 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 85. 
38 John Martin, An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands, in the South Pacific Ocean With an Original 
Grammar and Vocabulary of Their Language, Compiled and Arranged from the Extensive Communications of Mr. 
William Mariner, Several Years Resident in Those Islands, 2 vols., 4th ed. (Reprint: 1817; Tonga: Vavaʻu Press). 
39 Albert J. Schütz, “Reading between the Lines: A Closer Look at the First Hawaiian Primer (1822), Palapala 1 
(2017):7. Schütz adds understanding to the linguistic process of creating Polynesian orthographies with his analysis 
of the different overlays added by early attempts to create working grammars and vocabularies. In this instance, 
Schütz cited Martin’s work on Mariner’s account. 
40 Daly, “Missionary Printing in Tonga,” 368-9. 
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III is not recorded, but it could have been the Spaniard Don Francisco de Paula Marin whom 
biographer Ross H. Gast placed at Hawaiʻi about 1793. Gast recorded that Marin knew several 
languages and served Kamehameha as interpreter, business counselor, and keeper of accounts.43 
The extensive accounting records that Marin made of the goods Kamehameha received in 1812 
from Captain Winship in exchange for sandalwood sold in China documented both the 
complexity of the king’s commercial relationships and his interest in acquiring western goods.44 
Further proof of Kamehameha’s commercial entanglements is evident from the receipt dated 
March 6, 1811 that John Young signed on Kamehameha’s behalf for the settlement of a claim for 
damages caused by William H. Davis and others.45 It is immaterial that Kamehameha’s 
communications were written by others in a language other than his own; like Pōmare I’s 
correspondence with the governor of New South Wales about the pork trade, what matters is that 
Kamehameha recognized how to use written communications to his kingdom’s political 
advantage and his own commercial gain.  
After he succeeded his father as Kamehameha II in 1819, Liholiho established his own 
political relationship with a foreign leader by sending correspondence to the Emperor of Russia 
written in French by his secretary Jean Baptiste Rives.46 In a letter dated March 25, 1820—just 
days before the arrival of the first company of ABCFM missionaries—Liholiho informed the 
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emperor of his ascension and called the emperor to account for the attempts in 1816 by the 
Russian-American colonizing company to establish settlements at Oʻahu and Kauaʻi.47 A native 
of Bordeaux, Rives was fluent in French, English and Hawaiian and had entered Liholiho’s 
service on his arrival at Hawaiʻi in 1810.48 The letter demonstrates that, like his father before 
him, Liholiho relied on a scribe to write in a language he did not know so that he could work 
directly with another world ruler who could influence events within his kingdom.49 Several 
chiefs learned to speak and read English prior to the arrival of the missionaries in 1820, and 
many other Hawaiians also learned to read and write in English while traveling abroad.50 
 
ABCFM missionaries begin work 
Chappell investigates the experiences of Pacific Islanders who shipped out on western vessels 
from all points in Oceania, and Kuykendall noted that as early as 1787, Hawaiians had 
importuned ships’ crews to take them along on voyages to foreign lands.51 Eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century accounts are replete with examples of traveling Hawaiians. British fur trader 
John Meares, for example, was one of the first to record in 1787 the intense desire of numerous 
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Hawaiians “who pressed forward with inexpressible eagerness to accompany us to Britannee.”52 
William Mariner recalled that he met several Sandwich Islanders at Tonga during his captivity 
there from 1806 to 1810.53 John Papa ʻĪʻī recorded that in 1811, more than a hundred Hawaiians 
volunteered to work at American fur trapping settlements in the Pacific Northwest.54 Members of 
the ABCFM knew of ten Hawaiians just from the island of Hawaiʻi who were living in the 
northeastern United States in 1816,55 and in 1820 two Hawaiians ended up destitute in London.56 
Thus it was not unusual that four Hawaiian sailors who would become important to the ABCFM 
missionary effort—William Kanui, Henry ʻŌpūkahaʻia, Thomas Hopu, and John Honolii—left 
their homes on American ships and found themselves together in the New England environs in 
1816. Instead, what distinguishes the experiences of these Hawaiian sailors is what happened to 
them at Cornwall, Connecticut after they arrived and were joined by George Humehume, the son 
of Kaumualiʻi, the king of Kauaʻi.57 
John Demos recounted that when potential sponsors learned that the Hawaiians were 
eager for an education, a philanthropist in 1816 suggested to the society’s corresponding 
secretary Jeremiah Evarts that the youths needed to be brought together at a permanent residence 
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with a permanent instructor.58 And so the ABCFM formed a ‘school for heathens’ called the 
Foreign Mission School at Cornwall in 1817 to discover if four of the youths—Henry 
ʻŌpūkahaʻia (Obookiah), Thomas Hopu (Hopoo), John Honolii (Honoree), and William Kanui 
(Tennooe)—could be educated, converted, civilized, and sent back home to convert and civilize 
others.59 (The society intended to educate Humehume and return him to his father.)60 
ʻŌpūkahaʻia worked diligently to create the first Hawaiian language grammar and dictionary, but 
he died of typhus in Cornwall in 1818.61 Members of the small band of missionaries who formed 
the ABCFM’s first contingent to Hawaiʻi in 1819 cited the memory of ʻŌpūkahaʻia as having 
stimulated them to volunteer to serve.62  
Aboard the brig Thaddeus under the command of Captain Blanchard when it sailed from 
Boston harbor on October 23, 1819 bound for the Sandwich Islands was the first ABCFM 
missionary company of seven men, their wives, five children, and the remaining four Hawaiian 
youths.63 After a rigorous six-month sea voyage, the Thaddeus made landfall at the Kohala coast 
of the island of Hawaiʻi on March 30, 1820. To their surprise, the mission contingent found that 
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the Hawaiian rulers had overthrown their traditional religion, and they soon received permission 
from Liholiho to remain on a trial basis.64 
The ABCFM’s 1819 instructions from its Prudential Committee to the first company of 
Sandwich Islands missionaries exhorted them “to make [the Hawaiians] acquainted with letters; 
to give them the Bible with skill to read it.”65 The Rev. Hiram Bingham described this 
commitment in his published narrative: “we commenced printing the language in order to give 
them letters, libraries, and the living oracles in their own tongue, that the nation might read and 
understand the wonderful works of God.”66 When Bingham and the rest of the mission 
contingent concentrated first on teaching English language literacy, however, they quickly ran 
into the same difficulties experienced by LMS teachers in Tahiti and the Leeward Islands: 
Polynesians could not pronounce many English letters and sounds, and they were unfamiliar with 
English spelling rules.67 Commenting in 1823 on the Hawaiians’ struggles to enunciate some of 
the English letters, Kaʻahumanu told the Rev. Charles S. Stewart that they made “crooked work 
of it.”68 Liholiho encouraged the missionaries to learn his language so that they could print 
prayers and books in Hawaiian for his people to read, and so the Sandwich Islands Mission 
(SIM) members soon turned to devising a Hawaiian orthography.69 Several months later, 
however, the missionaries had made little progress in constructing a Hawaiian alphabet. 
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Unexpected help arrived on January 1, 1822 when two copies of Thomas Kendall and 
Samuel Lee’s A Grammar and Vocabulary of the Language of New Zealand arrived in the 
mission’s New Year’s Day packet of letters. After studying the Māori grammar and vocabulary 
lessons, the missionaries developed a feeling of confidence with the linguistic decisions they 
already had made and were ready to move ahead and print a native speller using seven 
consonants and five vowels. At last, in 1822, Hawaiians discovered the power of literacy in their 
own language.70  Bingham invited the chiefs and foreigners to watch on January 7 as 
Keʻeaumoku (a brother of Kaʻahumanu and a son of the chief who had presented Kamehameha’s 
certificates to Vancouver in 1792) pulled the lever on the mission press to roll off the first page 
of the speller.71 
Missionary printer Elisha Loomis distributed more than 2,000 spelling books in the first 
year alone.72 The development of the Hawaiian alphabet, the ability to disseminate copies 
through printing, and the ready acceptance of the alphabet by the chiefs was a triumph for the 
mission because they believed that now they could teach Hawaiians to absorb literacy and piety 
simultaneously.73 SIM members anticipated that literate and converted groups of Hawaiians 
could fan out around the islands and expand proselytizing efforts beyond the reach of the 
mission’s few stations, just as the missionaries had hoped the graduates of the Foreign Mission 
School would do; and just as Newbury reported that Tahitian volunteers did when delivering the 
LMS missionizing message to outlying islands.74 Mission teachers quickly pressed the spelling 
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book into service at their two schools: one at Oʻahu with forty students, and another at Kauaʻi 
with twenty-five students.75 
 
Learning to read and write 
“Ua loa’a ia’u!” (I got it!) exclaimed the chiefess Kaʻahumanu as she enunciated the sounds 
shown on the Hawaiian speller held up by the Rev. Bingham. Kaʻahumanu was the eldest child 
in her generation of the wealthy and influential Kekaulike family linked to Maui chiefs, a widow 
of Kamehameha I, and the most powerful of Liholihoʼs chiefs.76 Bingham later remembered that 
Kaʻahumanu was so pleased with this new reading skill that she immediately laid down her 
playing cards and ordered forty spellers for her household attendants.77 Keʻeaumoku—who had 
pulled the lever to print the first page of the speller—became the first chief to establish a school 
for the instruction of his people.78 
Liholiho also demanded copies of the speller for his household. The king told printer 
Loomis that he wanted to have his people taught as soon as possible, and he, his wives Kīnaʻu 
and Kekauʻōnohi, and the chief Kalanimoku began private tutoring from the Revs. Bingham and 
Asa Thurston.79 Poised at the brink of acquiring literacy in his own language, Liholiho also told 
printer Loomis that “he fully believes the islands will become like Otaheete.”80  
Liholiho would have learned about Tahitians’ literacy from travelers between the two 
island groups. Even before 1820 Hawaiians had traveled to Tahiti and returned home able to read 
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and write and to speak English.81 And Tahitians traveled to Hawaiʻi—at least three literate 
Tahitians lived in Hawaiian chiefs’ households at the time Liholiho spoke with Loomis.82 One of 
the three named Toketa lived in the household of the Hawaiʻi island district chief Kaluaikonahale 
“John Adams” Kuakini and assisted Kuakini in drafting a letter to Bingham using the new 
Hawaiian alphabet.83 
 In mid-1822, LMS missionary William Ellis and a group of nine Tahitians led by a chief 
named Auna arrived unexpectedly from Tahiti aboard H.M.S. Mermaid for a stay of several 
months. While there, Ellis used his knowledge of the Tahitian language to help sort out the 
pronunciation and structure of the Hawaiian language, which quickly resolved many of the 
linguistic difficulties that had stymied the Americans and enabled them to acquire greater 
speaking fluency.84 Meanwhile Auna set about teaching Liholiho’s principal wife Kamāmalu to 
read and write, and he also ran a school for children within the royal compound.85 When Ellis 
returned to the Society Islands in August 1822, he carried with him letters written in Hawaiian 
by Liholiho’s own hand to two chiefs at Huahine island, Mahina and Teuheiti, relating the news 
that Hawaiians had become literate.86 This informal exchange of knowledge and information 
between Tahitians and Hawaiians continued when three of the Tahitians who had accompanied 
Ellis in 1822 returned with him in February 1823. Kaʻauʻamoku, Kauʻākāne and Kauʻāwahine 
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lived with Liholiho’s high-ranking chiefly mother Keōpūolani at Maui where they preached to 
the members of her household, and all three of them instructed Keōpūolani in letters and music.87 
A second company of ABCFM missionaries dispatched from Boston arrived in April 
1823. In May the mission reported that twenty-four chiefs, “principal personages in the kingdom, 
besides the king,” were engaged in learning.88 Stewart depicted the chiefs as engrossed in their 
books and slates while they studied palapala and pule, writing and praying, and he reported that 
Kamāmalu had formed the habit of writing almost daily notes to different missionaries and 
chiefs.89 Kamāmalu also engaged in an important governance task with her new-found skills. 
When Stewart visited the royal residence in April 1823, he documented that Kamāmalu was 
busily keeping written records of the people filing by her to pay their taxes.90 
Liholiho could read and write well in his own language by November 1823 when he 
sailed to England.91 Liholiho appointed Kauikeaouli as his heir should he not return, and he left 
Kaʻahumanu and Kalanimoku in charge of the kingdom and as regents for the care of his 
younger brother. Kaʻahumanu had served as Liholiho’s kuhina nui, or chief minister, since his 
investiture in 1819, and she also continued that role during his absence. At his departure, “ua 
kauoha mai oia e ao kona kanaka i ka palapala a hiki i kona wa e hoi mai ai” (he ordered his 
people to learn to read and write until the time of his return),92 and the account in Ka Mooolelo 
Hawaii records that the chiefs and their people complied.93 Stewart recorded in his journal in 
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February 1824 that the chiefs had begun asking to have all the people in their immediate 
households receive books and instruction. Initially the chiefs were reluctant to permit their rural 
people to be instructed, however, preferring instead to first evaluate the efficacy of this new tool. 
But before ending a visit to Maui during the summer of 1824, Kaʻahumanu issued an olelo waha 
(spoken command) through heralds that “when schools are established, all the people must learn 
the palapala.”94 
John Kalei Laimana concluded that Kaʻahumanu’s spoken command evidenced chiefly 
commitment to ruling chief Liholiho’s order despite his absence,95 and Ka Mooolelo Hawaii 
recorded a further upsurge of interest by the chiefs in teaching literacy to people in the rural 
areas: “ia manawa, hoouna na ’lii i na kumu pi-a-pa e hele ma na kuaaina e ao i na makaainana i 
ka palapala” (at that time, the chiefs dispatched teachers of the alphabet to go to the rural people 
to teach reading and writing).96 By late 1824, the districts of Honolulu and Waikīkī each had 
forty schools, called native, or common schools, taught by Hawaiians who had spent time in 
America or who exhibited a higher level of learning.97 Seeking to supplement the SIMʼs scarce 
resources, Kalanimoku and Kaʻahumanu turned to the chiefs at the Society Islands to solicit the 
same kind of assistance that Auna and other visiting Tahitians had provided: by letter in March 
1825, they asked the Tahitian chiefs to send books and two or three good teachers, “like Auna.”98 
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Kauikeaouli’s royal command 
Liholiho’s death in London on July 14, 1824, the return of his remains to Honolulu on May 6, 
1825 aboard H. M. S. Blonde, and the ascension of his younger brother Kauikeaouli as Hawaiʻi’s 
ruler is a well-known story.99 Less well-known is what twelve-year-old Kauikeaouli said to the 
crowd that had gathered at a place called Honuakaha in Honolulu on June 6, 1825 to hear 
members of the council of chiefs present him as their new King Kamehameha III.100 Two things 
are striking about this speech: first, the young king enunciated a bold vision for his kingdom, and 
second, no westerner recorded it. An historical record of Kauikeaouli’s speech exists because S. 
M. Kamakau wrote an account of it that was printed on February 22, 1868 in the Hawaiian 
language newspaper Ka Nupepa Kuokoa as part of his biography of the king.101 
Henry M. Whitney (the son of missionaries Samuel and Mercy Whitney) began 
publication of Ka Nupepa Kuokoa in 1861 during the reign of Kauikeaouli’s successor, 
Kamehameha IV. Esther Mookini characterized Ka Nupepa Kuokoa as “the first independent 
Hawaiian newspaper” even though it enjoyed mission support, and curator Joan Hori described 
the newspaper’s stance as European-American with a long history of printing information about 
Hawaiian tradition and culture.102 Born on Oʻahu in 1815 and educated at Lahainaluna Seminary, 
Kamakau enjoyed a lengthy career in education and government service. Although controversy 
                                                 
99 Queen Kamāmalu accompanied Liholiho to England and preceded him in death. Both of their remains were 
transported back aboard the H. M. S. Blonde. See J. Susan Corley, “The British Press Greets the King of the 
Sandwich Islands: Kamehameha II in London, 1824,” HJH 42 (2008); Captain the Right No. Lord Byron, 
Commander, ed. Mrs. Mary Graham, Voyage of H. M. S. Blonde to the Sandwich Islands, in the years 1824-1825 
Part I and II (London: John Murray, Albemarle-Street, 1826), 1:69, 2:110, 2:151-2.  
100 Honuakaha is near present-day Kawaiahaʻo Cemetery and not far from Honoluluʼs port. See Mary Kawena Pukui 
and Samuel H. Elbert, Place Names of Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaiʻi Press, 1966), 5.  
101 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 2. 
102 Esther Mookini, The Hawaiian Newspapers (Honolulu: Topgallant, 1974), vi; Joan Hori, “Background and 
Historical Significance of Ka Nupepa Kuokoa,” Special Collections, Hamilton Library (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaiʻi 
at Mānoa, 2001), 1.  
50 
 
surrounded much of his published information about cultural history and the traditional chiefs, he 
was eulogized as a prolific historian with a remarkable and acute memory.103 Kamakau 
constructed many of his biographical essays from oral accounts, and Nogelmeier concluded that 
Kamakau’s work as a paid columnist for two successive newspapers bolstered his authority as a 
historian.104 
Kamakau’s personal relationship with Kauikeaouli and their shared love of historical data 
no doubt informed Kamakau’s 1868 account about the king’s 1825 speech.105 During the days 
before his investiture, Kauikeaouli would have heard the tales told by the returning members of 
Liholiho’s suite of the western societies that they had visited in London, Rio de Janeiro, and 
Valparaiso, and so it is not remarkable that Kauikeaouli chose to reinforce his elder brother’s 
command for people to learn to read and write. What is remarkable is that Kauikeaouli elevated 
his expectations of his peoples’ personal acquisition of literacy into a vision for the very nature 
of the kingdom itself:   
A laila, kū maila ka Mōʻī Kauikeaouli . . . ʻ ʻAuhea ʻoukou e nā aliʻi, e nā kahu, e 
ka hū, e ka makaʻāinana; aloha ʻoukou. E hoʻolohe mai ʻoukou; ʻo koʻu aupuni, 
ke hāʻawi nei au i ke akua. ʻO ke aliʻi pono, ʻo koʻu aliʻi ia, ʻo nā keiki a nā 
makaʻāinana i mālama i ka pono, ʻo koʻu kānaka ia ʻO ke aliʻi hewa a me ke 
kanaka hewa, ʻaʻohe noʻu ia kanaka[.] ʻO koʻu aupuni, he aupuni aʻo palapala 
koʻu. ʻAuhea ʻoukou e nā aliʻi a me nā makaʻāinana, e aʻo ʻoukou i ka 
palapala.ʼ106 
 
(Then the King rose [to speak] . . . Pay heed, chiefs, regents, and commoners; 
Greetings. Hear me: my kingdom, I give to God. My chiefs who behave for the 
good of the community, they are my chiefs, the children of the makaʻāinana who 
care for the community’s good, they are my people. Chiefs and people who act in 
                                                 
103 As characterized by W. R. Castle in the P. C. Advertiser, 09 September 1876; see also Thrum, “Brief Sketch of  
Kamakau,” 51-2. 
104 Nogelmeier, Mai Paʻa i Ka Leo, 117. 
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ways harmful to the community are not my people. My rule will be characterized 
by literacy. Pay heed chiefs and makaʻāinana, learn to read and write.)107 
 
The only place that a record of this speech appears in English is in the edited collection of 
Kamakau’s newspaper articles printed in 1961 under the title Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii. The 
rendering of the speech, however, suffered from the translation and extraction processes 
identified by Nogelmeier which the editors used to compile Ruling Chiefs:108  
He arose and said “Where are you, chiefs, guardians, commoners hu and 
makaʻāinana)! I greet you. Hear what I say! My kingdom I give to God. The 
righteous chief shall be my chief, the children of the commoners who do right 
shall be my people, my kingdom shall be one of letters.109 
 
Key components of the speech are missing. Omitted was the traditional Hawaiian construction of 
paired opposites—pono and hewa (good and bad)—to signal Kauikeaouli’s expectations about 
their behavior and his commitment to uphold the law.110 Also omitted was the king’s verbal 
command directing his people to learn literacy. Without the command, Kauikeaouli’s 
characterization of the nature of his rule lacks force. As Nogelmeier observed about similar 
situations, the translation and editing created a different sort of speech than the original.111  
Kamakau’s Hawaiian-language biography continued with anecdotes about the importance 
that Hawaiians placed on Kauikeaouli’s pronouncement: “E mālama i ka leo o ke aliʻi, o hāʻule 
wale i ka weuweu” (Heed the chief’s voice; do not ignore his commands) teaches a Hawaiian 
                                                 
107 Dr. Lyon assisted with this translation. In English, the distinctions between the words hū and makaʻāinana are 
subtle, but both refer to people without rank, and so the word commoner that is frequently used in eighteenth and 
nineteenth British English can apply to both groups. In my text I will use the Hawaiian word “makaʻāinana” rather 
than “commoner.” 
108 Nogelmeier, Mai Paʻa i Ka Leo, 124. 
109 Kamakau, Ruling Chiefs, 258. Note that the literal translation of “auhea ʻoukou” is “where are you,” but the 
phrase is an idiom which is better translated as “pay heed.” 
110 For an explanation of the uniquely Hawaiian duality of pono/hewa, see Jeffrey (Kapali) Lyon, “Davida Malo, 
Nathaniel Emerson, and the ‘Sins’ of Hawaiians: An Analysis of Emerson’s Hawaiian Antiquities as a Guide to 
Malo’s Moʻolelo Hawaiʻi,” Hūlili: Multidisciplinary Research on Hawaiian Well-Being 7 (2011). 
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proverb, and that is precisely how the chiefs and makaʻāinana reacted.112 A passage from Ka 
Mooolelo Hawaii reported that “ia manawa, hoouna na ’lii i na kumu pi-a-pa e hele mai na 
kuaaina e ao i na makaainana i ka palapala” (at that time, the chiefs sent teachers of the alphabet 
to the rural areas to teach reading and writing).113 Kamakau punctuated the practical application 
of the proverbial advice when he detailed the tremendous outpouring of enthusiasm by the 
Kingʼs subjects as the order went down through the ranks to fulfill his command: “ ʻO ka pane 
kā ka mōʻī. ʻHe aupuni palapala koʻu.ʼ O ka hāpai me ke kōkua kā nā aliʻi. . . . Ua hāpai ka lāhui 
holoʻokoʻa i kēia ʻoihana me ke alakaʻi ʻole ʻia e nā kumu misionari; hoʻokahi kumu, ʻo ka ʻōlelo 
pane a ka mōʻī .” (It is the King who proclaimed. ʻMine is a rule of literacy.ʼ It is the chiefs who 
undertake and support the task. All of the people undertook this task to support him without 
being led by the missionary teachers; there was only one reason for this, and that was the 
pronouncement of the king).114  
Only from a reading of Kamakau’s Hawaiian language account can the historian grasp 
the political importance of Kauikeaouli’s speech. For the kingʼs bold claim that his rule would be 
characterized by reading and writing was in fact an endorsement of new learning, a vision for the 
future, and an important policy initiative all rolled into one which turned the acquisition of 
literacy into a state directive. Kamakau affirmed the powerful force of this command: “He ʻōlelo 
                                                 
112 Mary Kawena Pukui, ed. and trans., “No. 345,” ʻŌlelo Noʻeau: Hawaiian Proverbs & Poetical Sayings 
(Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1983), 42. According to Pukui, the proverb’s literal meaning is “Take care of the 
chiefʼs voice, lest it drop among the grass.” 
113 “No Ka Noho Ana O Na Misionari,” Ka Mooolelo, 101. The account does not mention Kauikeaouli or his 
command; however, the chiefs’ action is placed immediately after Boki’s return from England. That timing 
coincides with Kauikeaouli’s ascension and subsequent command. Dr. Lyon assisted with the translation. 
114 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 318-9. Dr. Lyon assisted with this translation. Kamakauʼs use of the word “pane” 
provokes discussion. Did Kamakau mean that this was how the King responded to being introduced as their new 
ruler? Or is pane used in the sense of announcing an order that is carried down through the ranks? In any event, the 
words “answer,” “speak,” or “spoke” fail to convey the significance of the act of transmitting a spoken command 
down through the ranks. 
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waha wale nō kēia i kūkala ʻia ma Honuakaha; ua lilo naʻe i ʻōlelo mana i ʻoi aʻe ma mua o nā 
ʻōlelo kānāwai o kēia wā.” (It was only a spoken command that he proclaimed at Honuakaha; 
nevertheless it became an order that carried power and authority well beyond the power of the 
law in this time.)115 The phrase that cultural historian, teacher and writer Zepherin “Kepelino” 
Kahōʻaliʻi Keauokalani used in the mid-nineteenth century, “Hawaii imi loa” (Hawaii of the 
profound knowledge),116 perfectly captured the sense of Kauikeaouliʼs challenge to his people to 
seek out and be changed by knowledge acquired through literacy.117 Over time, the acquisition of 
literacy invigorated public discussions and created a resilient polity able to absorb profound 
changes to their traditions and culture. It was a well-calculated exercise of leadership by a young 
king which fell precisely in line with Hawaiian cultural beliefs about the pono, or beneficial, 
behaviors that they expected their ruling chief to exhibit. 
 
An explosion of learning  
Common schools soon sprung up in all areas, even those geographically distant from the mission 
stations. By 1826, four hundred literate native teachers instructed at schools established on 
chiefs’ lands. Laimana cited the consternation of the missionaries when they realized that 
perhaps another hundred less-skilled natives also taught. This rapid growth of common schools 
threatened to outstrip the ability of the mission press to supply spelling books, causing Laimana 
                                                 
115 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 316. 
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Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 2007), xii. 
54 
 
to conclude that “the engine that was now driving the literacy campaign was the Hawaiians 
themselves.”118  
ABCFM reports in the Missionary Herald indicated that other of their sister missions had 
also used native teachers as instructors at native schools—at Bombay, for example, the ABCFM 
mission had successfully used native schools presided over by Brahmins since 1815.119 On a 
similar but smaller scale, reports circulated from LMS missionary John Davies in 1816 about a 
chief in an outlying district on Eimeo (Moorea) who used the Tahitian speller and catechisms to 
teach his people himself.120 On the North Island of New Zealand, Māori themselves took over 
instruction from CMS staff at the village level.121 These other missions claimed that literacy had 
increased at all locations that had used native teachers, and the SIM contingent counted on 
achieving the same results at Hawaiʻi. 
Early reports validated this approach. “A vast number of people have become able to 
read,” Loomis wrote the Board at the close of 1825, and he reported that a great demand 
continued to exist for printed texts, even though thousands of printed copies of religious tracts 
and Hawaiian hymns already had been distributed.122 By 1828, in the Lahaina district of Maui 
alone, 174 common schools operated, with an enrollment of 11,881 students.123 Kamakau 
provided his own graphic picture of the enthusiasm with which everyone attended schools, and 
he estimated that attendance at some schools numbered as high as 1,000.124 
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Even though the mission staff struggled to equip so many new Hawaiian teachers with 
books and instructional advice, most of the Hawaiian teachers had only the speller as a teaching 
aid, and many students lacked their own books.125 But a shortage of books did not daunt the 
enthusiasm of Hawaiian pupils. At the close of 1831, schools staffed by Hawaiian teachers 
numbered 1,103 throughout the islands and had an enrollment of 52,882 out of an estimated 
population of 185,000.126 All ranks and classes participated to help each other learn: “e aʻo nā 
aliʻi i nā makaʻāinana, e aʻo nā makaʻāinana i nā aliʻi, e aʻo nā aliʻi i nā aliʻi, e aʻo nā ʻaialo i nā 
ʻaialo, e aʻo nā konohiki i nā konohiki, e aʻo nā makaʻāinana i nā makaʻāinana” (the chiefs 
should teach the makaʻāinana, the makaʻāinana should teach the chiefs, the chiefs should teach 
each other, those at court should teach each other, the land managers should teach each other, the 
makaʻāinana should teach each other).127 
Kaʻahumanu continued in her roles as kuhina nui and regent to the young king, and she 
led the chiefs in urging the people to follow his command and become literate. After 
Kaʻahumanu died in mid-1832, however, the enthusiasm that drove school attendance leveled 
off. By the end of 1832, attendance had dropped at schools taught by the missionaries, and fewer 
people attended mission church services. The missionaries scrambled to explain to the Boston-
based Board what had caused the change, blaming in part the relaxation of “the reins of moral 
duty” by the nineteen-year-old king, Kauikeaouli.128 But members of the SIM contingent placed 
the greatest share of responsibility on what they deemed were the inadequate qualifications of the 
Hawaiian teachers and appointed the Rev. Lorrin Andrews (a former Kentucky school teacher 
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and an 1828 arrival in the third company sent by the ABCFM who had been posted to the 
Lahaina station) to study the school system and make recommendations for change.129 Bingham 
had been present at the inception of the common schools, however, and he explained that 
“imperfect as they were, not being fully understood by all,” schools under Hawaiian teachers had 
been indispensable to the education of the populace.130 
From his later vantage point, Andrews saw only deficiencies, not successes. His written 
report severely criticized the character, qualifications and teaching methods of the Hawaiian 
teachers. Like his colleagues, Andrews acknowledged that the missionaries bore the 
responsibility to train them, and he incorporated those training responsibilities into his June 1832 
recommendations: common schools should remain in operation taught by Hawaiians, select 
station schools taught by missionaries should serve as models for Hawaiian teachers, and a new 
high school at Lahainaluna should be established to train Hawaiians to be teachers.131 
Throughout the 1830s, the SIM members worked to place the school system on a better basis.132 
Lahainaluna Seminary opened in the autumn of 1831 with Andrews as its principal and 
sole instructor.133 Twenty-five adult Hawaiian men who already had some teaching experience 
enrolled for the first year, and enrollment grew to sixty-seven students in the second year.134 
Andrews emphasized that the Lahainaluna curriculum would be structured to give the Hawaiian 
students the means to acquire knowledge and the ability to employ knowledge to some practical 
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purpose, in his words, “to teach them to think, and to think to some end [emphasis in the 
original].”135 The curriculum focused on the subjects which the students would teach: reading, 
geography, arithmetic and writing.136 The SIM’s educational imprints reflected Andrews’ desire 
to focus on teaching analytical processes and practical skills rather than rote learning. Printers 
worked diligently to furnish the books needed to support the curricula at all instructional levels 
and turned out 600,000 copies of 14 Hawaiian language imprints by 1832—for a total of 
24,065,800 pages.137 Like the imprints authored by Davies at Tahiti, many were exclusively 
religious in nature.138 The SIM report for 1831, however, also listed several secular works in 
print or in progress:139 
  First Elementary Book 
  Second Elementary Book 
  Third Elementary Book 
  Spelling Book 
  First Book for Children 
  Arithmetic 
  Tract on Geography 
Grammar of the Hawaiian language 
  A Hawaiian vocabulary 
  A Tract of Civil History 
  A work on Book-keeping 
Book of Hymns140 
  
By the following year, the mission press had also printed:  
  Fowle’s Child’s Arithmetic 
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Colburn’s Intellectual Arithmetic 
  Geographical Questions 
Gamut and Music, engraved (a book on musical theory encompassing the 
full range of pitches)141 
 
with plans to add: 
  Revision of the Geography 
  Preparation of a set of Maps to be engraved 
  Translation of Holbrook’s First Lessons in Geometry 
  Translation of Colburn’s Sequel to Mental Arithmetic 
  Small treatise on Book-keeping 
  Music book, Grammar, Vocabulary142 
 
Determined to bring about Kauikeaouli’s bold vision of a rule characterized by literacy, 
the chiefs embraced the 1831 formation of the Lahainaluna school because they recognized that 
the curriculum could develop an educated group of Hawaiian scholars on whom the king and the 
chiefs could rely for secular advice to the exclusion of haole (foreign) advisors: “ ʻAʻole he 
paulele o nā aliʻi i ke akamai o nā haole i ia wā. Ua makemake lākou i ka naʻauao o ko lākou 
lāhui kanaka iho, no laila hoʻi, ua hoʻoikaika loa ka poʻe e ʻimi ana i ka naʻauao i ia wā, a ua 
loaʻa o ko lākou kōkua.” (The chiefs did not have total confidence in the wisdom of the 
foreigners at that time. They wanted their own people to be educated, and so for that reason, at 
that time the people exerted themselves to acquire learning, and help was given to them.)143 The 
chiefs chose pupils from the ranks of their konohiki land agents for the honor of studying at 
Lahainaluna.144 An educated middle class emerged to form the beginnings of a new civil polity. 
Many of the graduates became leading men in the government and in the churches: among them 
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were several whose deeds are prominently recorded in nineteenth-century histories: Davida 
Malo, Samuel M. Kamakau, Timoteo Haʻalilio, Boaz Māhune, and Joseph Kāpena.145  
As enrollment increased and the faculty expanded, the educational objectives for 
Lahainaluna students broadened to encompass primarily a literary and professional education 
that would embrace both literature and science in their training to be school teachers and 
religious teachers.146 Missionary David B. Lyman founded the Hilo Boarding School for boys in 
1836 to serve as a feeder school for the Lahainaluna high school.147 Prospective Lahainaluna 
students needed to pass entrance exams in reading, writing, mental arithmetic, and geography, 
and the curriculum expanded to include arithmetic, geometry, trigonometry, composition, sacred 
geography, navigation, surveying, astronomy, chemistry, natural and moral philosophy, secular 
and church history, and Greek.148 Also in 1836, advanced students under the leadership of 
Sheldon Dibble interviewed knowledgeable elders and used their oral accounts to develop 
historical essays.149 The first two essays were printed in the Hawaiian language newspaper Ke 
Kumu Hawaii on July 20, 1836.150 
The Hawaiian community saw the positive educational results from the curriculum at 
Lahainaluna and came to regard it as like a university, where scholars could complete educations 
in school-teaching, law practice, civil service, or the ministry.151 Seeing an opportunity to expand 
their educational programs to further develop the kingdom’s resources, the SIM contingent 
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obtained the consent of the rulers in July 1836 to send to ABCFM headquarters for people with a 
variety of skills in the productive arts. The SIM letter noted that the kingdom required 
improvements in civil polity and that the study of the science of political economy would also be 
beneficial. On August 21, 1836 William Richards met with the chiefs to impress on them the 
need for internal improvements. Two days later, Kauikeaouli and fourteen chiefs proposed that a 
SIM emissary find a teacher in the U. S. to instruct them “in what pertains to the land, acording 
[sic] to the practice of enlightened countries.”152 
 Less than two months later—even before William Richards left as the SIM emissary 
tasked by the SIM members, the king, and the chiefs to find a tutor—assaults on the kingdom’s 
civil policies by representatives of American, French and British maritime powers highlighted 
the urgency of Kauikeaouli’s request.153 
 
Written framework adopted for governance structure  
When Kauikeaouli, U. S. Commodore Edmund P. Kennedy, and British Admiral Lord Edward 
Russell engaged in contentious negotiations in late 1836 over the king’s sovereign authority to 
determine the rights and privileges of foreign residents, the editor of the only English language 
newspaper Sandwich Islands Gazette covered the meetings.154 An anonymous letter printed in its 
October 8, 1836 edition the day before Kennedy’s ship U.S.S. Peacock sailed echoed the 
missionaries’ opinion about the kingdom’s need for polity improvements: the kingdom needed 
written taxes fixed in law, the newspaper writer opined, and urged “someone” to translate a 
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compendium on political economy into Hawaiian. The necessity of framing his arguments with 
Kennedy in terms of internationally-recognized personal rights had, as Jarves observed, already 
bettered Kauikeaouli’s understanding of the law of nations, and no doubt also improved the 
king’s ability to counter Russell’s arguments the following month.155 
Lauren Benton theorizes that indigenous polities actively make change and reorder 
institutions in response to globalizing pressures and internal political dynamics.156 Merry 
espouses the viewpoint that change was forced on the ruling chiefs by the pressures of warfare, 
maritime violence, and international economics.157 Beamer acknowledges that both viewpoints 
were in play when he emphasizes that the king and chiefs understood from events that they 
needed to legitimize their rule on the world stage by adapting the political ideas introduced by 
foreigners—but Beamer emphasizes that the rulers drove the change process themselves.158  
Studies of the political prehistory of Hawaiʻi conducted by Patrick V. Kirch and Robert J. 
Hommon validate that early Hawaiian rulers played active leadership roles in polity 
reorganizations and delegated power through formal bureaucracies.159 When ‘Umi-a-līloa 
deposed Hākau and took control of Hawai‘i island in the fifteenth century, for example, he 
divided the people into classes, divided land holdings into organizational units, and governed 
through an hierarchical system of heiau (temples).160 Māʻilikūkahi, another fifteenth-century 
ruler at Oʻahu, replaced kinship rights to land with rights tied to chiefly relationships.161 More 
recently, Kauikeaouli’s father Kamehameha I had united individual island chiefdoms under his 
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sole political and bureaucratic rule beginning in 1795, and his brother Liholiho had continued to 
administer the kingdom’s affairs through that centralized, multitiered bureaucracy despite ending 
the restrictions of the traditional kapu system. 
Hawaiʻi’s early development of its political organization at the time Cook arrived 
mirrored political development at island groups elsewhere in Polynesia. Howe documents that 
Tonga had a long tradition of a centralized polity, and its leaders soon adopted the techniques 
and ideas of Europeans to reorganize its internal polity structures and administration. Gonschor 
documents George Tupou I’s use of the Wesleyan missionaries as Tongan political agents, while 
Howe concludes that Pōmare II at Tahiti used both the acquisition of literacy and conversion to 
Christianity as political tools to effect unification.162 In 1839, Kauikeaouli ruled with the same 
political and economic governance structures that his father and elder brother had used. Like 
Tupou and Pōmare, however, Kauikeaouli turned to the Christian missionaries to provide him 
with knowledge about alternative political systems so that he could reorganize the Hawaiian 
polity into a westernized nation state. 
Richards returned from Boston in March 1838, however, without having retained a 
teacher to instruct the chiefs in western political institutions and political economy. Missionary 
Lorrin Andrews had been proposed as a teacher during Richards’ absence, but he had refused. 
Not to be denied, Kauikeaouli and the chiefs requested that the mission assign the role to 
Richards. Richards agreed, and he took up his duties at Lahaina as teacher, interpreter, and 
translator on July 3.163 
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 Richards outlined his teaching goals and the mode of instruction he intended to use in his 
letter of resignation to ABCFM headquarters in Boston: he would use as his principal text the 
Rev. Francis Wayland’s series of lectures on political economy first published in 1837 as The 
Elements of Political Economy.164 Wayland was a Baptist preacher, educator and economist who 
argued that free markets and limited government should reflect a Christian perspective. 
Wayland’s text encompassed wide-ranging discussions of the interrelationships between 
production, exchange, distribution, and consumption and the government’s role in aligning 
Christian principles with institutions and legal codes to enhance its citizens’ ability to create and 
accumulate wealth. 165 
The king invited Davida Malo, Boaz Māhune and Joseph Kāpena, all of whom had 
studied at Lahainaluna seminary, to join the discussions.166 Richards found the king and chiefs to 
be willing and engaged students who “manifested a becoming wish to reform the government in 
those particulars where it is inconsistent with true Political Economy.”167 Richards translated 
large portions of Wayland’s work for his dialectic lectures, added materials from political 
economists Say and Newman, and enriched the discussions with illustrations drawn from 
Hawaiian custom and practices: “I endeavored to make the lectures as familiar as possible, by 
repeating them, and drawing the chiefs into free conversation on the subject of the Lecture. They 
uniformly manifested a becoming interest in the school thus conducted, and took an active part in 
the discussion of the various topics introduced in the Lectures.”168 
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When his chiefly students identified differences between their own governance and western 
political economy principles, they asked Richards “Pehea la e pono ai?” (How will it be 
bettered?) At the request of the chiefs, Richards’ lectures were compiled into a book entitled No 
Ke Kalaiaina.169 
Kauikeaouli assigned Boaz Māhune to draft laws which conformed to the political 
economy principles they had learned from Richards’ lectures.170 Māhune concentrated on writing 
the laws on taxation, and others, including Davida Malo, John Papa ʻĪʻī, Timothy Keaweiwi, and 
Daniel ʻĪʻī, also produced first drafts of several laws.171 The description of their deliberations 
confirms Beamer’s observation that the king and the chiefs drove the process: Kauikeaouli did 
not sign the final result until after the participants had discussed Māhune’s drafts for several days 
and agreed on the final version.172 Entitled He kumu kanawai, a me ke kanawai hooponopono 
waiwai, no ko Hawaii nei pae aina (the “1839 Declaration of Rights”) and dated June 7, 1839, 
this first comprehensive written civil code was based on principles of equal rights and protection 
regardless of rank, and the code specified property rights, water irrigation distribution rights, and 
rules for inheritance by descent.173 
Western scholars soon compared the 1839 Declaration of Rights to the American Bill of 
Rights (Bradley, Hopkins) or the English Magna Charta (Bradley, Kuykendall, Alexander).174 
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Benton, however, argued that other cultures treated European legal traditions as “a useful 
collection” from which they might draw to craft their own legal systems, and Merry concluded 
that the 1839 and 1840 set of laws actually incorporated “significant amounts of Hawaiian 
customary law and practice.”175 In fact, as Beamer points out, the document’s property law terms 
were inconsistent with western property law because they incorporated the Hawaiian belief that 
all land was owned jointly by the king, the chiefs and the maka‘āinana.176 However, because the 
legal format of the 1839 Declaration of Rights duplicated the political and institutional 
framework used by western nations, it created what Robert H. Jackson called a positive 
expression of sovereignty, whose terms—such as those governing property rights—carried 
political force both domestically and internationally.177 
Meanwhile, Boaz Māhune acting for the king and Joseph Kāpena acting for the kuhina 
nui (Kīna‘u, until her death in April 1839, and then Kekāuluohi) began work on a constitutional 
document under the direction of Richards. When the final version of the 1840 Constitution was 
arrived at through the same deliberative process, Kauikeaouli assured himself that the chiefs 
approved its content before he also agreed, and the governance framework changed to that of a 
constitutional monarchy as of October 8, 1840.178 Kamakau later celebrated the fact that 
Kauikeaouli had achieved such major governmental change without bloodshed.179 
Indeed, the format of the constitution gave every appearance of creating a radically 
different governance structure from the traditional model: there were provisions for an 
independent judiciary, a bicameral legislature, and some of the checks and balances found in 
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western constitutions. As with the 1839 Declaration of Rights, however, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that the Constitution of 1840 simply mimicked western governance. In fact, an 
examination of the content demonstrates aspects of what James Tully terms ‘elements of 
traditional institutions and customs from an ancient constitution’ that were intermingled with 
modern elements to impose a new form of political association.180 Gonschor agrees, and he 
concludes that the Hawaiian state had undergone a hybridization process through selective 
appropriation of western elements, creating a constitutional state that was a unique, hybrid 
governance system.181 The continuation of traditional institutions and customs included the 
following: the king, kuhina nui, and governors retained the same titles and division of 
responsibilities, and the upper legislative chamber called the “Naʻlii malalo o ke Alii nui, House 
of Nobles,” replicated the traditional chiefly council. While the lower chamber “Ka Poe i 
Kohoia, Representative Body,” was an innovation, it confirmed the importance of the social 
compact that existed between the chiefs and the makaʻāinana.182 
Kuykendall pointed out that the significance of the constitution lay in the fact that it put 
in writing a statement of the plan of government and a definition of the powers and duties of the 
various officials.183 Applying Benton’s analytical frame, it was the king and the chiefs’ 
recognition of the dangers threatened by the confluence of global trade ambitions in the Pacific 
region that propelled them to create a constitution.184 Benton’s analysis harmonizes with 
Beamer’s conclusion that the rulers had acted affirmatively to create a governance apparatus that 
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Beamer and Gonschor describe as a ‘strong hybrid’ framework.185 Under Jackson’s analysis, the 
importance of a written constitution was twofold: first, it created an image of capable and 
responsible rule; and, second, the constitution demonstrated that the kingdom could collaborate 
with other governments in treaties and commercial enterprises.186 Tracey Banivanua Mar adds 
another dimension with her conclusion that chiefly rulers in the Pacific adopted written 
constitutions and other modernizing reforms as a way to insist that imperial powers respect their 
sovereign rights and privileges.187 Thus while the constitution was important domestically, its 
greater immediate importance lay in the fact that it could demonstrate the level of political 
sophistication necessary to convince western maritime powers to admit the kingdom into the 
worldwide community of sovereign nation-states. 
Further institutional change followed during Kauikeaouli’s reign, including the adoption 
of two organic acts to organize the executive ministry and departments (1845 and 1846) and 
another to organize the judiciary (1847), the Act to Quiet Land Titles (1845) which led to the 
māhele (the division of interests in all of the kingdom’s lands), an act to reorganize the 
legislature’s composition (1850), and a revision of the 1840 Constitution (1852). 
 
Literacy secured sovereign recognition  
 When news arrived in December 1840 that the British Parliament had declined to acknowledge 
its decades-old commitment to intervene in defense of Hawaiʻi should France or another imperial 
power seize political control,188 most white residents in Hawaiʻi did not believe that the kingdom 
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could remain independent for much longer.189 Kauikeaouli sent an embassy to London, Paris and 
Washington, D.C. to argue his case, and he charged his diplomats William Richards, Timoteo 
Haʻalilio and Britisher Sir George Simpson that their “grand, ultimate object. . . is to secure the 
acknowledgment, by those governments, of the independence of this nation.” 190 The diplomats 
carried with them a variety of papers and documents that depicted Hawaiʻi as a well-organized, 
literate nation with western-style educational and governance structures sufficient to regulate its 
domestic and foreign affairs.191 Richards and Simpson argued that the printed documents showed 
that literacy extended into every aspect of Hawaiian society and governance, and Richards 
offered to produce copies of Hawaiian language religious and educational texts, all fifty-one 
sections of the nation’s legal code, and an English-language copy of the 1840 Constitution.192 
Despite Hawaiʻi’s well-organized and orderly state, they warned, the security of its subjects and 
foreigners was vulnerable to foreign aggression so long as Hawaii’s independence was 
unacknowledged by the large imperial powers.193  
 The final hurdle in London was overcome in July 1843 after Mr. Addington of the 
Foreign Office met with J. F B. Marshall, another of Kauikeaouli’s emissaries. Addington told 
Marshall that the Foreign Office had received a statement alleging that Kauikeaouli had 
entrusted an American with a signed, blank document giving the holder the power and ability to 
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deed away all of the government’s lands.194 Marshall arranged for a meeting between Addington 
and the American, Peter A. Brinsmade, a principal of the Honolulu firm Ladd & Co. who was 
then in Europe negotiating with the Belgian king for a joint-stock contract creating a colonization 
enterprise at Kauaʻi.195 Brinsmade read to Addington from the document in question and 
explained the progress of his Belgian negotiations. Marshall reported that Addington was struck 
by the “manifest malignity” of the allegation he had received and persuaded by the “lucid 
manner” in which Marshall had laid out the true circumstances. When Addington related what he 
had learned to Lord Aberdeen, he warned that “they could not risk their reputation by doing 
other than justice to a small nation which could not resist them.” 196 
Thus, it was a showing of documents that evidenced the king’s comprehensive 
understanding of commerce, economics, and industry; his political ability to rule ably and 
responsibly; and his ability to engage his nation with the global affairs of other nations. On 
November 28, 1843, the monarchs of Great Britain and France agreed by joint declaration to 
“consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State.”197 On July 6, 1844, President John 
Tyler assured the “full recognition on the part of the United States of the independence of the 
Hawaiian Government.”198 
Enlightenment period scholars and philosophers placed great value on learning, and the 
medium of print acquired “immense ideological importance” in the Atlantic world as an enabler 
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of public discourse.199 When the Protestant revivalist movement known as the Second Great 
Awakening peaked during the 1840s, Atlantic world intellectuals reemphasized Enlightenment 
principles of rationality and the diffusion of knowledge. David S. Shields alleges that by 1840 
the international community judged a nation’s learning environment by the emphasis it placed on 
the use of print medium and exercise of rationality.200 Jackson pointed out that the showing of 
the political ability to declare, implement and enforce public policy both domestically and 
internationally was the distinctive feature of a ‘developed’ state.201 Jackson and Shields’ findings 
support Anderson’s argument that the use of print media and education helped build European 
national identities, and together they give insight as to why Hawaiʻi’s print media proficiency, its 
constitutional framework, and its diplomats’ rational argumentation proved a compelling 
argument for achieving recognition from the international community as an independent nation 
state.202 
Tonga also developed into an externally-recognizable nation state and adopted a 
constitutional form of government in 1875, but Gonschor concludes that by the 1840s the hybrid 
government that Kauikeaouli had adopted had made it the most modern state in the Pacific 
region. Sai points out that the Hawaiian kingdom was the first Polynesian and non-European 
nation to be recognized by the western powers as an independent and sovereign state.203 
This was the only time that the ruler of a small Pacific Islands kingdom sent his own 
diplomats into the seats of power at the very heart of the Atlantic world and secured his 
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kingdom’s political future on his own terms.204 It was a courageous statecraft decision and a 
diplomatic triumph that gave Hawaiʻi a different political trajectory than that of Tahiti, the 
Society Islands, the Marquesas, and New Zealand, all of which were swept up and colonized by 
Atlantic maritime powers during their Pacific island-grabs in the mid-nineteenth century.205 
Kauikeaouli accomplished that feat because early in his reign he had recognized the secular 
value of literacy and promoted a strategy which delivered the knowledge and information needed 
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CHANGING HAWAIʻI IN THE 1840s 
 
Political and social change dominated the course of events at Hawaiʻi in the 1840s. Merry cites 
the global processes of modernization, capitalist expansion, and imperialism as the drivers of 
those changes, and she concludes that western foreigners at Hawaiʻi were the actors who 
implemented change to further the ‘civilizing’ process.1 Beamer, on the other hand, argues that it 
was the Hawaiian rulers themselves who recognized the need for changes and who acted to 
selectively ‘hybridize’ traditional governance structures with western-style innovations.2 Jarves 
added another dimension—perhaps even more convincing because he was a contemporary 
witness—with his observation that governance changes during the 1840s were designed to 
‘protect’ Hawaiians from an onslaught of westerners and western influences.3 
 Kauikeaouli was a popular king who enjoyed the support of his people. Although 
Kamakau criticized some of the king’s policies, he believed that Kauikeaouli had no equal on 
earth for his gentle character and remembered that he loved all of his people, high and low alike.4 
Native Hawaiians dominated in Kauikeaouli’s political institutions throughout the 1840s, and the 
king ensured that chiefly debate informed changes in political direction and directed 
administrative adaptations to meet emerging social needs. Indeed, my review of pertinent records 
confirms Beamer’s argument that it was the king and his chiefs who modernized governance 
while maintaining a Hawaiian identity, and my study of Kauikeaouli’s executive decisions 
reveals his overriding concern for the safety and economic security of Hawaiians. The following 
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review of these political modifications and the adaptations made in response to social changes 
sets the context for the reading of subsequent chapters. 
 
Hybrid governance 
Keanu Sai concludes that the 1840 constitution should be viewed not as a limitation of abusive 
powers, but rather as an instrument enabling the king to share powers with all of his subjects by 
divesting himself of some of his powers and attributes as an absolute ruler. The constitution did 
not provide for the separation of powers, however, requiring the later enactment of the 1845-
1847 organic acts to establish ministries administering government functions separate from the 
crown.5 A study of the 1840 Constitution and the organic acts confirms the conclusions reached 
by Sai and Beamer that Kauikeaouli and the chiefs fully intended to create a hybrid governance 
system, and the text of the constitution itself explicitly affirms what Jarves suggested—that the 
framers designed it to protect the rights and privileges of all Hawaiians, both chiefs and 
makaʻāinana, under the authority of the rule of law.6 Chapter 2 “Literacy as Strategy” contains 
an analysis of this purposeful combination of traditional and modern elements. The following 
discussion complements that analysis. 
 The 1840 constitution gave the king the power of appointment of some “chief of rank” to 
fill the traditional role of kuhina nui,  who would continue the office and duties that had 
originated with Kaʻahumanu during Liholiho’s reign (1819-1824). Kaʻahumanu claimed that 
Kamehameha I had commanded her to assume that role, and the constitutional provision 
describing the position celebrated that historic link: “A o kela pono a Kamehameha I, i imi ai i 
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kuhina, e hoomauia kela pono ma Hawaii nei . . . . That important feature of the government, 
originated by Kamehameha I, shall be perpetuated in these Hawaiian Islands.”7 
Sai argues, however, that the role of kuhina nui as it existed in the time of Kamehameha I 
was not that of a premier as that term is understood in western governance, but rather was that of 
a chief agent who acted at the will of the crown on matters of national governance. The 1840 
Constitutional language confirms his conclusion, Sai continues, because the codified kuhina nui 
role did not include the exercise of direction over ministers of government functions who act 
separately from the crown. Sai concludes that it was not until the 1845 “Act to Organize the 
Executive Ministry of the Hawaiian Islands” (“1845 Act”) formed the Cabinet Council and 
placed the kuhina nui at the head of executive ministries that the kuhina nui role assumed the 
attributes of a premier, or prime minister.8 At that point, argues Sai, the provisions of the 1845 
Act codified a dual-executive role, where the kuhina nui under the king’s authority conducted the 
routine business of the administration, while the king led the government. Marshall Sahlins and 
other scholars argue otherwise, claiming that a co-ruler diarchy had been formed in 1819 when 
Kaʻahumanu declared herself to be the kuhina nui.9 What is clear from the constitution’s 
language, however, is that after its adoption in 1840 neither the king nor the kuhina nui had 
unrestricted power when operating independently, and neither could act without the knowledge 
of the other.10 
Following Kaʻahumanu’s death in 1832, a chiefly council began a selection tradition by 
confirming the highest-ranking female from Kaʻahumanuʼs lineage as her successor. Kīnaʻu, 
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Kaʻahumanuʼs eldest surviving royal Kamehameha niece, served as Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu II 
until her death in 1839.11 The king followed that tradition when he selected Kekāuluohi, another 
high-ranking niece of Kaʻahumanu, as Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu III.12 Kekāuluohi died in 1845, 
and the only remaining high-ranking female from Kaʻahumanuʼs lineage was the daughter of 
Kīnaʻu, seven-year-old Victoria Kamāmalu. Kauikeaouli then selected his close companion, 
Keoni Ana, to serve as kuhina nui. Keoni Ana held the position throughout the remainder of 
Kauikeaouli’s reign, after which it passed to Victoria Kamāmalu as Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu IV. 
Sahlins’ study of Kamehameha I’s appointments shows that Kamehameha had placed 
Kaʻahumanu and members of her extended Kekaulike family into key political and economic 
offices as a way of preventing Kamehameha’s own close kin from becoming powerful rivals. 
Doing so was also a way for Kamehameha to give Kaʻahumanu and her family members a stake 
in his continued governance.13 Thus the chiefly council’s selection of Kīnaʻu can be seen to have 
continued that policy to place an affine of Kaʻahumanu’s into the role to extend the political 
importance of that family and guarantee its continued support, but it also denied Kauikeaouli the 
ability to select his own candidate from a different chiefly family. When Kekāuluohi died, 
Kauikeaouli seized his opportunity and placed his own close ally who was a Kamehameha affine 
into the position.14 With his ally Keoni Ana as the dual executive after 1845, Kauikeaouli was 
assured of cabinet and privy council support as he pursued his policy objectives. 
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Beamer notes that the 1845 Act wa important because it also created a hybridized 
ministerial structure. A cabinet of western-style executive ministries was established for public 
instruction, finance, law, interior, and foreign relations that would be responsive to the 
governance needs brought by the processes of modernization, an influx of foreigners, and 
commercial expansion. All of the executive officials were to be appointed by the king and serve 
at his pleasure.15 A review of the duties and responsibilities of each ministerial department 
demonstrates the breadth and range of expertise required. Cabinet and council meeting minutes 
show that business was conducted in both Hawaiian and English. 
Cabinet meeting minutes were kept in English—the  language of its four white executive 
ministers but not the Hawaiian kuhina nui—and foreign affairs minister Robert C. Wyllie 
frequently served as scribe. Meetings were generally short and held nearly every week; the king 
usually did not attend. Agenda items included discussions of treaties and the preparation of 
correspondence with consular agents in advance of discussions within the privy council. Cabinet 
ministers were also privy council members and served ex officio in the House of Nobles.  
The first members of the cabinet council as shown on Appendix C were: 
• The kuhina nui, who also functioned as Minister of the Interior:  
Keoni Ana Young, sometimes identified as Keoniana, Keoni Ana, or John 
Young II.16 He was the son of John Young, the English advisor to 
Kamehameha I who had been present at the Olowalu Massacre. He descended 
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from the Kamehameha family through his mother, and his brother James 
Kānehoa Young had traveled to England in 1823 as a member of Liholihoʼs 
suite. Keoni Ana was appointed governor of Maui (1840), kuhina nui (1845), 
and minister of the interior (1846).17 He held the kuhina nui and ministerial 
positions throughout the remainder of Kauikeaouli’s reign. 
• Minister of Finance: 
Gerrit P. Judd, an American from New York state was a medical doctor who 
arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1828 as a member of the third company of ABCFM 
missionaries. Judd was released from mission service and was appointed 
Recorder and Translator (1842), President of the first Treasury Board (1842), 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1843-1845). He became Minister of the 
Interior in 1845 but moved to Minister of Finance after Keoni Ana’s 
appointment. Judd quickly became fluent in Hawaiian and frequently acted as 
the chiefs’ translator in privy council meetings.18 Judd became a naturalized 
Hawaiian citizen. 
• Department of Law: 
John Ricord, a New York attorney, had also practiced law in Florida, 
Michigan, and Washington, D.C. before arriving in Honolulu in 1844 only 
days before he was hired as Attorney General to oversee all of the kingdom’s 
legal affairs. He immediately began service in the cabinet and privy council 
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and crafted many executive and legal system reforms. The office of attorney 
general as the head of the department of law was suspended on May 4, 1847 
however, in anticipation of Ricord’s imminent resignation and was not filled 
again during Kauikeaouli’s reign. Ricord’s oath of allegiance was rescinded 
by the king when he left in 1847.19  
• Foreign Affairs Minister: 
Robert C. Wyllie was a Scottish businessman who arrived in Honolulu in 
1844 as the honorary secretary to British Consul General William Miller. 
Wyllie served as temporary consul during Miller’s absences in the South 
Pacific, and in 1845 he accepted the position of foreign affairs minister. 
Wyllie’s broad business experience, wide circle of international contacts, and 
familiarity with European governance aptly suited him for the position. He 
became a naturalized citizen. Wyllie was an ardent royalist and a firm 
defender of the king’s monarchical prerogatives. Although fluent in several 
European languages, Wyllie never learned Hawaiian. He is credited with 
collecting and archiving the kingdom’s documents and records.20 
• Minister of Education: 
The Rev. William Richards was an American from Massachusetts who had 
arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1823 as a member of the second company of 
missionaries sent by the ABCFM. He was released from mission service in 
                                                 
19 Charles E. Hitchcock was appointed Attorney General in 1862; Sandwich Islands News, 16 June 1847; “A Short 
Biographical Sketch of John Ricord,” Sandwich Islands News, 31 August 1848. 
20 Pauline King Joerger, A Political Biography of David Lawrence Gregg, American Diplomat and Hawaiian 
Official (New York: Arno Press, 1982), 99-100; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:249. 
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1838 to serve the king and chiefs as an instructor in political economy. In 
1842, Richards embarked with Timoteo Haʻalilio on the diplomatic mission to 
America and Europe that secured international recognition of the kingdom’s 
independence. Richards served as Minister of Education from 1845 to 1846. 
He died in 1847. Richards was fluent in Hawaiian and became a naturalized 
citizen.21 
The Privy Council was an advisory body that had functioned in traditional governance as 
a secret council composed of high-ranking chiefs selected by the king. The 1845 Act codified 
this traditional advisory body as a privy council composed of the five executive ministers, the 
four governors over the islands, and chiefs appointed by the king. The kuhina nui presided, and 
the king usually attended. 
Business was conducted in both English and Hawaiian. Recorders wrote meeting minutes 
in both languages that were arranged chronologically in bound ledger books. Judd served as the 
first official translator and recorder. Meeting minutes demonstrate that bilingual white members 
(initially Richards and/or Judd) translated discussions between Hawaiian and English for other 
privy council members.22 
The king and chiefs commonly debated policy questions among themselves, in Hawaiian, 
before proposing council resolutions. All executive actions by the cabinet ministers required the 
prior approval of the king in council and the attestation of the kuhina nui. Meeting minutes show 
that diplomatic communications to foreign agents underwent scrutiny by the king and the chiefs 
prior to finalization by the minister of foreign affairs. Even though the privy council met 
                                                 
21 Minutes, 08 May 1845, Series 222, General Records, 1845 Journals & Minutes for Series 221, vol. 2-1, House of 
Nobles, Legislature, HSA for the record of Richards’ naturalization; HMCS, Portraits, 17. 
22 Minutes, 13 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA, where Richards acted as translator.  
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frequently, business was not always conducted with the full complement of members, and 
memberships changed over time. My footnotes show which members attended key meetings. 
In addition to the kuhina nui and the other cabinet ministers, attendees at the first privy 
council meeting on July 29, 1845 as shown on Appendix D were: 
• John Papa ʻĪʻī, listed as Ioane ʻĪʻī, who had been a childhood kahu 
(attendant) to Liholiho. ʻĪʻī traced his lineage from the Luluka branch of 
the Luahine line who were hereditary attendants to the Hawaiʻi island 
chiefs. ʻĪʻī was appointed to the following positions: kingʼs aliʻi council 
(1829), the House of Nobles (1840), superintendent of Oʻahu schools 
(1841), member of the Treasury Board (1842), privy council (1845), quiet 
title land commissioner (1845), and superior court judge (1847). He was 
also a biographer and memorialist and published newspaper articles about 
significant events that had happened in the kingdom during his lifetime.23 
• Charles Kanaʻina was a descendant of chiefs from Hawaiʻi island. He 
married Miriam ʻAuhea Kekāuluohi (Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu III), a 
former wife of Liholiho, and their son William Charles Lunalilo 
succeeded Kamehameha V as king. Kanaʻina was appointed to the House 
of Nobles (1840) and privy council (1845), and served as an Associate 
Supreme Court Judge (1844).24  
• Aaron Kealiʻiahonui, or Keliʻiahonui, was the son of Kaumualiʻi, the 
former king of Kauaʻi. He married Kekauʻōnohi. He was appointed to the 
                                                 
23 M. A. Brown, Facing the Spears of Change, xv-xviii, 3, 38. 
24 “Records of Lawyers & Judges, Nineteenth Century, Hawaiʻi,” Supreme Court Records at Honolulu; “Calendar,” 
Polynesian, 20 July 1844.  
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House of Nobles (1840), the privy council (1845), and briefly served as 
the Chamberlain of the Royal Household (1845).25 
• Kekauʻōnohi was a granddaughter of Kamehameha I and had been one of 
Liholihoʼs wives. She was a descendant through her mother Wahinepio of 
the Kekaulike line of Maui island chiefs. She was appointed to the House 
of Nobles (1840), as governor of Kauaʻi (1842), and to the privy council 
(1845).26 
• Mataio Kekūanāoʻa was a descendant of Maui and Oʻahu warrior chiefs 
and had traveled to England with Liholiho in 1823. He married Kīnaʻu 
(Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu II), a former wife of Liholiho. Their children 
included Alexander Liholiho (Kamehameha IV), Lot Kamehameha 
(Kamehameha V), and Victoria Kamāmalu (Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu IV). 
Kekūanāoʻa served as the governor of Oʻahu from 1834 to 1868.27 He was 
appointed to the House of Nobles (1840) and the privy council (1845). 
• William P. Leleiōhoku was the hānai son of Kuakini, who was the 
governor of Hawaiʻi island until 1844 and a member of the Kekaulike 
family of chiefs. Leleiōhoku was appointed to the House of Nobles 
(1840), the governorship of Hawaiʻi island (1844), and the privy council 
(1845). He left the privy council in 1846 and died in 1848.28 
                                                 
25 Hawaiʻi State Archives card file. 
26 Stewart, Journal, 124-6; Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 131, 214-5. Kamakau identified her father as Kamehameha 
I’s son Kahoʻānokūkīnaʻu. 
27 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 132-4; ʻĪʻī, Fragments, 177. 
28 Hawaiʻi State Archives card file. 
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• Abner Pākī was a member of the Kamehameha and Kīwalaʻō line of high-
ranking chiefs of Maui island and Hawaiʻi island lineage. Pākī and his 
wife Konia were the parents of Bernice Pauahi Bishop and the hānai 
parents of Lydia Kamakaʻeha, later Queen Liliʻuokalani. Pākī was 
appointed to the House of Nobles (1840) and served as an Associate 
Supreme Court Judge (1842-1844), as a privy council member (1845), and 
as Chamberlain of the Royal Household (1847-1848). Pākī was 
remembered as a man of strong character, “where he took a stand, he was 
absolutely immovable.”29 
Kamehameha I had placed his own high-ranking chiefly supporters as governors over the 
island kingdoms that he conquered for them to administer affairs as his personal 
representatives.30 The 1840 Constitution codified that practice by requiring that four governors 
responsible to the dual executive would preside over political and administrative affairs in the 
following arrangement: one at Hawaiʻi island, one at Maui and its adjacent islands, one at Oʻahu, 
and one at Kauaʻi and its adjacent islands. Constitutional provisions spelled out the governors’ 
duties and prerogatives. Vacancies would be filled by the king from nominations submitted by a 
chiefly council.31 
A description of the range of duties performed by the governor of Oʻahu at the beginning 
of the decade demonstrates the breadth of political influence that the governors exercised. 
Governor Kekūanāoʻa was in charge of all government business within his jurisdiction not set 
aside by law to other officials. He sat as the Oʻahu circuit court judge in cases involving 
                                                 
29 Hawaiʻi State Archives card file; “Obituary,” “Calendar,” Polynesian, 20 July 1844; Polynesian, 16 June 1855.  
30 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:11. 
31 “Na Kiaaina,” “Governors,” 1840 Constitution, Ka Hoʻoilina, 44-7. 
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foreigners and Hawaiians, appointed judges to the several Oʻahu district courts, supervised tax 
collection, controlled the town’s waterfront fort, prison system and police force, controlled the 
operations of the markets and public works, and allowed or disallowed marriages and divorces.32 
While several of those duties were reassigned to other government officials as the king’s 
administrative departments reorganized in the 1840s, the focus of commercial activity at Oʻahu 
guaranteed that the governorship remained a key position. 
The House of Nobles (“Naʻlii malalo o ke Alii nui”) initially was composed only of 
sixteen high-ranking chiefs and replicated the traditional chiefly council. The terms of the 
constitution named the first members and charged them with enacting laws for the common good 
and conducting such other business as the king might assign. (See Appendix A for a listing of its 
members in 1840.) Although designed as a western-style legislative body, the creation of the 
elective Representative Body (“Ka Poe i Kohoia”) recognized the traditional bonds between the 
chiefs and the makaʻāinana, and the constitution provided that no law could be passed without 
their approval. The Constitution specified that members be elected from Hawaiʻi, Maui, Oʻahu, 
and Kauaʻi but left open the total membership number.33 (See Appendix B for a listing of its 
members in 1845.) The two legislative bodies were to convene separately during their annual 
meetings, record the business conducted by each body, and present acts approved by both bodies 
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33 1840 Constitution, Ka Hoʻoilina, 27, 31. 
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Whites become Hawaiian citizens 
Kauikeaouli decided to employ white foreigners as executive ministers in a deliberate move to 
provide a local administrative interface that was compatible with international agents and 
institutions. This hiring decision and the controversies that surrounded it are discussed at length 
in Chapter 4 “Western-Educated Ministers Defend Sovereign Rights.” The need for a 
naturalization policy arose as a number of foreign residents entered government service. 
John Ricord was a foreigner who was unknown to the chiefs, and his appointment in 
March 1844 as the kingdom’s first Attorney General challenged the wisdom of permitting non-
citizens to work for the government. Prior to his appointment, only foreigners desiring to marry 
Hawaiian women were required to declare an oath of allegiance.34 After Ricord’s appointment, 
however, swearing allegiance to the government became the policy for all non-Hawaiian 
officials. Jarves explained that the policy was intended to avoid charges against American and 
British citizens that they used their government positions to forward the fortunes of their own 
nations.35 Taking a different view, Kuykendall suggested that the policy was intended to fuse 
native and foreign ideas, and native and foreign personnel into one body politic.36 
Other foreigners who did not work for the government also sought to be naturalized, and 
a contentious public debate erupted in Honolulu newspapers over the merits of naturalization.37 
In 1845, thousands of Hawaiians petitioned the legislature objecting to the practice. What had 
begun as a petitioning campaign to have the king’s white ministers dismissed also included a 
prayer that the naturalization practice be discontinued: “aole o makou makemake e hoohiki na 
                                                 
34 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:230, 238-9. By law enacted November 12, 1840. Although Kuykendall quoted 
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35 Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 190-1. 
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haole i kanaka Hawaii” ; “we do not wish foreigners to take the oath of allegiance and become 
Hawaiian citizens.”38 Osorio pointed out that use of the traditional act of petitioning sent a 
deliberate signal intended to reinforce the makaʻāinana petitioners’ relationship with the chiefs 
and to bind them together as a people unified against the incursions of foreigners.39 
What happened instead, however, was that members of the legislature debated the several 
petitions in June 1845, then affirmed the government’s naturalization policy and assigned John 
Papa ʻĪʻī and Keoni Ana to draft a legislative response.40 Their July 8 reply to the petitioners first 
addressed the political wisdom of the naturalization policy for officials with a strong statement 
that non-Hawaiian government officials should be required to swear to be faithful to the king so 
that they owed no allegiance to another sovereign in another land. But it was their reply 
concerning the voluntary naturalization of other foreigners that demonstrated the delicate balance 
that needed to be struck between political realities and national policy. The reply first pointed out 
that there was no practical way to prevent foreigners from coming ashore or from getting into 
difficulties and then reminded the petitioners that it was foreigners’ difficulties that had 
subjected the kingdom to punishment from the gunboat assaults of LaPlace in 1839 and Paulet in 
1843. And the reply asserted that the only way to prevent that from happening again was to 
naturalize foreigners, because then “if they transgress, here are laws to punish them, and there is 
no other nation which will interfere in behalf of wicked foreigners, when we punish them.”41 
Implicit in that explanation is the legislators’ recognition that a key benefit for the kingdom of 
                                                 
38 “Na Palapala Hoopii o na Makaainana,” Ka Elele, 15 July 1845 for the prayer in Hawaiian and “A Petition to 
Your Gracious Majesty Kamehameha III and to all your Chiefs in Council Assembled,” Friend, 01 August 1845 for 
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41 “Na Manao o ka Ahaolelo No Na Mea i Hoopiia,” Ka Elele, 15 July 1845 for the Hawaiian text; “Reply of the 
Council Assembled to the Petition,” Friend, 01 August 1845 for the English translation “taken from the Elele’. 
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the naturalization process would be that naturalized foreigners could no longer seek the 
protections of the extraterritorial judicial terms imposed by the British and French treaties.  
Kauikeaouli and his chiefs held public meetings on Maui in January 1846 to address the 
petitioners’ several concerns.42 Public debate subsided, and oaths of allegiance for government 
employees became required by law on October 29, 1845. Provisions permitting the voluntary 
naturalization of foreigners after a one-year residency period became effective on April 27, 
1846.43 Any alien temporarily resident in the kingdom could instead petition for a letter of 
denization which would grant all the rights and privileges of a Hawaiian subject without 
requiring the surrender of citizenship. Persons granted letters of denization could serve as 
government officials.44 Jarves reported that between March 8, 1844 and December 10, 1846, 493 
men, women and children were naturalized. Of them, about one-half were Americans, one-fourth 
were British, and among the remainder were French, German, Tahitian, Portuguese, and Chinese 
subjects.45 
But a letter to the Ka Elele editor from several Hawaiians at Lahaina introduced a greater 
level of complexity into the naturalization debate than the ability to punish wrongdoers without 
fear of foreign reprisals or application of extraterritorial terms. Although the letter predated the 
legislative reply, it did not become public until the July 15 Ka Elele edition in which the 
legislators’ reply was printed, and it was then republished by the Friend in its August 1 issue. 
The authors reasoned that the makaʻāinana were unable to compete with cash-rich foreigners for 
the purchase of land or other goods because the chiefs compensated them for their services with 
                                                 
42 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the meetings. 
43 Ricord, “First Act of Kamehameha III,” Statute Laws of Kamehameha III, 1:11; Ricord, “1846 Act to Organize 
the Executive Departments,” Statute Laws of Kamehameha III, 1:75. 
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goods and property that could not be converted to cash. Because makaʻāinana were shackled by 
these old practices, they cautioned, the naturalization of foreigners would only accelerate the 
transfer of all the wealth of the kingdom into foreign hands.46 
By 1845, however, there was another reason for concern because the Hawaiian 
population was declining, while the foreign population was increasing.  
 
Population changes 
Long isolation with few infectious diseases rendered Hawaiians vulnerable to the diseases 
carried by foreigners. Between Captain James Cook’s arrival at Kauaʻi in 1778 and his return to 
the island of Hawaiʻi early in 1779, several infectious diseases spread by his crews had wreaked 
havoc on the population. Epidemics of syphilis, gonorrhea, tuberculosis and influenza tore 
through Hawaiian communities, even traveling to remote population areas on islands that Cook 
had not visited. While David E. Stannard estimates that the total population at Hawaii 
approximated 800,000 in 1778, other scholars estimate numbers closer to 250,000.47 Stannard 
also projects that at least 400,000 people had died by 1800.48 
 A second onslaught of disease occurred in 1804, when a diarrhea infection that may have 
been typhoid or cholera swept through the islands in what A W. Crosby calls the worst epidemic 
in the history of the islands. The Hawaiians named the disease “ōkuʻu,” and reports suggest that 
the epidemic scuttled Kamehameha’s plans to invade Kauaʻi because it killed two-thirds of 
                                                 
46 Letter to the Editor dated June 12, 1845, “No ka Hoohiki Ana o Na Haole,” Ka Elele, 15 July 1845 for the 
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Kamehameha’s fighting force.49 While another major epidemic did not occur until 1848, 
syphilis, gonorrhea and tuberculosis continued to infect communities and reduce the population. 
In 1839, Davida Malo became the first public voice to address the population decline. In 
his essay in the periodical Hawaiian Spectator entitled “On the Decrease of Population in the 
Hawaiian Islands,” Malo suggested that the decline resulted from several factors, but chiefly 
from licentiousness with foreigners, sloth, and widespread disobedience to the will of God.50 
While factors that Malo identified played a part, the larger question concerns the inability of the 
Hawaiians to repopulate with births even during decades without major epidemics. Stannard 
points out that venereal diseases and tuberculosis have a powerful infertility result that lasts for 
years, and population censuses in the 1830s and 1840s confirm that the death rate was 
consistently higher than the birth rate.51 Crosby also cites infertility stemming from venereal 
diseases as a cause of the decline, but he adds that a sense of disorientation and community 
collapse among Hawaiians stemming from the arrival of foreigners in large numbers was also an 
important a factor.52 
As shipping arrivals increased, so too did the threat of foreign diseases. Fears that one of 
the ships would bring smallpox from the American west coast prompted enactment of the first 
quarantine laws in 1839.53 Richard A. Greer reported that after a scare in 1842 that a ship 
arriving from Tahiti had brought smallpox, another quarantine law took effect making knowingly 
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bringing a contagious disease ashore an act of murder punishable by hanging.54 In 1843, 
Governor Kekūanāoʻa posted sanitary ordinances in Hawaiian and English ordering all residents 
to keep the streets clear of nuisances such as hogs and tied-up horses, to sweep in front of their 
premises, and for all men to help when there was a building fire.55  
Recurring fears of contagion caused the strengthening of the quarantine laws in 1845 and 
1846. Then in 1848-1849, three epidemics struck at once. Reports suggest that measles, 
whooping cough, and influenza caused about 10,000 deaths out of an estimated population of 
100,000. Kuykendall described the impact of the three epidemics as “like a gigantic scythe, 
[cutting] great swaths through the native population.”56 Venereal diseases and tuberculosis also 
continued to claim victims, and by 1850 the Hawaiian population had dropped to about 84,000. 
In 1853 a smallpox epidemic tore through the Honolulu community, causing approximately 
2,500 deaths and further reducing the Hawaiian population to about 73,000. Although Hawaiians 
still comprised ninety-five percent of the total population, their death rate had soared in 
comparison to their birth rate.57  
A foreign population of sailors and vagabonds had settled in the islands within a decade 
of Cook’s arrival.58 Vancouver noted that by 1794 Hawaiians already had begun making 
distinctions between the British, Americans, Spanish and French.59 By the time that trader John 
Boit arrived at Kealakekua Bay in October 1795 aboard the Boston-registry ship Union, a 
community of foreign craftsmen had begun to form. Boit expected to encounter hostile natives; 
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instead, he found two white carpenters and a white blacksmith at work building a ship for the 
king.60 During sailmaker Archibald Campbell’s residency in 1809-1810, Kamehameha and the 
chiefs employed roughly sixty foreigners from different nations who practiced a variety of 
western trades such as carpentry, masonry, blacksmithing, and bricklaying that were required to 
maintain the chiefs’ own businesses.61 
A Russian naval officer who visited in 1816 counted about 150 foreigners living in the 
islands. A cosmopolitan merchant community had formed in Honolulu composed of Chinese, 
Germans, a Flathead Indian from the northwest coast of America, Russians, Britishers, 
Americans, Spaniards, a Negro, French, Italians, a Kodiak islander.62 Russian and English 
language newspapers could be found in port at Honolulu in 1816 of “not too ancient a date.”63 
Four American mercantile trading houses set up Pacific headquarters in Honolulu in 1822, and 
more Americans arrived to hold ships at the ready to service mercantile bases along the 
northwestern coast of North America.64 
 By the 1830s, the word “foreigner” referred not only to transients and merchants, but also 
to residents from several different countries and several different language groups.  Spanish-
Mexican cowboys called paniolo were hired by 1830 to herd and slaughter wild cattle, then tan 
the cattle hides for export and sale in Lima, Peru. In 1835, an American businessman named 
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William French brought in a number of Chinese to run a sugar mill, and several sugar plantations 
in Kohala and Hilo on Hawaiʻi island were managed by Chinese. In 1849, Captain H. Hackfeld 
opened a store in Honolulu that he stocked with goods he brought with him from Hamburg, 
Germany. Other German merchants followed Hackfeld, and soon a substantial German 
community had formed.65 Census figures show that by 1850 there were 1,572 foreign residents.66 
Growth of a part-Hawaiian community of 983 people was first recorded in the 1853 census.67 
Both Kamehameha I and Liholiho had forcibly expelled undesirable and unruly 
foreigners, and in 1822 Liholiho posted the first printed regulations specifying confinement or 
expulsion of foreigners for breaches of the peace.68Arista notes another turning point in 
Hawaiian law, when in 1827 the same written laws extended personal jurisdiction over 
foreigners and Hawaiians alike. While proper behavior in the traditional society had been 
maintained over Hawaiians by the social control of kinship networks, now unruly behavior by 
foreigners had prompted the need for a new mode of control for everyone.69 By 1842, a 
compendium of printed statute laws promulgated by the legislature were applicable to both 
Hawaiians and foreigners. The statute laws prohibited a variety of unruly and disorderly 
behaviors, ranging from vagrancy to horse racing and drunkenness, as well as specifying laws 
respecting partnerships and debtors.70 
Before 1840, social and political divisions in the European-American community fell 
along missionary and mercantile factions, but after 1840 they divided along international 
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rivalries between the Americans and the British. Commercial disputes between them widened the 
gap further.71 Pauline King Joerger reported that by the 1850s the American business community 
controlled much of the wealth and commerce of the kingdom, followed closely in importance by 
the British community. While there were about 124 Chinese residents, only twelve were 
prosperous businessmen, while the remainder were contract agricultural workers on rural farms. 
The German community composed of immigrants from Belgium, Holland and the German states 
held important business control but little political influence, and there were small communities of 
French and Portuguese.72  
 
Commerce and urban growth 
By 1800, Americans dominated in the northwest fur trade, and Boston traders routinely ported at 
Hawaiʻi to refresh and refit. After 1812, Hawaiians discovered that fur traders would exchange 
western goods for sandalwood from Hawaiian forests, and soon a brisk trade developed. 
Harvesting controls imposed by Kamehameha were lifted after his death in 1819, and chiefs 
diverted labor from food production to sandalwood cutting.73 Soon so much sandalwood freight 
left the islands that Boston trading houses had to station ships and agents at Honolulu to 
coordinate cargoes.74 By 1829, unrestrained harvesting exhausted the forests and collapsed the 
trade.75 
However, whaling ships had begun to arrive in large numbers to winter at island harbors, 
and servicing the fleet’s maintenance and provisioning needs filled the economic gap left by the 
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collapse of the sandalwood trade.76 Honolulu also became a mercantile distributing point. 
Cargoes brought from the U.S., China and Europe were broken up so that some of the goods 
could be sold locally, while the rest were transshipped to California, the Pacific northwest, and 
other points in the Pacific.77 The British Hudson’s Bay Company, which controlled most of the 
fur-trading business in the Pacific northwest, located an agent at Honolulu in 1835 to establish 
trade with western businesses for commodities it needed to develop the resources of the 
Columbia River region. Hudson’s Bay Company also brought in cargoes from England and 
opened a mercantile store to sell goods in the local market, and other British merchants 
followed.78 
 Gavan Daws drew a picture of Honolulu in 1840 as a thriving urbanized town, with 
twenty retail stores, two hotels, two taverns, seven bowling alleys, three vegetable markets, and 
twelve boarding houses for seamen. A multiplicity of tradesmen provided services. According to 
Daws, there were four blacksmiths’ shops, fourteen ships’ carpenters, sailmakers, caulkers, and 
printers. Most firms were one-person businesses, but several larger Honolulu firms had branches 
at Lahaina, the second-largest port in the kingdom.79 A modern police force was established by 
1840 statutes authorizing the governors to appoint officers and constables “for the protection of 
the people and villages.”80 In 1845, the government hired a German engineer to survey the 
streets and draw a map of Honolulu.81 
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Harbor fees and land rents were no longer sufficient to fund either the salaries of 
government workers or other functions, such as schools, customs collection, or upkeep on roads, 
bridges, wharves and landings which were demanded by urban growth. A treasury board was 
formed in 1842 to manage the kingdom’s finances, and Judd as its president began the first 
regular and systematic accounting procedures. Judd developed additional revenue streams by 
licensing commercial activities such as grogshops, retail operations, and even bowling alleys. An 
1846 list of liquor license sales at Lahaina recorded twelve sales in one month ranging in price 
from $150 to $165, and the purchasers’ identities reveal the community’s demographics: 
“Ahsing, Pukikī [Portuguese] A. Manuel, and 10 haole.”82 The sale of certificates of Hawaiian 
registry for brigs also brought in funds, as did bonds for hotel and auctioneering operations. An 
interisland coasting service owned and run by Hawaiians went into business between the islands 
on a demand basis, and the government profited from the sale of coasting licenses.83 
When Wyllie arrived in 1844, he noted that the foreign population was “very 
considerable” and their rate of consumption of goods exceeded consumption by Hawaiians. 
American and British general merchants and storekeepers outfitted community and commercial 
needs, and their mercantile trade complemented the business brought by the whaling fleet.84 The 
1840s were boom years for whalers’ visits. Wyllie reported that whalers refitting at Hawaiian 
ports spent an average of $800 to $1500 annually on foodstuffs and store articles. Merchants’ 
prosperity became dependent on this whalers’ “floating market.” Crews on British and American 
ships of war preferred the port of Honolulu to any other Pacific port except Valparaiso, and their 
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ships visited frequently. Ships’ provisioners found that food was cheap and abundant, and the 
prospect of trade carried to French settlements at the Marquesas and Society Islands created new 
markets for island produce.85 A variety of commercial agricultural ventures including coffee, 
sugar, salt, cattle, kukui oil and fresh vegetables served island markets, the whaling industry, and 
export markets.86 
 Three newspapers published at Honolulu in 1844. The Polynesian and the Friend 
reported on local and international news for English-speaking readers, while Ka Nonanona 
(renamed Ka Elele Hawaii in 1845) printed news for Hawaiian-language readers. By 1844, one 
report of the missionaries’ statistics showed that nearly half of the population had learned to 
read, and approximately 20,000 students attended schools run by ABCFM and Roman Catholic 
missionaries. 87 All three newspapers offered public forums for readers to exchange their ideas 
and opinions.  
Because the Polynesian was purchased by the government in 1844 and operated as its 
official press organ, it also published “by authority” news about court proceedings, texts of 
legislative acts and diplomatic treaties, and diplomatic correspondence. In response to an 1845 
request from William Richards, editor Jarves reduced the price of the Polynesian and enlarged it 
to a paper of more general scope and utility for the resident foreign community. In his final 
report shortly before he resigned as Director of the Government Press in 1847, however, Jarves 
opined that “with our limited population a newspaper cannot be well conducted, except at an 
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annual loss.”88 Jarves’ final financial report validated his opinion: total receipts for newspaper 
sales from May 1, 1844 to April 1, 1847 were $2,658.97, while receipts for job work done on the 
press during the same period was five times greater, at $12,791.01. Chapter 6 “Tactical Use of 
Print Media” discusses the non-monetary value brought by the Polynesian because of its ability 
to focus local and international attention on the king’s sovereign rights and privileges. The same 
ships which carried foreign newspapers to Hawaiʻi also carried away copies of the Polynesian 
and spread official news about the kingdom at every port they entered.  
Continuing the bilingual approach to governance, the 1845 Act mandated that all of the 
kingdom’s laws be published in Hawaiian and English, and courts were ordered to use the 
English language in all cases involving foreigners. English was chosen as the approved language 
for the conduct of relations involving foreigners because it was the only foreign language 
through which the stipulations of diplomatic treaties were understood in the Hawaiian courts. 
Furthermore, American and British commercial interests predominated in Hawaiʻi’s 
marketplace, making English the language most useful to foreign residents in business matters. 
According to Wyllie, Kauikeaouli “speaks [English] sufficiently to carry on an ordinary 
conversation in that language” as does the kuhina nui. The governors of Maui, Oʻahu and 
Hawaiʻi understand English and speak it “a little.”89 However, the king and his chiefs continued 
to deliberate, issue orders, and negotiate treaty terms in Hawaiian. 
Hawaiian chiefs participated in commerce by leasing lands to foreign businesses, and 
other Hawaiians participated in the economy as investors in mercantile, whaling, or shipping 
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ventures. Some Hawaiians were merchants or shopkeepers in Honolulu; others were wage 
earners in shops or on the docks, and many were farmers who produced the goods that foreign 
merchants exported.90 As King Joerger pointed out, however, it was the foreign population that 
fueled the economic expansion of the kingdom. Merchant houses, ship chandleries, retail stores, 
saloons and hotels, and small service companies provided the primary economic activity of the 
business community and produced the major portion of the wealth of the kingdom. The 
economic health of those merchants in turn was dependent on the continued arrivals of large 
numbers of whalers. 91  
Meanwhile, Honolulu was urbanizing at the expense of the rest of the island. The town’s 
population in 1850 approximated 14,500, which was 3,500 more than resided in rural Oʻahu. The 
overall Hawaiian population may have been declining, but it was also redistributing in favor of 
urban Honolulu.92 
Honolulu was changing its appearance, and Hawaiians also adopted a western look. In 
1843, Malo in his capacity as General School Agent for the islands of Maui and Lānaʻi requested 
government money to buy western-style clothes for Maui teachers, and he provided a list of what 
they wanted: pleated skirts, collarets, white cloth for shirts, cloth suitable for trousers, and silk 
handkerchiefs.93 Three years later, Kekūanāoʻa solicited money from Judd to buy clothing for the 
33 men at the Punchbowl forts. Before we supplied them with mamaki, kapa, Kekūanāoʻa 
lamented, but now they want clothing—pants, shirts, jackets, hats, shoes, and all the regular 
equipment for a soldier.94 
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Land tenure restrictions impede agricultural growth  
Retaining Hawaiian control of the kingdom’s lands was a key political concern for Kauikeaouli 
that began in the 1830s when foreigners first began to assert ownership rights. There was no 
concept of private ownership, however, in the land tenure system that had supported the 
Hawaiian population over many generations. Unlike tribal ownership of land in New Zealand, or 
the village and communal system of land in Samoa, in Hawaiʻi it was the highest-ranking chief, 
the king, who owned the allodium, while the chief in whose hands he placed the land held it in 
trust.95 Like Hawaiian chiefs, foreigners who occupied land did so only at the pleasure of the 
king. Because of this, when Ladd & Co. formed the first foreign-owned sugar company in 1835 
and its principals needed a tract of land and a mill site on Kauaʻi,96 Kauikeaouli cautioned 
Governor Kaikioʻewa not to sell land, but to lease it: “alaila no lawe mai, mai haawi lilo loa oe i 
ka aina” (and at that time take it back, don’t give land away without restrictions).97  
Sugar cane had been grown on small lots in Hawaiʻi for many centuries. According to 
Robert C. Schmitt, the first commercial enterprise was begun in 1825 in upper Mānoa valley 
where seven acres were placed into cultivation.98 An 1840 survey cited by Kuykendall showed 
that several missionaries and chiefs started small sugar mills on Oʻahu, Kauaʻi and Maui and 
ground the cane that nearby farmers raised.99 In 1840, Kauikeaouli owned a sugar mill at 
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Wailuku, Maui which ground cane raised by individual farmers, and in 1841, the king also leased 
lands in upcountry Maui to a foreigner on which to grow cane and manufacture sugar.100 Carol 
A. MacLennan’s studies of sugar production on Maui showed that most commercial ventures in 
the 1840s were undertaken by Hawaiians, but that they generally failed because they were run as 
traditional Hawaiian agricultural endeavors without the economic controls normally found in 
foreign commercial enterprises.101  
Ladd & Co.’s fifty-year lease for a tract of land and mill site at Koloa made it the first 
permanent plantation of any size.102 Twenty-five acres of sugar cane were planted at Koloa in the 
first year, and the plantation also ground cane grown on small tracts by neighboring farmers.103 
The initial capital outlay was heavy, however, and early returns were small.  
In 1843, Ladd & Co. and the Hawaiian government contracted to promote a “Belgian 
Company of Colonization” on Kauaʻi lands, and Peter A. Brinsmade (a principal of Ladd & Co.) 
traveled to Belgium to enlist that country’s participation in the scheme. While in Europe, 
Brinsmade assisted the king’s diplomats with their efforts to secure recognition from Britain and 
France of the kingdom’s independent status. The Belgian colonization scheme failed, however, 
at the same time that Koloa’s sugar operations were winding down.104 
The Hawaiian government had loaned large sums of money to Ladd & Co. as part of the 
Belgian colonization agreement, and by 1844, Koloa Plantation owed the government $8,478.80 
for cash advances which it could  not repay. Judd, as president of the Treasury Board, authorized 
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a sheriff’s sale of the plantation and its improvements.105 Ladd & Co.’s debt to the government 
was arbitrated in 1846, and subsequent claims and counterclaims involving local business 
investors generated considerable ill will between the government and the foreign community for 
some time afterwards.106 Brinsmade and William N. Hooper, another of Ladd & Co.’s principals, 
became fierce critics of the king and his white ministers. 
But by 1845, Great Britain’s support for Charlton’s claim to fee simple ownership of a 
valuable Honolulu waterfront lot threatened the king’s ability to retain his allodial interest over 
leased lands. Charlton had occupied the land since his 1825 arrival, and he alleged that 
Kalanimoku had deeded the land to him, but none of the privy council members believed that 
Kalanimoku ever held the power to transfer land ownership, and they launched their own 
investigation.107 Between September 18 and October 8, 1845, privy council members heard 
testimony from fifteen witnesses who were a mix of foreigners, government officials, and 
Hawaiian chiefs, then issued a printed report of their findings disputing the deed’s validity.108 
Two months later, in December 1845, they began a political process that would forestall similar 
claims with the passage of the Law Creating the Board of Commissioners To Quiet Land Titles. 
Two more formal investigations into Charlton’s deed followed—one held by Admiral Seymour 
in 1846, and one held by the king in March 1847 at which Malo testified under oath that 
Kalanimoku lacked the chiefly power to grant a deed.109 Pamphlets of the proceedings were sold 
to publicize the government’s case.  
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Despite Charlton’s challenge, in 1847 the traditional land tenure system still vested 
Hawaiians with full control over land, labor and water resources, and sugar plantations run by 
foreigners were still in the minority. MacLellan concluded that sugar plantations gave Hawaiian 
chiefs the means to participate in Pacific basin commercial networks, just as the sandalwood 
trade had enabled them to do.110 Chapter 7 “Treaties and Secret Orders” examines the 
government’s efforts to increase domestic exports by negotiating favorable import duty rates on 
sugar and other products marketed abroad.  
Kauikeaouli’s opening speech at the 1847 legislative session linked together the need to 
provide clear land titles, the need to develop export products, and the need to raise capital to fund 
native farmers. Keoni Ana had reported to legislators at the beginning of the prior session that 
about 3,000 young men had left the land and were believed to be either sailing the oceans or 
living at widely scattered oceanic and American locations.111 Some of his people were suffering 
because a lack of cultivation had caused a scarcity of food, the king told the legislators, and “it 
pains me.” Hearkening back to the concerns voiced by the Lahaina letter-writers in 1845, 
Kauikeaouli told the legislators that without capital, his native subjects could not “buy cattle, 
fence in the land and cultivate it properly.” Land reform would ensure that his subjects could 
possess secure title for tillable lands on which they could grow export products, thus “enabling 
them to live in abundance and comfort, and to bring up their children free from the vices that 
prevail in the seaports.” As for capital, the king asked the legislators to find ways to induce 
foreigners to furnish it.112 
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Pauline King Joerger and Jon M. Van Dyke argued that Great Britain’s defense of 
Charlton’s land claim (see Chapter 5) was the principal driving force behind Kauikeaouli’s push 
for land reform. While it is clear that concern for the kingdom’s territorial integrity was 
uppermost in the king’s mind, Kauikeaouli’s May 1847 speech evidences that his desire to 
protect native Hawaiians’ ability to sustain themselves on the land also factored into his decision. 
Beamer endorses that conclusion. Kameʻeleihiwa explains that protecting society as a whole was 
a proper chiefly duty, and she concludes that the king and the chiefs relied on the advice of their 
foreign advisors and “accepted the opinion that [the Māhele] would truly benefit the 
makaʻāinana.”113 
Great Britain advised the Hawaiian government in August 1847 that it had rendered a 
final decision in favor of Charlton, and the chiefs surrendered the contested land parcel. An 
anonymous letter-writer from Koloa, Kauaʻi viewed the 1847 political events as forecasting that 
legal titles would be settled “in a couple of years.” Writing under the pseudonym “Apis” in the 
September 4, 1847 edition of the Polynesian, the letter-writer also applauded the fact that the 
government had recently leased lands to foreigners for “about a dozen” new sugar and coffee 
plantations.114 
 
Labor scarcities further threaten agriculture 
Labor for Koloa Plantation had been difficult to secure from local chiefs almost immediately, 
and in July 1841 a labor strike further compromised the plantation’s profitability. Koloa paid its 
workers 12.5 cents a day in scrip redeemable only at the company store for goods sold at inflated 
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prices, but its Hawaiian workers demanded double that amount paid in cash. The workers did not 
prevail, however, and they simply responded by finding employment elsewhere.115 In fact, many 
young Hawaiians abandoned agricultural work during the 1840s for the sense of adventure and 
better pay offered by signing on to whalers and merchant ships.  
A spike upwards in whaling ships’ arrivals at the islands after 1840 led to an increased 
need to recruit young Hawaiians to augment crews depleted during lengthy voyages.116 A statute 
enacted in 1841 for the protection of Hawaiian youths required ships’ captains first to receive the 
consent of the island’s governor before signing on a recruit, and then to post a $200 bond 
guaranteeing to return the Hawaiian seaman home within two years from the date of the bond 
and the shipping articles.117 One ship’s captain was forced to give up a Maui boy in 1844 when 
he tried to take the boy away without first receiving the father’s permission. By that time, 
shipping articles for whaling voyages commonly included a $20 pay advance and guaranteed 
wages ranging from $5 to $16 per month, which were sometimes paid as a share of the oil 
profits. Promotions to positions like harpooner would also increase a seaman’s pay. British 
regulations and market demand in the South Pacific further improved the treatment of Oceanian 
seamen.118 
In 1846, Keoni Ana decried the fact that one-fifth of the youth of Hawaii were 
“wandering on the ocean or in foreign lands” and that “there is no port in this ocean untrodden 
by Hawaiians.” Many Hawaiians in foreign ports want to come home, Keoni Ana reported, but 
lack the means to obtain passage on a vessel. At the same time, however, Keoni Ana expressed 
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the government’s reluctance to prevent whalers’ from signing on young Hawaiians because of 
the large contribution made by whalers to the kingdom’s foreign commerce and revenue 
income.119 
Hawaiians were also recruited by businesses like Hudson’s Bay Company to work in the 
fur trade in the Pacific Northwest, and as lumberjacks and sawmill operators. Fur companies 
depended on hiring Hawaiian boat handlers on three-year contracts for $10 a month plus food 
and clothing. Sir George Simpson of Hudson’s Bay Company provided anecdotal evidence that 
the fur company took hundreds of Hawaiian men to the Northwest yearly, and Simpson 
estimated that of the roughly one thousand males who left the islands annually, “a considerable 
portion of them don’t return, either dying or settling elsewhere.”120 Chappell presented statistical 
evidence in Double Ghosts that suggested a high percentage of Hawaiian seamen did in fact die 
from disease or accidents before completing their voyages. Out of a sample size of 43 Hawaiians 
who shipped out, about a third returned (35%), a third died overseas (32%), and a third were not 
heard from again (32%). These statistical findings demonstrated the risks encountered on ocean 
voyages and confirmed Simpson’s statement that a high percentage of Hawaiian youths never 
returned.121 
 Estimates published by Wyllie in 1844 (who at that time was the deputy British consul) 
corroborated Simpson’s outflow numbers.122 Once word went out that the king had granted 
permission to ships’ captains or businesses to recruit, as many as 500 men might assemble.123 In 
his 1847 report to the legislators, Interior Minister Keoni Ana noted that there were several 
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alarming reports of husbands who had enlisted on board ships without their wives’ knowledge 
and left them destitute. Keoni Ana called for new legislation to remedy the problem, and 
Hawaiian legislators responded by passing a statute that required ships’ recruits to post a bond as 
support for their wives and families in addition to the bonds posted by ships’ captains 
guaranteeing their return.124 Hawaiians leaving for California during the 1848 gold rush also had 
to post bonds before they could leave. Additional government measures were taken in 1850 to 
stem the outflow, including a law prohibiting Hawaiian youths from emigrating except for 
specified reasons.125 
By 1845 the out-migration of Hawaiian youths between the ages of 15 and 30 had so 
severely depleted the potential labor pool for agricultural work that it hindered the ability of 
foreign planters to sustain their businesses. But not only out-migration caused labor shortages: 
Osorio reported that rapid depopulation also had severely depleted the labor pool needed by 
Hawaiian farmers to sustain their own extensive cultivation of the upland areas, and food 
shortages resulted.126 
Edward D. Beechert described the several proposals that some planters made to solve the 
shortage problem, ranging from compulsory day labor for all Hawaiians between the years 14 to 
30, to fixing wages and output for each worker through a task system, or to an uku-pau system 
where the worker could quit for the day when his assigned task had been completed.127 Other 
prospective employers proposed solving the shortage by developing what Eric Wolf in Europe 
and the People Without History termed a modern “labor diaspora,” in this case an inbound 
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diaspora, where job seekers from other areas of the world would migrate to fill the local labor 
pool.128 
Ideas on how to develop such a labor pool to staff large-scale agricultural ventures were 
debated in the press. An editorial in the September 4, 1847 issue of the Polynesian urged the 
importation of laborers from China. Editorials in the Polynesian on October 9 and October 16 
extolled agriculture’s material advantages for the Hawaiian economy and laid out specific 
measures to promote large-scale development. Both of the October editorials recommended 
staffing plantations with workers from northern Europe. While he stopped short of endorsing the 
importation of a labor pool, Keoni Ana pointed out in his 1846 report that the size of the foreign 
population “by no means” was equal to the number of Hawaiians who had gone abroad.129  
Prompted by the public debate, on October 23, 1847 the privy council took up 
consideration of a resolution recommending the importation of German laborers.130 Members of 
the privy council already had expressed a reluctance the previous April to giving “any 
appearance of inviting foreigners to come into the islands or to take lands,” and the October 23 
meeting minutes indicate that the Hawaiian chiefs continued to be concerned: “some of the 
chiefs remarked that there might be a danger in opening a door for too many foreigners to come 
into the islands.”131 Pākī enlarged on the chiefs’ concerns in a written statement: “aole pono ia 
kakou e palapala aku e holo mai na lakou no e holo mai ko lakou manao iho, mai hooholo kakou 
o nui loa a pilikia na kanaka maoli.. . . it will not be proper for us to write them to come, they can 
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come on their own volition, we should not consent or there will be too many and the native 
Hawaiians will be in trouble.”132 
The Hawaiian chiefs recognized that an organized and sustained influx of foreigners 
could easily overwhelm the Hawaiian population, already reduced by disease and the voluntary 
diaspora of its young men. Resolution of labor staffing needs for agricultural enterprises lay in 
the future, however.133 Meanwhile, the effects of the global processes Merry had identified might 
yet overwhelm the kingdom. Kauikeaouli and the chiefs had put into place the hybridized 
governance framework that Beamer described, and they had implemented policies designed to 
absorb the influx of foreigners into the Hawaiian body politic. As Kauikeaouli and the chiefs 
searched for an alternative economic crop and considered the final division of land interests, 
foremost in their minds was the need identified by Jarves to protect the safety and security of 

















                                                 
132 A. Pākī, “Kumu Manao,” 28 October 1847, M-80, folder 1-4, Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole Collection, Manuscript 
Collection, HSA. The archival translation is unattributed and appears to have been made in 1847. 
133 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:328-9. Government measures were later taken to stem the outflow, including 




WESTERN-EDUCATED MINISTERS DEFEND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS 
 
In June 1839, Kauikeaouli, kuhina nui Kekāuluohi, and the chiefs Hoapilikāne, Hoapiliwahine, 
Keohokālole, and Mataio Kekūanāoʻa petitioned the SIM contingent to assign Amos Starr and 
Juliette Montague Cooke to educate the chiefs’ children who would be the kingdom’s future 
leaders.1 Mr. Cooke was a Connecticut native and Mrs. Cooke was from Massachusetts. They 
had married shortly before departing from Boston harbor in December 1836 as members of the 
eighth contingent sent by the ABCFM and had arrived in April 1837.  
Ke Kula Keiki Aliʻi, the Chiefs’ Children’s School, was formally established in 1840. It 
was funded by the kingdom to educate the royal children exclusively, and Mr. and Mrs. Cooke 
remained as the school’s instructors until its closure in 1850. Beamer described the school as a 
hybrid institution—neither traditionally Hawaiian nor controlled by SIM members—but one 
which disrupted traditional relationships by separating the children from their parents and their 
attendants. The Cookes provided a formal Euro-American education designed to internationalize 
the students, and they instructed in English so that the future rulers could acquire the linguistic 
ability necessary to interact with foreigners.2 Although the students studied geometry, grammar, 
algebra, moral science, bookkeeping, trigonometry, and the natural sciences, Linda K. Menton 
pointed out that they were taught almost nothing about western government, economic or legal 
systems, or diplomacy. Menton decried that lack in her study of the school’s operation, because 
she concluded that it left the royal heirs “ill-prepared to deal with the limiting effects of 
constitutional restraints, the complexities of capitalism, the critical issue of land tenure, or the 
                                                 
1 M. A. Richards, The Hawaiian Chiefs’ Children’s School, 25-6. 
2 Beamer, No Mākou Ka Mana, 156-61. 
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economic and political demands of the outside world.”3 Beamer, however, celebrated what he 
viewed as the foresight of Kauikeaouli and the chiefs for having the children educated in the 
protocols, knowledge systems, and languages of other countries so that they would be prepared 
to rule in a new world.4 
In the 1840s, however, the young chiefs had not yet left school. Nevertheless, complex 
statecraft issues arose involving the state’s exercise of its functional powers. And even though 
Lahainaluna Seminary had graduated an educated group of Hawaiian scholars like Davida Malo 
and Boaz Māhune on whom the king and the chiefs relied for secular advice, members of the 
chiefly ranks serving in the House of Nobles and privy council lacked familiarity with the 
technical complexities of western statecraft necessary to make strong diplomatic and legal 
defenses of the kingdom’s positions. Facing the prospect of loss of functional control in key 
areas, Kauikeaouli hired western-educated whites to serve as ministers and engage with agents of 
western powers in the defense of the kingdom’s rights and privileges. This chapter explores 
Kauikeaouli’s rationale for that decision, his response to the hostility it generated, and his own 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the governance actions that flowed from the directive. 
Although the king’s decision engendered harsh criticism from white residents, consular agents 
and Hawaiians, the employment of western-educated white ministers laid the foundation for the 
kingdom’s control of international political interactions.5 
 
                                                 
3 Linda K. Menton, “A Christian and ‘Civilized’ Education: The Hawaiian Chiefs’ Children’s School, 1839-50,” 
History of Education Quarterly 32, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 228-9, 242. 
4 Beamer, No Mākou Ka Mana, 161. 
5 I refer to these ministers as “white” rather than using the commonly-accepted Hawaiian word “haole.” The official 
texts that appear extensively in this chapter translate the word “haole” as “white,” “whitemen,” or “foreigner.” 
Because the white ministers took oaths of allegiance, the translation “foreigner” is not a good fit. Also, it is unlikely 
that Miller or Brown would have used the Hawaiian word in their own speech. For those reasons, I find it more 
appropriate to use the word “white” throughout. 
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Treaties of unequal alliance 
British Consul General William Miller carried two documents for the king to execute when he 
arrived in Hawaiʻi in February 1844: the first resolved claims stemming from Paulet’s seizure, 
and the second presented a commercial treaty, entitled a convention, to replace any earlier 
commercial treaties between the two states.6 The terms of the first document had been agreed to 
in London by Kauikeaouli’s ambassadors, Haʻalilio and Richards, and the king promptly 
executed it. The terms of the second, Kauikeaouli learned, had been fixed in London by British 
diplomats and were not negotiable. In fact, the convention that Miller presented mirrored the 
extraterritorial terms of the Convention between France and Hawaiʻi of 1839 that had been 
forced on Kauikeaouli by LaPlace: Article III created jury composition protections for British 
citizens tried in Hawaiian courts, and Article VI required Hawaiʻi to accept all goods of every 
kind imported from British dominions (including liquors and beers, which the king had 
attempted to curtail) with a ceiling of five percent on the kingdom’s income from British import 
duties.7 Kauikeaouli found that his authority over the functions of the courts, imports, and a 
major revenue source were now doubly curtailed by treaties with Britain and France that jurist 
Henry Wheaton had described in 1836 as treaties of unequal alliance.8 Left with no choice, on 
February 12 Kauikeaouli executed his acceptance of what became known as the 1844 Treaty of 
Lahaina.9  
                                                 
6 Specifically, the 1836 Agreement negotiated by Lord Russell granted to British citizens certain property and 
ownership rights, but only so long as the king agreed. See Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:148, 1:204. Thomas’ 
treaty resolved claims arising from Paulet’s seizure.  
7 “Convention between Great Britain and the Sandwich Islands,” Friend, 20 February 1844, Extra, where the 
identical terms were at Articles 4 and 6. Extraterritorial judicial restrictions are discussed in Chapter 5 “Legal and 
Land Reforms,” and extraterritorial economic restrictions are discussed in Chapter 7 "Treaties and Secret Orders.” 
8 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law: with a Sketch of the History of the Science (Philadelphia: Carey, 
Lea &  Blanchard, 1836), 51. 
9 “Convention,” Friend, February 20, 1844, Extra; Robert Crichton Wyllie, Table of Consular Grievances, 1843-
1846 (Hawaiʻi: 1848), 2. 
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Great Britain had mirrored the terms in LaPlace’s 1839 Convention by design. France 
had out-maneuvered Great Britain at the Society Islands two years earlier, and (despite French 
protestations to the contrary) France appeared intent on retaining control over both Tahiti and the 
Leeward Islands.10 Great Britain needed the neutral ports at Hawaiʻi so that its naval and 
merchant ships could refit on voyages between the northwest coast of America and the South 
Pacific, Australia, and New Zealand.11 Copying the terms that the French had secured 
demonstrated to the French both Britain’s willingness to coexist with them at an independent 
Hawaiʻi as well as Britain’s determination to prevent France from securing any superior 
commercial or political advantage at those ports.12 Thus the 1844 Treaty of Lahaina served Great 
Britain’s broader political and trade purposes, and it turned out to be the price that Britain 
demanded of the king for handing back the political sovereignty usurped by Paulet. 
Consequently, Kauikeaouli found that his ability to exercise authority over economic and 
juridical policies was more limited by the Treaty of Lahaina than it had been when Haʻalilio and 
Richards set out on their mission two years earlier.13  
Consul General Miller was an Englishman who had distinguished himself in several 
South American revolutionary battles against the Spaniards before turning to a career in 
diplomacy at the Hawaiian Islands.14 Honolulu in 1844 had the air of a “rising City,” Miller 
                                                 
10 J. R. Baldwin, “England and the French Seizure of the Society Islands,” The Journal of Modern History 10, no. 2 
(1938):215, 217; “Queen Pomare IV to Louis Philippe, King of the French, September 25, 1844,” trans. Geo. Platt 
(Honolulu: Hon. L. Hope, n.d.). 
11 Jean I. Brookes, International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875 (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1941), 
155. 
12 Brookes, International Rivalry, 151; Edward Everett, U. S. Minister to Great Britain to Daniel Webster, U. S. 
Secretary of State, 28 March 1843 and Everett to A. P. Upshur, U. S. Secretary of State, 15 August 1843, U. S. 
Congress, Senate Journal, “Papers and Documents relating to the Hawaiian Islands, comprised in Senate executive 
documents nos. 45, 57, 76, 77,” 52nd Cong., 2d session.  
13 Refer to Chapters 5 and 7 for a discussion of his strategy to remove those limitations. 
14 Frederic Boase, Modern English Biography, containing many thousand concise memoirs of person who have died 
between the years 1851-1900 with an index of the most interesting matter, Vol. 2 I-Q (Reprint: 1897, New York: 
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wrote, with well laid out unpaved streets that were dry and clean. Thirty or forty houses of stone 
were occupied by foreigners and chiefs. The Protestant mission’s stone church held from three to 
four thousand people. Two English commercial houses operated, while the rest of the 
commercial trade was in the hands of Americans. Despite the Americans’ dominant 
merchandising position, however, Miller noted that most goods consumed were of British 
manufacture.15 Miller commented favorably on the “propriety and decency” of the ceremony at 
Lahaina presided over by the king when Miller delivered his Letter of Credentials: there were 
assembled six or seven principal chiefs, the premier, and two lady chiefs who “from their manner 
& dresses would not have disgraced a Drawing Room in Europe.”16  
At that time, international commercial networks linked private business enterprises at 
harbors and ports throughout the Pacific region, and Honolulu Harbor had become the principal 
gathering place at which commercial and naval shipping from Great Britain, France, and the 
United States mingled to refresh and refit. Government officials Keoni Ana and John Papa ʻĪʻī 
described Hawaiʻi’s geographic attractiveness to foreign ships in the legislature’s defense of the 
need for white expertise: “He aina keia ua kupono ma ke alanui o na moku holo ma ka moana 
Pakifika nei.”; “This is a land which lies where ships in the Pacific Ocean often come.”17 One 
hundred sixty-eight whaling and merchant vessels arrived at Honolulu harbor during the year 
                                                 
Barnes & Noble, 1965), 883-4. Miller also had been appointed Consul for the Society and Friendly Islands and other 
islands in the Pacific Ocean. See “The Arrival of General Miller,” Friend, 15 February 1844. 
15 Wm. Miller to H. U. Addington, 27 February 1844, “Appendix A: Hawaii in 1844,” Report of the Historical 
Commission of the Territory of Hawaii for the Two Years Ending December 31, 1928, Publications of the Historical 
Commission of the Territory of Hawaii, Vol. 1, no. 5 (Honolulu: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd, 1929), 13-5.  
16 Miller to Addington, February 27, 1844, “Appendix A,” Report, 14.  
17 John “Keoni Ana” Young, Ioane “John” ʻĪʻī, “Na Manao O Ka Ahaolelo No Na Mea i Hoopiia,” Ka Elele, 05 July 
1845. My punctuation. They wrote in response to the several petitions that had been filed protesting in part the 
employment of white ministers. The English translation is from “Reply of the Council Assembled to the Petition,” 
Friend, 01 August 1845, and the editor noted that the full answer to the petitions was translated for their use from 
the article in Ka Elele. See Chapter 3, “Changing Hawaiʻi in the 1840s” for a description of the several roles that 
Young and ʻĪʻī filled. 
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1843; one hundred nine of them were American-registry, seven were British-registry, and 
fourteen were French-registry.18 As Miller would discover, merchants brought their international 
rivalries ashore with them, and turned Honolulu into what Foreign Relations Minister Robert C. 
Wyllie called a “hot-bed of faction, envy, misrepresentation and all uncharitableness.”19 Rights 
and privileges granted to one of them were immediately demanded by the other two “[so] great is 
the jealousy here of the agents of different foreign Nations, each complaining of injustice to his 
own Countrymen and of a denial of privileges granted to the Subjects of other Nations.”20 
Indeed, just as soon as the newly-arrived U. S. Commissioner George Brown of Massachusetts 
learned that Hawaiʻi had executed a treaty with Great Britain, animosities boiled over and 
threatened to cripple the ability of Kauikeaouli’s government to function. 
Brown had arrived in Honolulu in October 1843 charged with the responsibility to 
“frustrate” attempts by any other foreign power to obtain exclusive commercial or political 
influence in the islands.21 His first impression of Kauikeaouli during a November interview was 
positive: “I was much pleased with his Majesty, who appears to be an intelligent and very kind 
hearted man, with every intention to do right.”22 Brown’s initial impression of Gerrit P. Judd also 
had been favorable, and he recommended that Judd be appointed to a new position of Minister of 
                                                 
18 R. C. Wyllie, “Comparative Table for Twenty Years, of the Yearly Arrivals of Whaling and Merchant Vessels at 
the Port of Honolulu, S.I.,” Friend, 01 May 1844. 
19 R. C. Wyllie to Commodore John D. Sloat, 28 October 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Local, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. 
20 R. C. Wyllie to Archibald Barclay, 14 March 1846, Series 410, Box 3, Book 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
21 After a journey that included a lengthy stopover at Tahiti awaiting a ship to carry him to Hawaiʻi. See Colin 
Newbury, “Commissioner George Brown at Tahiti, 1843,” HJH 20 (1986): 83; see also Kenneth E. Shewmaker, 
“Forging the ‘Great Chain’: Daniel Webster and the Origins of American Foreign Policy Toward East Asia and the 
Pacific, 1841-1852,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 129, no. 3 (1985):232. 
22 Ralph S. Kuykendall, “Correspondence of United States Diplomatic Representative in Hawaii with the Secretary 
of State,” Hawaiian Diplomatic Correspondence in the Bureau of Indexes and Archives of the Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. Publications of the Historical Commission of the Territory of Hawaii, Vol. 1, no. 3. (Honolulu: 
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 1926), 11-2. 
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Foreign Affairs. Judd, trained as a medical doctor, had been raised in New York state and had 
arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1828 as a member of the third company sent by the ABCFM.23 Judd had 
resigned from his mission position in 1842 when he replaced the departing Richards in the 
position of Government Interpreter and Recorder for the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi.24 In one of his 
first diplomatic reports, Brown wrote that Judd was the best man that the king could have 
selected for the position: “speaking the language fluently and writing it with ease, gentlemanly 
and mild in his deportment but firm in his actions, and having had the confidence of the King & 
Chiefs—over whom he has great influence—for a long time.”25 
But when he learned of the 1844 Treaty of Lahaina three months later, Brown reacted 
furiously, alleging that ‘common courtesy’ dictated that the U. S. Commissioner should have 
seen a draft of what was proposed by Great Britain before the king had signed it.26 Brown 
focused his ire on the jury composition and selection rules in Article III which gave the British 
consul the authority to select jurors from among foreign residents. A consul’s standard duties 
included aiding and protecting citizens from the country which credentialed him, and Brown 
promptly lodged a formal protest with the Hawaiian government demanding that the same jury 
selection and composition terms enjoyed by British defendants also apply to American 
defendants.27 
                                                 
23 Jane L. Silverman, “Imposition of a Western Judicial System in the Hawaiian Monarchy,” HJH 16 (1982):54. 
24 HSA card file records. The position was established by the legislature as of May 12, 1842. Judd was appointed as 
President of the new Treasury Board on the same date.  
25 Kuykendall, Correspondence of U. S. Diplomatic Representative, 11-2; Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 190. 
26 George Brown, 14 February 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 1, Consular, Consular Correspondence, HSA. Brown 
did not believe that the LaPlace treaty was binding on the Hawaiian government because it had been forced on them, 
and so he made no attempt to demand the same privileges based on that treaty. See George Brown to his wife, 17 
October 1844, MS Brown, Correspondence 1843-1846, HHS. 
27 Wyllie, Table, 4. The implication is that a jury of one’s own countrymen would be more likely to acquit. 
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Despite U. S. recognition of Hawaiʻi’s independence, no commercial treaty existed 
between the two nations, however, and Brown’s credentials did not include the authority to 
negotiate.28 Furthermore, on February 17 (just five days after execution of the Treaty of Lahaina) 
the Hawaiian government had formally requested of the British government that its ministers 
confer with French ministers to reconsider the terms of Article III.29 The Earl of Aberdeen 
advised Miller in July 1844 that the British government would discuss modifications with French 
officials which “may be mutually satisfactory to all parties.”30 Accordingly, it made little sense 
for the Hawaiian government to expand application of the article while it still hoped that Britain 
and France could be persuaded to withdraw it. 
Brown’s protest over the applicability to American citizens of Article III of the 1844 
Treaty of Lahaina languished until August 1844, when an American named John Wiley went on 
trial for rape of a Hawaiian woman.31 The court selected Wiley’s jury in accordance with 
Hawaiian law: one-half of the jury was selected from among other resident Americans, and the 
other half from among Hawaiians.32 Brown protested vigorously, but Judd, writing for the 
government, relied on the kingdom’s sovereign powers to enact jury selection statutes and the 
absence of any treaty terms with the Americans modifying those statutes.33 
                                                 
28 The commercial Hawaiʻi-United States Jones Treaty of 1826 was not in effect as it had not been ratified by the 
U.S. Senate. 
29 Wyllie, Table, 2, 4. 
30 Official Journal of the Hawaiian Government, “Earl of Aberdeen to W. Miller, 01 July 1844,” Polynesian, 02 
November 1844. 
31 Wyllie, Table, 5-6. Complaint preferred by George Brown, 27, 30, 31 August and 04, 05, 16, 18 September 1844. 
32 Laws and Regulations, 11 August 1843, Series 418, Folio 8-3, Early Laws, HSA; “Review of Correspondence 
between H.H.M.ʼs Secretary of State and the U. S. Commissioner in the case of John Wiley,” Friend, 14 November 
1844 Extra. Hawaiian law mirrored the terms imposed by Admiral Thomas, but the 1844 Treaty of Lahaina required 
that all jurors be foreign residents. See “Agreement between Rear-Admiral Thomas and the King of the Sandwich 
Islands, 31 July 1843,” British and Foreign State Papers, 1842-1843, Vol. 31 (London: James Ridgway and Sons, 
1858), 1032-4 and “Convention between Great Britain and the Sandwich Islands,” Friend, 20 February 1844. 
33 G. P. Judd to G. Brown, 14 September 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 3, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA; 
Correspondence between H.H.M. Secretary of State and the U.S. Commissioner, in the Case of John Wiley, an 
American Citizen (Honolulu: Government Press, 1844), 4-5; Correspondence between U. S. officials at Hawaiʻi and 
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On March 14, 1844, British Consul General Miller refiled former trade consul Richard 
Charlton’s claim for redress and damages stemming from his alleged ownership of a parcel of 
land at Honolulu. Other British claimants had also raised charges of unfair treatment in the 1842 
resolutions of their disputes by Hawaiian courts, but Charlton’s claim had been the lead charge in 
the demands levied by Paulet in 1843.34 While in London negotiating for recognition for the 
kingdom, Richards and Haʻalilio authorized the Earl of Aberdeen to resolve Charlton’s claim 
(along with the other disputed case decisions), and Aberdeen referred Charlton’s lawsuit back to 
the Hawaiian courts to decide evidentiary claims.35 One disinterested observer—the U. S. 
Ambassador to the Court of St. James—reported to his superiors that Charlton’s claims seemed 
to him “such as are too apt to be set up by the strong against the weak.”36 When Charlton 
produced for the Hawaiian court what he claimed was a valid deed, even most of Honolulu’s 
American residents believed it had been dishonestly drawn up, and Kauikeaouli did not intend to 
grant Charlton’s demands based on what he and the chiefs believed was a falsification of the 
facts in evidence.37 
                                                 
government ministers continued throughout 1844 and 1845 and eventually amounted to more than two hundred 
printed pages. Attorney General John Ricord appeared to have crafted many of Judd’s responses.  
34 Alexander Simpson, The Sandwich Islands: Progress of Events Since Their Discovery by Captain Cook; Their 
Occupation by Lord George Paulet; Their Value and Importance (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1843), 79-80; 
Lord Aberdeen to T. Haʻalilio and W. Richards, 12 September 1843, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2, Hawaiian Officials 
Abroad, FO&EX, HSA which set the stage for the retrial to examine Charlton’s land claim. The king had refused 
Paulet’s demand to reverse the other disputed court decisions. 
35 Aberdeen to Haʻalilio and Richards, 12 September 1843, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2. The diplomats accepted 
Aberdeen’s dispositions. The other lawsuits were the Skinner-Dominis claim and the F. J. Greenway bankruptcy. 
See Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:209 for a full discussion of the role of Hawaiian courts, animosity between 
British and American merchants, and why Haʻalilio and Richards purposefully involved Aberdeen in the disposition 
of these Hawaiian court cases. 
36 Edward Everett, U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain to Abel Patrick Upshur, ad interim U.S. Secretary of State, 15 
August and 28 September 1843, U. S. Congress, Papers and documents relating to the Hawaiian Islands, S Ex 77, 
No. 50 and 56. 
37 Laura Fish Judd, Honolulu: Sketches of Life Social, Political, and Religious, in the Hawaiian Islands from 1828 to 
1861 (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company, 1880), 144. 
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Brown’s jury composition demands and the Charlton case progressed through the 
Hawaiian courts at the same time, and they both posed complex questions about statute law, 
international law, and legal procedure. At stake in the Wiley and Charlton disputes was the 
king’s ability to exercise jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters over all persons, property and 
events within his sovereign territory. The significance of the disputes reaches far beyond their 
individual facts or outcomes, however, because it was these disputes which led Kauikeaouli to 
reach a policy decision to employ whites with western skills in key ministerial positions.  
 
Rationale for the hiring policy 
It quickly became apparent that the Hawaiian government needed persons in its employ who 
understood the interaction of kingdom law with treaty and international law and could make a 
strong legal defense for the kingdom’s position. Judd himself recognized his own inability to 
continue to manage the complex legal disputes raised by Brown without assistance.38 By chance, 
a New Jersey native and member of the New York State Bar named John Ricord arrived in 
Honolulu in late February. Ricord was the first western-trained lawyer in Hawaiʻi, and within 
two weeks’ time, Judd had arranged Ricord’s appointment as the kingdom’s first Attorney 
General.39 Ricord took the lead in the Charlton case; it turned out to be a long and contentious 
legal battle involving disputes with Charlton and the British government over evidentiary proofs 
and appropriate legal forums.40 Although Charlton eventually prevailed, the acrimony with 
                                                 
38 G. P. Judd to T. Haʻalilio, W. Richards, and G. Simpson, 04 May 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 1, Letters, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA.  
39 Silverman, “Western Judicial System,” 6-58; Judd announcement, 11 March 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 1, 
Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
40 G. P. Judd to William Miller, 02 April 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 1, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA; 
T. Haʻalilio and W. Richards to Kamehameha III, 30 September 1843, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2, Hawaiian 
Officials Abroad, FO&EX, HSA. The British government remained involved based on Aberdeen’s referral back to 
the Hawaiian courts for an evidentiary decision. 
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which the case played out poisoned Miller’s relationship with the Hawaiian government for 
several years.41 
Hawaiian rulers routinely delegated political power over polity-wide tasks through 
several layers of chiefs serving as line officers.42 This practice of delegating authority began at 
least as early as 1720: the ruler issued orders to line officers who carried the orders down to 
others through established channels.43 Beginning with Kamehameha I, Hawaiian kings often 
took the counsel of white advisors. Kamehameha I’s long relationships with Britishers John 
Young and Isaac Davis are well-reported, and Kamehameha I, Liholiho and Kauikeaouli all 
employed whites in positions requiring western technical expertise, such as harbor master, or as 
ships’ captains. Kaʻahumanu routinely counseled with several of the missionaries, most notably 
the Rev. Hiram Bingham. Despite that, not until the appointments of Richards and Judd had 
whites assumed control over governmental functions and taken orders from the ruling chief to 
transmit down the line—but both men first had risen to a level of trust over several years’ service 
as SIM members. Osorio noted, however, that Ricord’s appointment disconcerted the 
makaʻāinana because it marked a signal departure from prior practice: Ricord was unknown to 
the chiefs and took control over a governmental function based solely on his claims of 
professional and educational skills.44 
While the immediate legal need had been filled by Ricord, none of the kingʼs chiefs or 
ministers possessed the diplomatic skills required to manage the kingdom’s relations with 
western governments.45 On March 26, 1845, the king commissioned a Britisher, Robert Crichton 
                                                 
41 Wyllie, Table, 47-54. 
42 Hommon, Ancient Hawaiian State, 134. 
43 Hommon, Ancient Hawaiian State, 251. 
44 Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui, 36. 
45 G. P. Judd to G. Simpson, 03 July 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 2, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
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Wyllie, as Minister of Foreign Relations, whose role would be the same as those of foreign 
ministers serving in the governments of Great Britain, the United States, France and Belgium, 
and Judd moved to the position of Minister of the Interior.46 Wyllie, a Scot with extensive 
worldwide business interests, had arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1844 as Miller’s secretary, and he had 
served as interim British consul during Miller’s absences to perform his consular duties in the 
South Pacific. Wyllieʼs international contacts that he had developed through successful 
international business ventures gave him a broad understanding of the intricacies of government-
to-government relationships. 
Executive communications reveal Kauikeaouli’s thinking on his hiring policy 
formulation. After Brown’s communications with Judd and Ricord became more and more 
intemperate during the summer of 1844, Kauikeaouli reached out to U. S. President John Tyler 
(1841-1845) in a September 20, 1844 letter. The king acknowledged to Tyler his need for 
Hawaiian juridical changes and his need to hire educated foreigners to work under his direction 
and provide the ministerial expertise needed to implement the changes: “E kii ia na haole naauao 
e kokua mai ma keia hana, o ka poe ua hoohiki mai mamuli o’u, a e hooikaika lakou mamuli o’u 
e hooko like i ua mau kanawai la me ka paewaewa ole, e like me na oihana a me na manao o na 
aina naauao. . . . To fulfill these the auxiliary aid of intelligent foreigners will be called in who 
having sworn allegiance to me will exert themselves under my direction to execute those laws 
equally and impartially pursuant to the principles and doctrines of civilized nations.”47 In a 
February 1845 letter to Pōmare IV, Kauikeaouli extolled the strategic value that he believed the 
                                                 
46 March 1845 Proclamation and Commission, Letterbook 1, April 1845 – Nov. 1846, Interior Department, HSA. 
47 Kamehameha III to President of the United States, 20 September 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 3, Letters, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA. Official texts. This English translation accompanied the autograph letter which was 
written in Hawaiian. The king also requested that Tyler replace Brown as his diplomatic agent. 
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employment of whites had added to the defense of his sovereignty: “Eia wau ke noho nei me ke 
kokua ia mai e na haole pono a ke manao nei au malaila e onipaa ai ko’u aupuni [ina] ua 
hoopilikia hou ia mai au e [ko na] aina e. . . . I am now assisted by good whitemen and think that 
by this means my Government will stand firm in case of being brought into difficulty again by 
foreigners.”48 Lastly, in March 1845 the king made an unambiguous acknowledgement of his 
government’s need for white expertise in a proclamation to the chiefs and “all the people subject 
to my government”: the king announced that he had appointed Wyllie in order to “carefully and 
scrupulously conduct my relations with Foreign Nations, and to discharge the duties which by 
the International Code I am obliged to perform towards them having in view the Constitution and 
Laws of my Government.”49 In an 1846 letter to the kingdom’s representative at the Court of St. 
James, Wyllie put the policy decision bluntly: “If the British government think that purely native 
rulers are capable of handling [cases like Wiley and Charlton], the King is of a very different 
opinion. He considers that to the preservation of His independence. . . it is essential that he 
should have the assistance of some Foreigners, sworn to serve Him faithfully.”50 
This became a key tactic in Kauikeaouli’s strategy to negate international interference: 
hire western-educated whites as his point men to engage hostile consular agents and 
communicate his government’s positions to the maritime powers on the new, complex issues that 
flowed out of international recognition of sovereignty and treaty agreements. Privy council 
                                                 
48 Kamehameha III to Pomare IV, 04 February 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Local, Consular Correspondence, 
1846, HSA. Official texts with added punctuation and minor clarifications. An English translation accompanied the 
autograph letter in Hawaiian. 
49 March 1845 Proclamation and Commission, Letterbook 1, April 1845 – Nov. 1846, Interior Department, HSA. 
50 R. C. Wyllie to Archibald Barclay, 16 November 1846, Series 410, Box 3, Book 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA. By that date there was a statutory requirement that foreigners who served the king 
must take an oath of allegiance to the Hawaiian kingdom. See Chapter 3 for the origins of the policy. 
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records show that Kauikeaouli valued the advice of his white ministers, but both the white 
ministers and the Hawaiian chiefs understood that the king retained decision-making authority. 
Kauikeaouli appointed other whites to key positions following implementation of the 
provisions of the 1845 Act. On April 13, 1846, William Richards (having returned from his 
overseas mission) joined Judd, Ricord and Wyllie as Minister of Public Instruction in the 
executive Cabinet council headed by kuhina nui Keoni Ana.51 The privy council—now formally 
constituted by statute—in June 1846 appointed the Rev. Lorrin Andrews (who had resigned his 
position with the mission) as a superior court judge at Oʻahu to handle foreigners’ causes of 
action, and in November 1846 also appointed William L. Lee, a member of the bar in the State of 
New York, to the bench.52 Although the judiciary reform act of 1847 did result in the 
appointment of John Papa ʻĪʻī to join Lee and Andrews on the bench, the Oʻahu courts by that 
time had acquired a predominantly white character: two out of the three justices, the clerk, and 
the two police justices were whites.53 
 Most of the members of the privy council were Hawaiians—either the appointed 
governors of the island districts, or chiefs from distinguished, high-ranking families. Of the 
Hawaiian chiefs, Keoni Ana, Abner Pākī, John Papa ʻĪʻī, Mataio Kekūanāoʻa and Aaron 
Kealiʻiahonui attended nearly every privy council meeting, and governors of the outlying islands 
attended when in Honolulu. Other Hawaiian chiefs attended less regularly. Privy council meeting 
minutes show that the actions to appoint whites and/or endorse their official acts were taken with 
                                                 
51 Minutes, 13 April 1846, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees at the meeting were the king, kuhina 
nui, Leleiōhoku, Kanaʻina, Judd, Kāʻeo, Richards, Wyllie, Kekūanāoʻa, Ricord, Pākī, and ʻĪʻī. Kekāuluohi died June 
7, 1845 and the king appointed Keoni Ana to replace her. 
52 Minutes, 24 June 1846, Series 421 vol. 1, 30 November and 02 December 1846, Series 421, vol. 2, Privy Council, 
HSA. Attendees at the June meeting were the king, kuhina nui, Pākī, Kanaʻina, Kāʻeo, Kealiʻiahonui, Judd, Ricord, 
Wyllie, and Richards. Attendees at the November meeting were the king, kuhina nui, Pākī, Judd, Kāʻeo, Ricord, 
Kanaʻina, Kekūanāoʻa, Wyllie, Richards, Kealiʻiahonui, and ʻĪʻī.  
53 “Appointments under the Act to Organize the Judiciary,” Polynesian, 15 January 1848.  
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the full support of its Hawaiian members. Privy council members also held seats in the House of 
Nobles. In 1845, the House of Nobles had twenty-three members, and only two (Judd and 
Richards, both ex officio members) were whites.54 All seven members of the lower chamber 
were elected by the makaʻāinana and were Hawaiian.55 Representation began to change in 1846 
in the House of Nobles, however, with the formation of the Cabinet under the leadership of the 
kuhina nui and the ex officio memberships of its four white cabinet ministers. 
 Kauikeaouli, however, did not overlook the importance of having Hawaiian chiefs 
maintain close involvement in policy development and administration. He carefully paired 
Hawaiian chiefs with white ministers for several key tasks:56 Timoteo Haʻalilio, John Papa ʻĪʻī 
and Judd served together in 1842 on the first Treasury Board;57 Haʻalilio traveled with Richards 
during their 1842-1844 diplomatic mission to America and Europe;58 privy council member ʻĪʻī 
paired with Wyllie to negotiate a treaty in 1846 with U. S. Consul Ten Eyck;59 and Alexander 
Liholiho Kamehameha and Lot Kamehameha accompanied Judd to Europe and America in 1849 
to negotiate treaties with the Americans and the French.60 Whether white or Hawaiian, however, 
it was the king’s directives that the ministers, chiefs, and line officers executed. Biographer M. 
A. Brown emphasized that ʻĪʻī made it clear to foreigners on several occasions that he and the 
white ministers worked under the kingʼs direction and “always” informed the king of their 
actions.61 
                                                 
54 Minutes, 02 April 1845, Series 221, vol. 1, Journal of the Legislative Council, 1841-1845, Legislature, HSA.  
55 Minutes, 20 May 1845, Series 221, vol. 2, Journal of the Legislative Council, 1845-1847, Legislature, HSA. 
56 M. A. Brown makes this point in her biography about John Papa ʻĪʻī, Facing the Spears of Change, 84.  
57 M. A. Brown, Facing the Spears of Change, 84.  
58 Kamehameha III to Richards and Simpson, 08 April 1842, Series 402-7-171, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA. 
59 Minutes, 24 September 1846, Series 421, vol. 2, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees at the meeting authorizing the 
two of them to negotiate were the king, Judd, Pākī, ʻĪʻi, Kealiʻiahonui, James Kānehoa Young, Kanaʻina, Kāʻeo, and 
Kekūanāoʻa.  
60 G. P. Judd to R. C. Wyllie, 22 October 1849, Series 410, Box 3, vol. 14, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA.  
61 M. A. Brown, Facing the Spears of Change, 100.  
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Harsh criticism of the policy 
 
The “fierce paper war” that had erupted between Brown and Ricord over the jury composition 
dispute and the Wiley case continued throughout 1844, and Brown refused to permit visiting 
American naval officers to pay normal courtesies to members of the Hawaiian government.62 In 
a September 1844 diplomatic report, Brown evidenced his change of heart about the character of 
the king and Judd and expressed his personal hostility towards Ricord: “the King is completely 
under the guidance of Judd, and Judd completely under the thumb of Ricord. Everybody is 
disgusted. . . [Judd] has little experience and Ricord who is a designing if not unprincipaled [sic] 
man has got him entirely under his control.”63 The government responded to Brown’s 
intemperate tone by printing correspondence between the parties in a pamphlet and in the 
Polynesian, the government-owned newspaper.64 The issue divided the American community: 
another newspaper, the Friend, edited by Samuel Damon, an American Congregational minister, 
ran a lengthy article in support of Brown.65 
It was inevitable that the employment of whites in ministerial positions would give a 
character to the government that it had not previously possessed.66 When Paulet seized control in 
1843, the main charge brought against the king’s government was that chiefs were “quite unfit to 
perform any of the functions of government.”67 But by 1845, Brown bemoaned the fact that 
white ministers had filled that gap in western qualifications and “it is not a nation just emerging 
                                                 
62 L. F. Judd, Honolulu, 143-4.  
63 Kuykendall, Correspondence of U. S. Diplomatic Representative, 12. 
64 Correspondence in the Case of John Wiley, an American Citizen (1844); “Literary Review: Correspondence 
between H. H. M.’s Secretary of State and the U. S. Commissioner in the Case of John Wiley, an American citizen. 
Printed by order of Government. Government Press: Honolulu, 1844,” Polynesian, 02 November 1844. 
65 “Review,” Friend, 14 November 1844. 
66 As noticed by Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 191.  
67 Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 191. 
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from a state of barbarism that we have to deal with now.”68 Consequent to implementing the 
king’s policy, opined Jarves in his 1847 History, “it was perfectly natural” that opposition should 
arise to the white group serving in the government.69 
Brown’s charges and counter-charges continued into 1845 as the Wiley case moved 
through the courts. Brown and U. S. Consular Agent William Hooper became more and more 
personally offensive towards the king, his ministers and court officials.70 Brown and some of the 
mission families socialized together often, and they openly discussed Brownʼs animosity towards 
Judd and Ricord. Brown continued to hurl epithets and took every public opportunity to voice his 
determination to have Judd dismissed.71 
In March 1845, Brown petitioned the king to dismiss Judd for his alleged mistreatment of 
American merchants. Although Brown insisted on meeting with the king personally to press his 
charges, Kauikeaouli adamantly refused, replying through Judd that judgments of the fitness, 
character, or official acts of those whom he appointed to be his ministers were his alone.72 The 
king’s strong reply did not deter Brown, and the king subsequently found it politically expedient 
to appoint Keoni Ana, John Papa ʻĪʻī, and John Ricord to investigate Brown’s charges. After an 
                                                 
68 G. Brown to R. C. Wyllie, 18 July 1845, Correspondence between H.M.’s Minister of Foreign Relations and the 
U. S. Commissioner, in the Case of John Wiley, an American Citizen, Imprisoned at the instance of Viscount 
William e la Perrotiere, M.D., a French Subject (Honolulu: Government Press, 1845), 113. This letter in typescript 
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examination of several interested parties, the committee recommended on March 26 that the king 
disregard Brown’s complaint.73  
The following month, on May 20, Kauikeaouli formally opened the 1845 legislative 
session. In his speech, he noticed the appointments of the three whites as Cabinet ministers (Judd 
as interior minister, Wyllie as foreign office minister, and Ricord as attorney general), and he 
announced that he intended to overhaul traditional law and apply it equally to all Hawaiians and 
whites subject to his jurisdiction.74 A broad segment of the community attended the opening 
ceremonies and heard the king’s speech, and the Polynesian printed the text in English in its May 
24 edition. During his own remarks the following day, Judd announced a review of all land titles 
and the land tenure system.75 What happened next came as a surprise to the king, the privy 
council, and members of the legislature.  
Word arrived in Honolulu on June 10 or 11 that many Hawaiians on Maui “were in a 
state of excitement” and that they intended to petition the king to dismiss the white officers.76 
Petitions signed by hundreds of Hawaiians began to arrive at Honolulu in mid-June from Kailua, 
Hawaiʻi island and Lahaina, Maui. More than 1,600 people from Lahaina and Wailuku signed 
the April petition from Maui.77 A similarly-worded petition from Lānaʻi also dated April 1845 
was signed by 301 people and typified the objections that all the petitions made: “Hoole i na luna 
                                                 
73 Report from Keoni Ana Young, Ioane (John Papa) ʻĪʻī, and John Ricord to Kamehameha III dated 26 March 1845, 
cited in “Nā Leka O Ka Wā Noho Aliʻi A Kamehameha III” (Hilo: Hale Kuamoʻo, Univ. of Hawaiʻi, 1994), 3-10; 
and R. C. Wyllie to G. Brown, 03, 05 April 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 4, Foreign Officials, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA.  
74 King’s Opening Speech, 20 May 1845, Series 222, folder 1-15, General Records, Bills and Laws, Legislature, 
HSA; see also, “The Royal Speech, At the Opening of the Legislative Chambers, on Thursday, May 20th,” 
Polynesian, 24 May 1845. 
75 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:278. Chapter 5 “Legal and Land Reform” discusses the strategic reforms that 
the king implemented. Here the emphasis is on the reactions to white ministers that the proposals elicited. 
76 G. Brown to Wyllie, 18 July 1845, Correspondence in the Case of John Wiley (1845), 110. 
77 “Na Palapala Hoopii o na Makaainana,” Ka Elele, 15 July 1845.  
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haole i kohoia i luna no ke Aupuni Hawaii” (Refuse the foreigners appointed as ministers for the 
Hawaiian government), and “Aole o makou makemake e hoohiki na haole i kanaka Hawaii” (We 
do not want foreigners to be sworn in as citizens for Hawaii), and “Aole o makou makemake e 
kuai hou aku oe i kekahi apana aina o kou aupuni i na haole” (We do not want you to sell any 
more land of your government to foreigners).78 Reports arrived at Honolulu that people at 
Lahaina had held political meetings and prayed that “the nation may be delivered from the 
influence of foreigners” who wanted to take their lands and their birthright as Hawaiians.79 
But the nature of governance tasks had changed, and increasingly the administrative roles 
required skills that whites possessed but chiefs did not. As the demand for western expertise 
rose, reliance on traditional relationships and chiefly ranks became less determinative of 
eligibility for who would serve the king. Formerly, the ruling chief and the makaʻāinana had 
relied on the intermediate-ranking chiefs between them to maintain their own respective 
positions and roles.80 Over time, movement of the administrative service role from the 
intermediate chiefs to whites disrupted the relationships that had bound the makaʻāinana to the 
chiefs for centuries.81 In 1845, Hawaiians erupted with anger towards the foreigners: “e lohe 
kakou i ka lakou olelo kuamuamu i mua o ko kakou mau papalina. . . Na wai la [e] ae i hoalii aku 
                                                 
78 Petition from Lānaʻi, April 1845, Box 141, Miscellaneous, Interior Department, HSA. Archival translation by E. 
H. Hart.  
79 Chamberlain, Journal, 12 June 1845, HMHA. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of oaths of allegiance and Chapter 5 
for a discussion of land reform. 
80 Kanalu G. Terry Young, Rethinking the Native Hawaiian Past (New York: Routledge, 2012), 15, 29; see also 
Arista, “Part 2, Malo,” 2:123. 
81 Young, Native Hawaiian Past, 112. Young provided a thoughtful analysis of the dilemma in which kaukau aliʻi 
(lower-ranking chiefs) found themselves. They were used to performing hana lawelawe (service roles), and Young’s 
analysis has enriched my understanding of the erosion of traditional trust networks.  
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i alii ae maluna o makou o ka poe keokeo?” (we hear them revile us to our faces. . . Who indeed 
would acknowledge the white skinned people over ourselves as aliʻi?).82 
Hawaiians traditionally petitioned their chiefs orally over matters that concerned them; 
with the advent of literacy, petitions now arrived in writing addressed to the king or the kuhina 
nui praying that the king would discharge the white ministers. Kauikeaouli immediately deputed 
Attorney General John Ricord and privy council members John Papa ʻĪʻī and Aaron 
Kealiʻiahonui to sail to Maui aboard the Hooikaika to investigate what became known as the 
“Lahaina agitation.”83 The king’s formal order written in Hawaiian and English instructed the 
deputation to investigate the actions of foreign residents at Lahaina who may have acted in 
concert with “kekahi Luna Aupuni o ke Aupuni e launa mai ana paha, me ka manao e hoohuli i 
koʻu aupuni ma ke ano o ka hooponopono ana i ka aina. . . .an accredited Diplomatic Agent of a 
foreign friendly Power having in view some political change in our domestic policy.”84 The 
three-man commission interviewed and obtained written statements from several persons at 
Lahaina about the petitioners’ demand that the foreign ministers be released from government 
service, but returned to Oʻahu on June 16 having learned only that “the memorializing of the 
King by the natives was a rightful exercise of privilege granted by the constitution.”85 Who had 
instigated the petition-writing campaign remained uncertain.  
Meanwhile, the members of the legislature debated the petitions from Lahaina, Wailuku, 
Lānaʻi and Kailua-Kona on June 26 and agreed to reject the petitioners’ pleas to dismiss the 
                                                 
82 Petition from the people of Kona, Hawaiʻi to Kamehameha III and the Legislature, Kailua, 25 June 1845, Series 
222, folder 2-3, General Records, Petitions 1845, Legislature, HSA. Archival translation.  
83 “Order by Kamehameha III,” 12 June 1845, Series 402-13-316, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA; L. F. Judd, 
Honolulu, 145.  
84 “Order,” 12 June 1845, Series 402-13-316, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA. Official texts. The domestic policy 
referred to is the employment of white ministers. 
85 See statements from Lorrin Andrews, Henry S. Swinton, Kenui, and Kaohie, for example, at Series 402-13-316, 
Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA; Chamberlain, Journal, 16 June 1845, HMHA.  
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white ministers. Legislators also affirmed the king’s decision to require whites who entered 
government service to swear an oath of allegiance to his kingdom. Next, the legislature 
appointed John Papa ʻĪʻī and Keoni Ana to draft a legislative response intended to explain to the 
satisfaction of the petitioners what the governance need was for both measures.86 Their July 8 
reply specifically addressed the king’s rationale for the policy: 
Ina lakou e hoopauia, auhea la ke kanaka makaukau i ka hana pu me ka aina e? 
Aole no e loaa i keia wa, mahope paha kupono ka poe alii hou ke hiki aku i ka wa 
kanaka makua, a me ko lakou makaukau. 
; 
If these shall be dismissed, where is there a man who is qualified to transact 
business with foreigners? There is no one to be found at the present time; 
hereafter perhaps the young chiefs will be qualified, when they have grown up to 
manhood, and shall have completed their education.87 
 
Agitation against whites in government service persisted, however. When a Lahaina 
legislator read the reply to his constituents, some of the people stood afterwards and said “we 
thought that that letter would inform us that the foreign ministers had been dismissed, and would 
not be ministers again. . . [later others] said that the natives would not give up writing, only when 
the foreigners ceased being ministers. . . then worries of the heart and fear of the natives would 
end, and they will petition again.”88 And from Molokaʻi in July 1845 came another petition 
signed by 1,344 people who warned that white ministers posed a threat to the kingdomʼs 
independence: “No ke kuokoa ana o kou aupuni e ka Moi III aole o makou makemake e noho 
luna na haole ou i hoonoho ai maluna o ke Aupuni Hawaii” (For the independence of your 
nation, King [Kamehameha] III we do not want the haoles you have appointed over the Hawaiian 
                                                 
86 Minutes, 26 June 1845, Series 221, vol. 2, Journal of the Legislative Council 1845-1847, Legislature, HSA. 
87 “Na Manao o ka Aholelo no na Mea i Hoopiia,” Ka Elele, 15 July 1845 for the Hawaiian text; “Reply,” Friend, 01 
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129 
 
government to serve as officials).89 Hawaiians and whites debated the issue in letters to 
newspapers, and the government-owned newspaper Polynesian printed its own assessment of the 
issue.90  
Hostility among resident foreigners also continued to fester. On August 9, Miller 
announced to the king and Privy Council that the Earl of Aberdeen had obligated him to deal 
only with “Native Rulers. . .na ’Lii maoli” and not with foreigners who served as ministers.91 
The king in council stated emphatically “aole e pono e hookaawale ma waena o na Luna, na 
Luna maoli a me na Luna haole, ua pau pu lakou i ka hana ma lalo ona a no laila he poe luna 
lakou nona. . . . [he] could permit no distinction to be made between His Officers who were 
natives and those who were Foreigners, that both acted by His Authority, and consequently were 
His Authorities.”92 But Miller persisted, and during Admiral Seymour’s next visit in October 
1845, Miller persuaded Seymour to join him in his objections to dealing with white ministers.93 
 
Suspicions of a conspiracy 
Still suspicious that a diplomatic agent of a friendly power had instigated the petitions, the chiefs 
continued to investigate and confirmed that the petitions “were originally suggested by white 
                                                 
89 Petition, Molokaʻi, July 1845, Series 222, box 2-3, General Records, Petitions 1845, Legislature, HSA. Archival 
translation. 
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Kekauʻōnohi, Pākī, Leleiōhoku, Kekūanāoʻa, Kanaʻina, Kealiʻiahonui, Ricord, Richards, Judd, and Wyllie. Judd 
acted as the secretary. Emphasis in the original.  
92 Minutes, 13 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Official texts. Attendees were the king, kuhina 
nui, Pākī, Leleiōhoku, Kekūanāoʻa, Kealiʻiahonui, Ricord, Richards, Judd, and Wyllie. Judd acted as the Secretary. 
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men opposed to the government.”94 Judd immediately launched his own effort to discover the 
culprits.95 Meanwhile, the king in council reiterated his belief that the petitions originated with 
white men, as he had stated in his formal Order constituting ʻĪʻī, Ricord, and Kealiʻiahonui as his 
investigative committee: “No ka hoopii o na kanaka maoli, olelo ke Lii, o na haole ke kumu o 
keia hoopii aole loa e hiki kela manao i na kanaka maoli . . . . The King said that the Petitions of 
the Natives, originated with Foreigners – that the idea never entered the minds of the Natives.”96  
But which “white men”?  
ʻĪʻī suspected Brown and the American commercial agent William Hooper.97 Wyllie 
discovered that Brown and Miller privately had colluded on a plan to overthrow the government 
which included coercing a U. S. naval squadron to force the king to dismiss all foreigners in his 
service. To prepare for this, Brown would arouse “the excitement of native jealousy” and petition 
for the removal of foreigners.98 Missionary wife Juliet Montague Cooke suggested that it was 
Brownʼs frequent public outbursts against Judd and Ricord that had aroused Hawaiians to 
petition for their removal.99 Brown, in fact, had left for Maui and Hawaiʻi island on April 26—
not long after his own petition to the king for Judd’s removal had been dismissed—and did not 
return until May 15. Brown knew that the three-man investigative commission had asked 
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Hawaiians on Maui who had induced them to petition—didn’t Baldwin or Brown stir you up to 
this? “No one,” Brown claimed they replied, “we got them up ourselves.” Although Brown 
admitted to having met with missionary Dr. Dwight Baldwin while on Maui, he vehemently 
denied participating in any political discussions with Hawaiians.100 
Baldwin, the SIM physician assigned to the Lahaina district, also denied having engaged 
in any political activities, either while preaching or in private conversation.101 Despite his 
protestations, however, Baldwin’s correspondence with missionaries Levi Chamberlain, E. O. 
Hall, and William Richards during the months of May and June 1845 evidence his strong 
opinions on several political topics.102 Baldwin, by his own report, hosted a day of fasting and 
prayer at which attendees had criticized the king’s advisors to such an extent that Baldwin 
thought that the advisors would soon be rejected.103 Letters demonstrate that he and Davida 
Malo—known to be opposed to many of the king’s policies—enjoyed a close relationship and 
exchanged opinions about the Lahaina petition.104 Former missionary Lorrin Andrews stated that 
he had witnessed church members flocking to Baldwin’s meeting to pray that the kingdom be 
delivered from “the white faces.”105 Baldwin, however, deflected suspicion away from himself to 
implicate recent native visitors from Oʻahu who had “stirred the natives” at Lahaina to petition to 
bring about “no haole rulers.”106  
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Governor of Hawaiʻi island Leleiōhoku turned suspicion towards Davida Malo when he 
reported in a legislative meeting in mid-July that Thomas Hopu told him that petitioners in the 
Kona district had been encouraged to petition by Malo.107 Malo also served as the minister of 
public instruction for Maui.108 Judd added in the same legislative meeting that Malo had 
admitted to it, and that Judd had urged him to return to Maui and work to restore trust in the 
government.109 Judd probably was the “Cabinet minister” that Judd’s wife, Laura Fish Judd 
claimed to have heard identify Malo as the originator, and Mrs. Judd opined that Malo acted out 
of disappointment from failing to receive a government appointment.110 In an obvious reference 
to Brown and Malo, editor Jarves in the Polynesian linked “aliens not disguising their bitter 
enmity to their former countrymen…with a disaffected native” as the authors of the petitions.111 
It is noteworthy that the petitions arose only in areas in which Malo had influence—Maui, 
Molokaʻi, Lānaʻi, and the Kona district of Hawaiʻi island—and that no petitions arrived from any 
district on Oʻahu or Kauaʻi.  
There is a lack of direct evidence that Brown and/or Baldwin conspired with Malo to 
produce the petitions, or that Malo acted on his own. There is evidence, however, to infer that it 
was the outspoken opinions of all three men that had incited the petitioners to action: petitioners 
from the Kona district implicated Malo to Leleiōhoku; Baldwin had voiced strong opinions 
within his Lahaina church community about political issues and exchanged similar opinions with 
Malo; and Brown’s accusations against Judd and Ricord were widely-reported.  
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The king continued to believe that there was sufficient reason to support the inference 
that it was Brown who had instigated the campaign. In October 1845, he asserted to American 
Commodore Sloat that Brown had incited the Hawaiians to petition for the removal of white 
ministers,112 and that same month the king declared to British Admiral Seymour that “white 
men” had agitated the Hawaiians to petition for the removal of foreigners from the 
government.113 
 
Kauikeaouli personally responds 
In late July, after the texts of the petitions became public knowledge and the legislative reply had 
been disseminated through meetings and print media, Kamakau offered Kauikeaouli a platform 
to address the people of Maui about his policies. A prominent Maui resident and member of the 
Lahainaluna intelligentsia—but not yet the author of historical accounts—Kamakau used the 
medium of a private letter to query Kauikeaouli about his reasons for not employing hereditary 
chiefs in the ministerial positions occupied by the whites. Kamakau’s July 22 letter was a 
balanced appraisal of the controversy: he graphically described the hopes and fears of many of 
the Maui makaʻāinana about the future of the kingdom and their place within it, but he 
juxtaposed their fears against the need of the king to staff his ministries with western-educated 
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people who understood western governance and treaty obligations. Kamakau ended his letter by 
throwing his support behind the king: “aole pono ke hoole ia na Luna haole ke loaa ole na 
kanaka naauao” (it is not necessary to reject foreign ministers when there are no educated 
Hawaiians available).114 Kamakau also sent along a second private letter in which he attested to 
the love and respect held by the people of Maui for their king.115  
Kamakau’s approach changed the tone of the discourse away from strident demands to a 
respectful request for dialogue. Kauikeaouli responded in kind, also by private letter, explaining 
that the ‘new circumstances’ of treaty obligations and a constitutional framework required him to 
adopt a different approach, and he reaffirmed his respect for his Hawaiian subjects: “a e hoololi 
ae i kekahi mau pono kahiko ma ke ano hou e pono i na aoao e ae i kui mai a’u . . . . aole au i 
hoonoho i keia mau Luna haole me ka hoowahawaha i na kanaka kahiko o ka aina” (and agree to 
alter some traditional rights and customs because of new ways of doing things which have been 
enacted in my reign. . . I did not appoint these white ministers with the intent to show contempt 
for the original inhabitants of the land).116 Kauikeaouli also pointedly directed his Maui subjects 
away from Malo by requesting them to send their greetings to him through Kamakau as he is “ka 
mea pono ke hai mai i ko oukou aloha ia’u” (the proper person through whom to send me your 
greetings).117 
Although there was a wide gap in their ages in 1845 (Kamakau was thirty years old, 
while Malo was fifty-two), Malo and Kamakau both had studied at Lahainaluna School during 
the same years and belonged to the new circle of literate Hawaiians who through their western 
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education had acquired a broad understanding of the outside world. Both of them were 
outspoken in their criticisms of the traditional chiefly society, but at the same time they both 
believed that the Hawaiian people were at risk from the effects of encroaching westernization. 
Malo stridently opposed the social changes even while he supported constitutional government 
and worked for the westernization of the political system. Kamakau expressed a similar 
ambivalence: while he respected the king, Kamakau questioned the wisdom of many of the new 
policies. Osorio points out that the opinions that Malo and Kamakou expressed reflected the 
political complexities of the Hawaiian community, and that they found different ways to convey 
the peoples’ concerns to the chiefs.118 
Ka Elele printed these private letters in its August 12, 1845 edition with the permission of 
the authors. On September 6, 1845 the Polynesian printed an English translation of the king’s 
reply to Kamakau, declaring that Kauikeaouli’s explanation had demonstrated “the necessity of 
employing naturalized officers in certain departments [e.g., interior ministry, foreign office, and 
as attorney general] of his government,” and that his private letter “may be supposed to express 
his true views.”119 Kamakau agreed. He later wrote that Kauikeaouli’s letter had shown his great 
love and affection for his people, and the king’s desire to place Hawaiians in the government 
offices that they could fill.120 Unbeknownst to the public at the time, all of the king’s white 
ministers had signed a document on June 20, 1845, committing that they would surrender their 
ministry commissions to the king whenever he should choose to appoint natives to fill their 
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136 
 
places. The king’s white ministers further pledged that it was their duty to endeavor to render 
native Hawaiians fit for filling such situations as soon as possible.121 
Convinced that Brown had incited the petitioners, the king and privy council acted to 
contain the threat that Brown posed to the kingdom’s safety and security. Brown had claimed to 
speak for all American residents in his July 18, 1845 letter to Wyllie: “the AMERICANS were 
never more united than now, not a single individual American, lay or clerical, male or female on 
the Hawaiian Islands approves of the conduct of those who have had the management of this 
Government for months past,” and he had repeated his personal attacks on Ricord and Judd in 
the most offensive terms.122 Debate in the privy council over his letter concluded with the 
resolution that “he ano hoohihia iwaena o ke Aupuni o ka Moi a me Aupuni o Amerika Huipuia 
e hoino a e hoowahawaha mai ai hoi i ke Aupuni o ka Moi, a me ka hana ana o kona kanawai, e 
hoohaunaele, a e hooulu i ka mokuahana, aole hoi e malu ke Aupuni ke hoomanawanui hou aku . 
. . . the conduct pursued by Mr. Brown is calculated to embroil His Majesty’s Government with 
the Government of the United States, to throw odium and contempt upon His Majesty’s 
Government and the administration of the laws, to create discord, to promote sedition, and can 
no longer be tolerated with safety to the Kingdom.”123 Wheaton’s popular 1836 diplomatic 
compendium advised that consuls who had behaved improperly might be sent back to their own 
country “at the discretion of the government which they have offended.”124 That is precisely 
what Kauikeaouli ordered: he and members of the privy council ceased all communications with 
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Brown, and the king demanded that the U. S. recall Brown.125 The Polynesian printed Wyllie’s 
notice to that effect in its August 2, 1845 edition. When U. S. Commodore Sloat returned to 
Honolulu in late September 1845, his courteous behavior towards the king and his ministers 
allayed any fears they had entertained that Brown would have emulated Charlton and succeeded 
in inciting U. S. naval forces to overthrow Kauikeaouli’s government.126 
  Brown’s very public dismissal prompted the writing of one last petition. By what they 
termed a “memorial” addressed to U. S. President James K. Polk (1845-1849) and dated August 
27, 1845, a small group of dissident American residents at Honolulu decried Brown’s dismissal 
and urged Polk to defend their legal and commercial interests against the actions of 
“unprincipled men” who had persuaded the “simple native rulers” to implement a complicated 
new legal code and require that Americans swear an oath of allegiance to conduct business and 
maintain property rights.127 The memorialists kept their petition secret from the king and from 
other Americans at Honolulu who did not share their views. Polk’s government, however, “saw 
the true position of affairs at a glance” and simply disregarded their memorial.128 Polk also wrote 
to the king that he trusted Kauikeaouli would “bury in oblivion all the unhappy differences” 
occasioned by Brown.129 
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 Kauikeaouli continued his outreach to his subjects while touring Maui the following year. 
A crowd of several thousand Hawaiians gathered at Wailuku, Maui on January 12, 1846 to hear 
the king, kuhina nui Keoni Ana, and privy council member Abner Pākī speak about the need for 
white ministers. Oʻahu Governor Kekūanāoʻa had been assigned to hear cases between 
foreigners, but he was criticized by them for his lack of legal training and lack of English-
language fluency. Judd and Ricord often sat with Kekūanāoʻa on the bench to advise him on 
proper case conduct.130 The king put the matter frankly: “Your hereditary chiefs have been in 
trouble, and therefore we have chosen some to aid them. They are the ministers of white skin, 
whom you see. They know more than we, and I have chosen them for the sake of their 
knowledge.” Speaking with equal frankness, Keoni Ana admitted that neither he nor Pākī could 
do the work of the white ministers. Keoni Ana held out hope, however, that the young chiefs 
would be qualified when they had finished their education, “but now we must have these white 
men.” Wiley’s counsel had just petitioned for a new trial, and treaty negotiations with the British 
and French were upcoming the following month. The king warned of the danger that would 
result should the petitioners insist that the white ministers be dismissed: “We have heard of your 
petitions. Should we consent to them, trouble would immediately follow—instantly—before 
night. I ask of you therefore to put an end to your wish to promote that petition.”131 Pākī spoke 
last, encouraging the crowd to pay careful attention to what had been said.132  
Kauikeaouli, Keoni Ana and Pākī repeated their message to another crowd of a thousand 
at Mokulau, Kaupo District on January 18, and to a crowd at Hana on January 19. Reports of the 
king’s Maui tour stressed that “great loyalty and the utmost respect was manifested throughout 
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the journey by the entire population, especially by those who had been instrumental in getting up 
the petitions of last spring.”133 One of the chief agitators even came forward after a meeting to 
ask Judd’s pardon for the attempt he had made to injure him, confessing that he was misled.134 
It was common practice in the Pacific that European and American naval forces assisted 
local consuls in enforcing the personal and business interests of their country’s citizens. In his 
zeal to refuse to deal with the king’s white ministers, Miller convinced British Admiral Seymour 
during his October 1845 port visit that Judd had threatened British subjects Joe Booth and 
Andrew Auld that they would lose rights to the land they occupied if they did not take the 
kingdom’s oath of allegiance.135 Wyllie reported that Seymour glared at Judd as he berated 
Kauikeaouli in a privy council meeting, declaring that “it never could be the intention of the 
British Government that the King should transfer the authority of the Government, either 
principally or entirely, to foreigners. . . [and] that the petitions by the King’s native subjects, 
which were against foreigners, well deserved the King’s serious consideration.”136 
At the same time, Seymour refused to conduct any sort of an investigation into Miller’s 
claims about Judd’s alleged threats or engage in any discussion with the privy council. Wyllie 
politely rebuked the admiral on behalf of the king for his unquestioning acceptance of the 
allegations made by Booth and Auld: “if the declaration of individuals themselves, without any 
other evidence or crossquestioning, are to be assumed, and reported on as acts of grievance, [the 
king] despairs of being able, ever to do justice either to his own subjects or to foreigners.”137  
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Seymour’s threat to forcibly redress Booth’s and Auld’s grievances on his next visit 
without even holding an inquiry heightened the king’s anxiety because of the uncomfortable 
similarity the admiral’s threat bore to Paulet’s actions in 1843.138 “No keia mea hoouna au ia 
Haalilio laua o Richards e pau keia hihia . . . . It was for the purpose of preventing this, that I sent 
Haʻalilio and Richards to England,” Kauikeaouli told the council members.139 The situation is 
dangerous, Kauikeaouli continued, because “o ke ano o keia olelo, oia ka lawe i ke Aupuni, a 
olelo mai ke Lii oiaio no ia me ka lohe ole hoi i ka oiaio e maopopo ai ka pono. . . . the meaning 
of the whole address made by the Admiral [Seymour] is to take possession of the kingdom. . .it is 
so even without the semblance of enquiry into Justice.”140 The king was convinced that Miller 
wanted “to exercise the power himself and wants. . .  the King to go and play chequers and 
billiards with him.” Asked by other council members if he did not feel himself a prisoner, “the 
King said he understood the object of wishing to reduce him to the same level.”141  
No doubt Joe Booth’s involvement evoked memories of Booth as the messenger between 
the king’s party and Paulet as well as memories of the 1843 offers of protectorate status made by 
the American and French consuls, for the privy council meeting minutes record that the king 
concluded caustically: “e aho ka hoomalu ana mai o ka Aina e, no ka mea ina me neia ka hana ua 
lilo oia ma lalo o na Kanikele, a ma lalo o na white e like me Joe Booth. . . . a foreign 
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protectorate would be far preferable, for under the system now threatened, he would not only be 
under the Foreign Consuls, but under such men as Joe Booth.”142 In his letter to Seymour 
recapping the king’s concerns, Wyllie advised the admiral that the impediment to governance 
posed by Miller’s refusal to deal with Judd and other white ministers through the kingdom’s 
established judicial system had become such a vital matter that His Majesty is considering 
sending a special envoy to Britain—"despite the penury of the treasury.”143 
 
In summary 
Kauikeaouli would have understood why a contemporary Tunisian diplomat Khayr al-Din al-
Tunisi cautioned his countrymen in 1839 about the risks of refusing to modernize along western 
lines: as “the torrent of European civilization [overflows] the world,” al-Din al-Tunisi warned, 
“kingdoms. . . are in danger from this current unless they imitate [its secular aspects]. This can 
save them from drowning.”144 The current that threatened to drown the Hawaiians in the 1840s 
came from British, French and American traders and merchants, all of them vying for supremacy 
at the islands to enhance their own commercial interests. What saved the Hawaiian kingdom 
from drowning was the knowledge about western governance functions that Gerrit P. Judd, John 
Ricord, and Robert C. Wyllie brought to deliberations with the king and his chiefs. When 
challenged again by Admiral Seymour nearly a year later in August 1846, Kauikeaouli succinctly 
described what had caused him to implement the hiring policy: “were it not for the foreigners 
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living under his jurisdiction he would require no Foreign Officers. . . foreigners with great 
cunning and perseverance often sought to involve him in difficulty and that by experience he 
found that he could not get along, but by appointing foreigners to cope with them.”145  
It cannot be overlooked, however, that whether Brown or Baldwin instigated Malo or 
others to author the petitions has less historical importance than the fact that the petitioners 
recognized that the appointment of white ministers signaled further change in their relationships 
with their chiefs. Osorio traced the beginning of that change to the enactment of the 1839 
Declaration of Rights. When everyone became equal under the law, Osorio explained, chiefly 
responsibility for the maintenance of the land and the people passed from the gods and the 
chiefs, and the rule of law created a new layer of authority between the chiefs and the 
makaʻāinana. Echoing the conclusion of the king’s fact-finding deputation, Osorio noted that the 
1840 Constitution had given the makaʻāinana a voice, and they used it in their 1845 petitions to 
criticize the chiefs for not recognizing the threat that the foreigners posed to them all.146 But 
therein lay the governance dilemma that Kauikeaouli faced: although the employment of white 
ministers provided him with the level of western expertise he needed to effectively rebut the 
present threat of assaults on his sovereign powers by consular agents and naval officers—at the 
same time, their employment further weakened the relationship bonds between Hawaiians that 
had enabled chiefly governance for generations. 
Meanwhile, intense European and American rivalries continued to play out daily in 
Honolulu. Government plans fell into place for legal reforms, and the king pressed for a 
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negotiated solution to the onerous extraterritorial terms in the French and British treaties. 













































LEGAL AND LAND REFORMS 
 
As western merchants and traders flocked to profit from the business opportunities offered in 
Hawaii’s marketplace, they brought with them expectations that they would enjoy the same legal 
protections and privileges they enjoyed in their home countries. Merchants and traders secretly 
bought and sold properties in defiance of the kingdom’s posted land-ownership laws. Business 
failures and trade deals gone awry sent merchants into Hawaiian courts to seek satisfaction. But 
in 1840 there were no rules of court, few written laws, and a lack of infrastructure to adjudicate 
cases. While the courts struggled under the burgeoning case load of claims and bankruptcies, 
Kauikeaouli, the chiefs and members of the legislature worked to redefine the laws and improve 
the administration of justice. 
  British Captain Paulet brought Kauikeaouli’s reform efforts to an abrupt halt in 1843 
when he used gunboat threats to take over the kingdom. Sovereignty was restored, but not before 
Paulet had seized control of the courts and insisted that a prime land parcel be turned over to 
former British consul Richard Charlton. In the aftermath, Great Britain imposed the same 
extraterritorial judicial restrictions on the kingdom that the French captain LaPlace had imposed 
four years earlier, and British Admiral Thomas cautioned that future injustices to British citizens 
would provoke future gunboat actions. 
  For Kauikeaouli, the Paulet episode was a watershed event. He had experienced the loss 
of functional judicial powers and the loss of a physical piece of his territory. Determined to 
restore control over both, in 1845 he initiated simultaneous multi-year processes to effect legal 
reforms that would meet western standards and land reforms that would protect the interests of 
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all Hawaiians. Kauikeaouli involved the legislators in both major policy initiatives, and the work 
was accomplished by the white cabinet ministers who possessed the western-trained legal skills 
necessary to deliver the political results the king sought. By 1848, he held firm functional control 
over a reformed judicial system, and Kauikeaouli’s allodial ownership of the kingdom’s lands 
had been transformed into fee simple ownership. 
 
Turning points 
Merchants flooded into Honolulu in the late 1830s because of Hawaiʻi’s strategic Pacific 
location. They built wharves along the docks at the waterfront for ships to unload cargoes, and 
the area became the center of foreigners’ commercial activity. Traders erected stone buildings to 
store and sell merchandise on lots they leased from the chiefs, and ownership of the wharves and 
buildings changed hands as business fortunes declined or improved.1 Over time, however, traders 
began to assert ownership rights to the underlying land. 
Kamehameha I and Liholiho had refused to permit foreigners to own land, and 
Kauikeaouli reaffirmed that policy when he refused the 1836 demands of the British gunboat 
commander Russell to grant property rights to foreigners.2 Kauikeaouli and the chiefs later 
learned, however, that foreigners nevertheless were secretly selling land lots to each other. 
Consequently, in January 1838, Hawaiian authorities issued an ordinance putting foreigners on 
notice that the lots belonged to the government and they had no ownership rights.3 Several 
months later, however, so many foreigners continued to claim possession of building lots and 
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plantation sites that Kauikeaouli made the government’s position even more clear in an August 
1838 ordinance: any occupation by foreigners of real estate was temporary, the king declared, 
and had been made “ma ka haawi lokomaikai e like me ka haawi ana i na kanaka maoli” (by 
generously providing it in the same way he would do with native Hawaiians). It is the chiefs who 
own the real estate, the law emphasized: “no na lii o Hawaii nei no ia, e like me na waiwai i paa i 
na kanaka maoli” (it belongs to the chiefs of Hawaii, just like the property held by the native 
Hawaiians). Kauikeaouli also admonished the chiefs: “Aole i ae ia ka lilo ana o ka waiwai paa i 
kekahi haole ma Hawaii nei” (The transfer of ownership of real property to any foreigner in 
Hawaii is not permitted).4 
As political and social pressures occasioned by the influx of foreigners continued to 
mount, more laws were enacted throughout 1838 and 1839 defining foreigners’ tax obligations, 
customs duties, port regulations, and grogshop operations.5 Working collaboratively, 
Kauikeaouli and the chiefs implemented the 1839 Declaration of Rights, a comprehensive civil 
code, on June 7, 1839.6 The twenty-four page code arranged laws into thirteen sections 
regulating, for example, the poll tax and the amount of labor which the king and landholders 
were permitted to require of their tenants.7 The code also drew an historical connection between 
the new laws regulating behavior and Kamehameha I’s law granting safe passage to travelers 
(Kānāwai Mamalahoa), and the 1840 constitution furthered that connection by establishing the 
idea of social responsibility for the population.8 
                                                 
4 Laws and Regulations, He Mau Kanawai no na Haole, 17 August 1838, Series 418, Folio 5-2, Early Laws, HSA. 
Dr. Lyon assisted with these translations. 
5 Series 418, Folios 1-9, Early Laws, HSA. 
6 See the discussion in Chapter 2. 
7 “Abstract of the Laws,” Missionary Herald 36, no. 3 (1840):101-4. 
8 Gonschor, “A Power in the World,” 161-3. 
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French Captain Cyrille de LaPlace arrived at Honolulu just one month after enactment of 
the 1839 Declaration of Rights, and at the point of a gun imposed the first extraterritorial 
restrictions on Hawaiian jurisprudence. After reports reached Paris that Hawaiian authorities had 
expelled Catholic priests and imprisoned Catholic converts, Louis Phillippe, the King of the 
French, had ordered LaPlace to “lay down rigid terms regarding the treatment of French subjects, 
and Catholics in particular.”9 In response, LaPlace first forced Kauikeaouli to reverse his 1837 
ordinance outlawing the practice of the Roman Catholic religion. Next, LaPlace forced 
Kauikeaouli to sign a treaty in which the king pledged that French citizens could prosecute 
claims against Hawaiians and that only foreign jurors personally selected by the French consul 
could sit in judgment against any French subject tried for a crime in a Hawaiian court.10 
Although juries had been in use since 1823 in capital cases, they were not regulated by 
law and not routinely used in court cases.11 But according to anecdotal evidence from Alexander 
Simpson, a Hudson’s Bay Company employee who made frequent visits to Hawaiʻi beginning in 
1839, Hawaiian authorities thereafter made it a practice to name twelve resident or visiting 
foreigners to sit on juries to deliver verdicts for all disputes between foreigners. Numerous 
juridical problems resulted, Simpson related, because there were no rules of court or applicable 
laws to guide them; consequently, jurors could only act as arbitrators “with nothing but their own 
judgments and consciences to guide them.”12 While enactment of the October 1840 Constitution 
taken together with the 1839 Declaration of Rights guaranteed due process of law in accordance 
                                                 
9 Emmett Cahill, The Dark Decade: 1829-1839, Anti-Catholic Persecutions in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: Mutual 
Publishing, 2004), 58-9, 81. 
10 Cahill, Dark Decade, 81-4; Articles II and IV, Convention between France and Hawaiʻi, 1839, Treaties and 
Conventions Concluded Between the Hawaiian Kingdom and Other Powers Since 1825 (Honolulu: Pacific 
Commercial Advertiser Print, 1875), 5-6. Chapter 6 discusses the trade regulations imposed by the treaty at Article 
VI. 
11 Walter F. Frear, “The Evolution of the Hawaiian Judiciary,” Papers of the HHS 7 (Honolulu, 1894), 9. 
12 A. Simpson, The Sandwich Islands, 47. 
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with a civil code and distributed judicial powers among district and circuit courts and a supreme 
court, neither enactment corrected the judicial deficiencies identified by Simpson, and Simpson 
argued that these deficiencies could only be remedied by the imposition of extraterritorial 
judicial terms.13 
The administration of justice was hindered by factors other than insufficiencies of 
Hawaiian statutes or processes, however. While Jarves reported that foreigners’ juries delivered 
satisfactory verdicts in mercantile cases where no national jealousies were involved, Simpson 
contended that “bitter animosity” between British and American merchants adversely impacted 
proceedings.14 In the Skinner v. Dominis (1841) case, for example, Simpson related that Skinner 
(an Englishman) and Dominis (an American) could not agree on juror selections; eventually 
Skinner prevailed in an arbitration proceeding, but he was dissatisfied by the size of his award. In 
the Greenway v. French case (1842), the bankruptcy of Greenway (an Englishman) entangled his 
partner French (an American) and their multinational, multi-million-dollar operations. When the 
Hawaiian government supported Steven Reynolds’ (an American) demands for payment of his 
claims from Greenway, British claimants complained because that diverted assets away from 
payments to them.15 Blaming the monarchy for favoring American interests became the standard 
response of Britishers who failed to prevail in court. As Kuykendall pointed out in his lengthy 
discussion of these and other contentious cases of the period, they became a platform for British 
resident-merchants and British consul Charlton to claim that justice could not be obtained for 
British litigants in a Hawaiian court.16 
                                                 
13 See the discussion of the enactments in Chapter 2. 
14 A. Simpson, Sandwich Islands, 48. 
15 A. Simpson, Sandwich Islands, 49, 53-4. 
16 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:208-9.  
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In February 1842, the North American Governor-in-Chief of the Hudson’s Bay Company 
Sir George Simpson (a distant cousin of Alexander Simpson) arrived on a visit to the company’s 
Honolulu offices to scout out the kingdom’s affairs for his company and the British Foreign 
Office. While his cousin lobbied for annexation of the islands, Sir George quickly developed a 
different opinion. He recognized that international business fortunes at the islands relied on the 
kingdom remaining independent, and that the lawsuits and contentiousness generated by 
foreigners’ trade rivalry threatened the government’s stability. Sir George volunteered to support 
the diplomatic mission of Richards and Haʻalilio to Washington, D.C., London and Paris to seek 
acknowledgement of the kingdom’s independent sovereign status.17 Before Sir George, Richards 
and Haʻalilio departed, Kauikeaouli and the legislature enacted additional legal reforms and 
strengthened the justice process with the first general law relating to the judiciary. Juries were 
made a statutory part of the trial process, and the nine-page Act of May 10, 1842 also described 
the courts, the nature of the suits to be heard by each court, and how to begin a lawsuit and make 
an appeal.18 
Richards and Haʻalilio left Honolulu in July 1842. Charlton sailed for London himself in 
September 1842, taking with him thirty-five specious complaints that he had solicited from 
British residents which alleged that they had received unfair court judgments because Americans 
occupied most of the jury places.19 Along the way, Charlton stopped at Mazatlán, Mexico and 
briefed British Rear-Admiral Richard Thomas on the several injustices he claimed British 
litigants had suffered in the Hawaiian courts.20 Charlton had his own interests in mind: he was 
                                                 
17 Richard MacAllan, “Sir George Simpson and the Mission for Hawaiian Independence 1840-1843,” HJH 20 
(1986):67, 72-4. 
18 “Chapter 47: A Law for the Regulation of Courts,” Translation of the Constitution and Laws, 170-80. 
19 MacAllan, “Sir George Simpson,” 71-2. 
20 G. P. Judd to Gentlemen, 27 February 1843, Series 402-8-195, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA. 
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being pursued by several creditors, and Hawaiian authorities disputed the claim he had made in 
April 1840 to a large parcel of land called Pūlaholaho lying between present-day Merchant Street 
and the waterfront.21 Based on Charlton’s account, Thomas promptly dispatched British Captain 
George Paulet aboard H.M.S. Carysfort to investigate and redress British grievances at Hawaiʻi. 
In so doing, Thomas set into motion a train of events that led to Kauikeaouli’s 
formulation of his legal and land reform strategies.  
 
Paulet, the laws, and Kauikeaouli 
Paulet arrived at Honolulu harbor on February 10, 1843 with a list of six demands which he had 
framed from representations made to him at Mazatlán by Charlton.22 Paulet coerced Kauikeaouli 
into ratifying Charlton’s purported deed for the land at Pūlaholaho by threatening to attack 
Honolulu with his ship’s complement of 240 officers and men and 26 guns.23 Another of 
Charlton’s demands sought relief from an adverse judgement rendered in a suit brought against 
him by George Pelly, an agent of the Hudson’s Bay Company, stemming from an 1832 debt 
incurred by Charlton to a third party at Valparaiso.24 
At interrogations lasting several hours each over a three-day time span, Paulet and 
Alexander Simpson (whom Charlton named as acting British consul before sailing but whom 
Kauikeaouli refused to recognize) took turns browbeating the king mercilessly about the 
                                                 
21 Greer, “Along the Old Honolulu Waterfront,” 44. 
22 There is a significant body of historiography about what became known as “the Paulet episode.” See, for example, 
Kuykendall, “Chapter 13, The Paulet Episode,” Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:206-26; HSA files contain several folders of 
correspondence, reports, and memoranda received and sent by Hawaiian officials. Much of the material is in 
Hawaiian. See Chapter 4 for details about Charlton’s grievances. 
23 Judd to Gentlemen, 27 February 1843, Series 402-8-195, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA. Judd’s report to 
Richards and Haʻalilio is widely quoted. 
24 Jarves, History,3d. ed., 175. Pelly v. Charlton was tried before a foreign jury in a Honolulu court. Charlton owed 
the debt to Sewel & Patrickson of Valparaiso. See Judd to Gentlemen, 27 February 1843, Series 402-8-195, 
Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA.  
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outcomes of court proceedings involving British claimants. When Kauikeaouli professed that he 
did not know the facts about a specific case, his interrogators accused him of incompetence. 
After the first day’s meeting, they sequestered Kauikeaouli during the interrogations from all of 
his advisors except Judd, who acted as interpreter. Using abusive language, Paulet and Simpson 
demanded the king reverse legal proceedings against Charlton, his representatives, and other 
British litigants.25 Paulet angrily rebuffed attempts by Judd to offer explanations on the king’s 
behalf, telling Judd he “must only act as Interpreter.” Monies and property had been disbursed 
among British, French and American claimants, however, and Judd estimated that the total 
liability exposure of the cash-strapped government from direct costs and damages would exceed 
$117,000.26  
In a lengthy letter to Haʻalilio and Richards, Judd explained the dilemma that 
Kauikeaouli faced: 
the act of reversing past decisions without trial, would be considered by the 
French and Americans as illegal, and they would claim indemnity, e.g., Dudoit 
[the French consul] has possession of the old store of Wm. French [an American 
merchant]. . . Mr. Pelly would hold this Government responsible for the debt of 
Mr. Charlton to Sewel & Patrickson of Valparaiso. …Two other Frenchmen have 
cases in Court, and some Americans, will be losers by the illegal proceedings of 
the King, if he consents to the demands of Mr. Simpson. . . .Mr. Simpson [also] 
insisted that the Dominis case [Dominis was an American who had prevailed in 
his suit] should be retried. No plea [would be admitted] that it had been done, that 
the parties had settled by arbitration and passed receipts.27 
 
After an hours-long session with Paulet and Simpson on February 23, Kauikeaouli declared 
himself “a dead man,” and expressed to Judd his conviction that  
                                                 
25 George Paulet to Mataio Kekūanāoʻa, 11 February 1843, Series 402-8-192, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA; 
Judd to Gentlemen, 27 February 1843, Series 402-8-195. Judd’s lengthy report to Richards and Haʻalilio spared no 
details about Paulet’s and A. Simpson’s humiliation and harassment of the king.  




his ruin was determined…The object was to rob him of his money, and destroy 
his laws. Money he had not and could not raise it. He could not overturn the 
decisions of the Courts, without destroying the credit of the Government, and 
exposing it to attack on all sides. He would sooner give up all, ‘Let them take the 
Islands.’28 
 
The following morning, Kauikeaouli relinquished control over the disputed cases to British 
authorities in London. The king also agreed to cede political control of the kingdom to Great 
Britain under protest that matters would be resolved by his diplomats who were then in Europe.29  
Although there is general agreement that Charlton was a scoundrel (Kuykendall,30 
Jarves,31 M. A. Brown,32 and MacAllen33), historians and scholars examine the Paulet episode 
from different viewpoints. Jarves, as a witness to the ensuing lengthy dispute over Charlton’s 
land claim, perceived that “the weakness of the king in consenting to a ratification of such a 
fraud upon his territory [the document presented as Charlton’s deed] is lamentable.”34 While 
Kuykendall pointed out that Kauikeaouli could not legally reverse court decisions, he concluded 
that the king acted out of international considerations rather than legal constraints: “To have 
yielded would have involved the Hawaiian government in difficulties with other nations.”35 
Klieger identified the harm that could accrue to the king’s personal ability to govern when he 
concluded that Kauikeaouli “could not agree to the award of land to Charlton and other British 
without incurring the wrath of everyone else…And he could not reverse court cases without 
severally undermining his own authority.”36 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Kamehameha III and Kekāuluohi to George Paulet, 18 February 1843, Series 402-8-192, Chronological File, 
FO&EX, HSA; Deed of Cession, 25 February 1843, Series 402-8-192, Chronological File, FO&EX, HSA. 
30 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:211-3. 
31 Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 167. 
32 M. A. Brown, Facing the Spears of Change, 85. 
33 MacAllan, “Sir George Simpson,” 71-2. 
34 Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 179. 
35 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1: 214-5. 
36 Klieger, Kamehameha III, 294-5. 
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Richards emphasized that very point to British diplomats Addington and Aberdeen. After 
receiving formal acknowledgement from Great Britain in 1843 of Hawaii’s independence, 
Richards and Haʻalilio remained in London for several more weeks as Richards pressed the 
British government for a just resolution of the kingdom’s claim for indemnification of the losses 
inflicted by Paulet’s forces on government structures and the king’s fleet.37 In defense of the 
claim, Richards pointed to the interruption of the reforms to the kingdom’s laws and institutions 
that resulted from Paulet’s interference, and the harm that Kauikeaouli forbore from inflicting on 
the kingdom by his principled refusal to change the court verdicts:  
His Majesty foresaw the fatal consequence that would have resulted from 
compliance. He was sensible that the greatest calamity that can befall a state 
whether in its foreign or domestic relations is the destruction of the people’s 
confidence in the administration of justice. . . rare indeed are the instances if any 
are to be found in which a sovereign has chosen to surrender his crown rather than 
violate the laws of his Country.38 
 
 
Britain expands extraterritorial legal restrictions 
When Admiral Thomas learned that Paulet had taken possession of the kingdom, he immediately 
sailed from Valparaiso to rescind the cession and restore Kauikeaouli’s sovereign status.39 
Thomas, however, also made it clear to Kauikeaouli that the kingdom’s justice system did not 
meet western standards. Thomas pointed out, for example, that the Hawaiian court should not 
have assumed legal jurisdiction over the Pelly v. Charlton case because the attachment of 
Charlton’s property “had been placed at the instance of an individual not residing within the 
                                                 
37 William Richards to Henry Unwin Addington (Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs), 07 October 1843, Series 404, 
Box 61, vol. 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, FO&EX, HSA.  
38 Richards to Addington, 07 October 1843, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2; William Richards to Earl Aberdeen, 28 
February 1844, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, FO&EX, HSA.  
39 “Declaration of Rear-Admiral Thomas, 31 July 1843, To King Kamehameha III, and the Principal Chiefs of the 
Sandwich Islands,” British and Foreign State Papers, 1029-32. 
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limits of His Majesty’s dominions [the lender at Valparaiso], and the suit respecting [it] was 
instituted in the absence both of the plaintiff and defendant.”40 And in his public remarks at the 
restoration ceremony, Thomas cautioned the king and his chiefs that, if there should there be 
future denials of justice for British subjects, then it would be the duty of the British naval 
commander-in-chief to obtain redress for their claims.41 Thomas mandated that disputes between 
British subjects and others must be decided by juries, and given previous instances of juror 
imbalance between Americans and British subjects, he also imposed a requirement that one-half 
of the jurors be British subjects approved by the consul. The admiral also enjoined Kauikeaouli 
to ensure that the British consul attended all formal appeals affecting the interests or property of 
a British citizen.42 
Both of Thomas’ jury requirements mirrored the restrictions imposed four years earlier 
by LaPlace for French citizens. In non-western countries, consuls routinely performed juridical 
and political duties in addition to promoting trade as part of their responsibilities to assist and 
protect the citizens of their own countries and their property in the variety of circumstances in 
which their misconduct or accident placed them.43 Extraterritorial agreements defined a consul’s 
particular jurisdictional duties, and these agreements played a crucial role in commercial 
relations between Great Britain and France and states in East Asia, the former Spanish American 
colonies, and the Pacific during the first half of the nineteenth century.44 From her studies of 
Brazil, for example, Benton found that treaty arrangements secured provisions which gave 
                                                 
40 “Agreement,” British and Foreign State Papers, 1032. 
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British citizens special trading privileges, and that personal legal protections for British citizens 
were seen as instrumental to trade.45 Benton explained that European powers justified demands 
for consular jurisdiction to guarantee impartiality in the treatment and trials of their citizens 
residing in non-European states.46 The key motivating factor in imposing juridical strictures in 
the states Benton studied was that consular agents had demanded those terms to resolve what the 
agents reported to their home offices as failings of the local justice system.47 Thomas had found 
that British subjects had suffered injustices from the Hawaiian legal system, and the jury 
requirements he imposed were designed to ensure impartial treatment not only in fact, but also in 
the perception of British litigants, the accused, and the consul.  
Kauikeaouli responded quickly to Thomas’ challenge. Less than two weeks later, 
Kauikeaouli met with the chiefs’ council, revised the existing juror law to conform with Thomas’ 
requirements, and distributed printed copies in Hawaiian and English.48 Unlike Benton’s 
conclusions about the pace of legal reforms in Spanish American states, at Hawaiʻi under 
Kauikeaouli’s leadership the government moved quickly to resolve procedural irregularities and 
administrative injustices.49 French and British threats of military intervention at Hawaiʻi over 
perceived injustices gave their consuls’ legal pronouncements more weight, just as Benton found 
that similar threats did in South America.50 Walter F. Frear linked legal reform to a deep 
conviction among the rulers of the need for legislation to meet the new conditions imposed by 
international recognition so as to validate Hawaiʻiʼs inclusion in the worldwide family of 
                                                 
45 Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, 233. 
46 Ibid., 214. 
47 Ibid., 211. Benton identified this as the motivating factor in the jurisdictions she studied. 
48 Laws and Regulations, 11 August 1843, Series 418, Folio 8-3, Early Laws, HSA.  
49 Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, 213. 
50 Ibid., 214 at fn. 7. 
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nations.51 However, Jane L. Silverman’s finding from her study of judicial changes during 
Kauikeaouli’s reign appears more on point: the rulers had learned that it had become politically 
necessary, Silverman concluded, to create a system “that could settle the disputes of foreigners in 




When word reached London in June 1843 about Paulet’s rogue action, British diplomat H. S. 
Fox writing for Foreign Affairs Secretary the Earl of Aberdeen assured his American counterpart 
A. P. Upshur that the seizure had been “entirely unauthorized.” While advising Upshur that the 
British government intended to engage, “and if necessary, to compel” Kauikeaouli to redress 
whatever acts of injustice may have been committed against British subjects, Fox emphatically 
rejected any British intent to interfere with the laws of the native government. British naval 
officers, Fox declared, had been instructed to “leave the administration of justice in their 
hands.”53 
The cacophony of foreigners’ angry voices at Honolulu continued, however, and even 
increased with the arrival of the new American Commissioner George Brown in late 1843. The 
1844 Treaty of Lahaina that Great Britain had forced Kauikeaouli to ratify as a condition of 
restoring his sovereignty perpetuated the extraterritorial jury requirements that Thomas had 
insisted on, and Brown then demanded the same for American defendants. When his demands 
                                                 
51 Walter F. Frear, “The Development of Hawaiian Statute Law,” Thirteenth Annual Report of the HHS (1906):46. 
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legislature rather than the practical rationale offered by Silverman. See Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:261. 
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were refused, Brown railed against perceived failures of the kingdom’s court administration.54 
On a practical level, no other governance issue weighed as heavily on the kingdom’s ability to 
exercise its own sovereign authority than this, because no other issue united the passions of 
resident foreign merchants, consular agents, visiting naval officers, and diplomatic metropoles in 
Europe and America. On a political level, Kauikeaouli had learned that he could not develop 
international confidence in his courts’ ability to adjudicate claims and dispense equal justice 
unless he implemented wide-ranging reforms. 
Although Thomas’ stern warnings had delivered the message that judicial reform was a 
political necessity, it was not until an American attorney unexpectedly arrived in Honolulu in 
February 1844 that Kauikeaouli had access to the western-trained legal expertise he needed to 
accomplish sweeping changes. Within days of his arrival, John Ricord was appointed by the king 
to assume control of legal affairs in the kingdom as the kingdom’s first attorney general.55 Ricord 
promptly took charge of Oʻahu circuit court cases presided over by Governor Kekūanāoʻa, and 
together they resolved cases involving foreigners in accordance with the principles of American 
and English jurisprudence.  
Ricord’s brash demeanor and aggressive litigating stance angered both his fellow-
Americans and British Consul General Miller.56 Brown was particularly aggravated by the fact 
that it was Ricord who crafted the government’s responses while Brown—not a lawyer 
himself—had to compose his own legal arguments,57 and the evidentiary adjudication of the 
validity of Charlton’s land deed became an acrimonious, protracted legal battle. Brown and 
                                                 
54 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
55 Judd announcement, 11 March 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 1, Consular, Consular Correspondence, HSA; See 
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56 Jarves, History, 3d. ed., 192-3. 
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Miller retaliated by filing numerous claims and counterclaims challenging the kingdom’s 
political and legal positions.58 Brown insisted that he would not cease filing charges until “the 
courts of this country are properly organized, and their proceedings conducted in a proper and 
legal manner, and when gentlemen of legal knowledge become residents on these islands.”59  
No legislative action on revisions to the court system or legal code could be taken in 
1844, however, as Kauikeaouli had postponed the annual legislative session until the return of 
diplomats Richards and Haʻalilio. But it was abundantly clear to Kauikeaouli, the chiefs, and the 
ministers that, if Britain’s intent to leave the administration of justice in their hands was to be 
realized, they needed to take reform measures that would remedy the concerns that had originally 
led France and Great Britain to impose extraterritorial restrictions. Kauikeaouli also realized that 
Paulet’s naked political alienation of a prime waterfront lot to Charlton had placed the kingdom’s 
territorial sovereignty in jeopardy. As Jon M. Van Dyke and Pauline King Joerger pointed out, 
Kauikeaouli had learned that he and all Hawaiians could lose ownership interests in the land 
unless he converted the centuries-old tenure system to a western pattern of land title.60 
 
Kauikeaouli initiates law and land reforms 
Kauikeaouli chose the pomp and ceremony of the May 20 opening of the 1845 legislative session 
as the backdrop for an announcement of his plans to align the kingdom’s legal processes with the 
principles and doctrines of western nations. The legislature met at Honolulu rather than Lahaina 
as it had previously, and for the first time the legislature was opened by a formal speech from the 
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throne.61 Kahili bearers attended the king as he was escorted to his seat on which a yellow 
feather cloak had been spread. The queen followed, attended by Judd, Wyllie and Ricord, and 
kuhina nui Kekāuluohi sat nearby. Seated to the king’s right were the members of the House of 
Nobles, and to his left were seated the members of the House of Representatives.62 
After opening remarks noticing the cordial relations with western powers that recognition 
had brought, Kauikeaouli stipulated that it was his wish to treat the subjects of all nations with 
equal justice. As he declared to the American Commodore Stockton a month later, he intended 
that improvement in the laws and courts would “answer all the wants of the different classes of 
Residents within my jurisdiction.”63 With that goal in mind, Kauikeaouli advised the legislators 
that “ua manao no maua e pono ia oukou e Kukakuka no ka hooponopono hou ana i na 
Ahahookolokolo, a e mahele pono paha i na hana, a e hooponopono i na Kanawai.”; “we 
recommend for your consideration, the better organization of the Courts of justice, the division 
of powers, and a careful revision of the Laws.”64 Announcement of that policy initiative when 
Ricord was the only western-trained lawyer employed by the kingdom was an ambitious move. 
The legislators responded, however, and formally tasked Ricord “e palapala no makou i olelo 
hoonohonoho … a me na kanawai a kakou; a e kakau hoi i na kanawai maoli no ka haawi ana i 
na hana like me kana i olelo ai. E hooku pono nae i na kanawai ma ko kakou ano, a me ko kakou 
                                                 
61 Frear, “Statute Law,” 46. 
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noho ana”; “to draw out for us a digest of the constitution and laws, and also a project of the 
organic acts which he recommends, accommodating them to our condition and circumstances.”65 
Kauikeaouli also announced the appointments of the white ministers Judd, Ricord, and 
Wyllie, and their appearance at the legislature’s opening ceremony caused quite a stir in the 
Hawaiian community. Petitions praying for their dismissal flowed into the legislative offices 
from several thousand Hawaiians.66 The petitioners also reacted strongly to Judd’s 
announcement in his ministry report that the king, the kuhina nui and the chiefs intended to 
“improve the tenure and leasing of land as may facilitate its acquisition by the poorer classes.”67 
The reaction from Lānaʻi petitioners typified all petitioners’ objections who feared that the plan 
Judd had announced was in fact a subterfuge for alienating their lands: “aole o makou makemake 
e kuai hou aku oe i kekahi apana aina o kou aupuni i na haole” (we do not want you to sell any 
more land of your Government to foreigners).68 
Despite the considerable unrest occasioned by the petitions, however, Ricord moved 
forward with the drafting of organic acts to provide a framework for the reorganization of 
governmental departments staffed by senior officials and the preparation of law codes. The first 
act passed in October 1845 and organized the executive departments into a cabinet of five 
ministries replacing various functions of the executive role previously exercised by the king: 
interior, foreign relations, finance, public instruction, and department of law, and also formally 
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constituted the privy council.69 Although the second organic act drafted by Ricord entitled “An 
Act to Organize the Executive Departments” was not passed by the legislature until April 1846, 
the portion entitled “Law Creating the Board of Commissioners To Quiet Land Titles” which 
enabled the land tenure changes referred to by Judd was passed on December 10, 1845.70 
Land ownership and tenancy patterns like Hawaiʻi’s centuries-old system existed 
throughout Polynesia and the South Pacific. Māori tribal leaders, for example, described their 
practice of giving lands to Europeans with the clear understanding that when the Europeans no 
longer needed to use the land it would be returned to the tribe; it was given only for use and 
never to sell.71 Māori scholar Margaret Mutu explained that the same concept governed in the 
Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tahiti, Hawaiʻi, Fiji, and New Caledonia. But westerners had made 
claims to take possession of land throughout the Pacific like the claims raised in Hawaiʻi by 
British Captain Russell in 1836 and Charlton in 1840. Ranginui Walker traced the origins of 
Māori activism to British arguments that their 1840 Treaty of Waitangi had transferred land 
sovereignty when the Māori only intended that the treaty grant land use.72 When Rarotongans 
saw that the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi had unbeknownst to the Māori transferred ownership of 
their land to the British crown, they reacted by ruling that none of Rarotonga’s land could be 
bought or sold.73 In Tahiti the insecurity of land tenure had become a contentious issue by 1842, 
and Tahitians were strongly opposed to alienating any land.74 When Fiji ceded political control 
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to Great Britain in 1874 the controlling agreement fixed land ownership into three categories: 
land already owned by foreigners, land in use or occupation by a chief or a tribe, and all other 
land that might in the future be required by chiefs or tribes was vested in the British crown.75 
Like Hawaiʻi, Tonga had a stratified society where the commoners were not genealogically 
related to the chiefs, and where land tenure was regulated by the paramount chief.76 After 
observing over several years the results of land alienation in Hawaiʻi and elsewhere in the 
Pacific, Tongan’s King George Tupou I in 1862 codified a prohibition against land sales to 
foreigners and even forbade land sales between Tongans.77 
Scholars and historians offer several explanations why Kauikeaouli and the chiefs 
considered changes to the ancient land tenure system, many of which are derived directly from 
the principles formulated by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles. Pressure to 
change either arose from a recognition that the ancient system was incompatible with further 
progress in civilization (W. D. Alexander78), or was needed to provide a secure land tenure 
system for large scale agricultural development (Melody K. MacKenzie79), or was urged by the 
missionaries and/or alternatively provoked by aggressive naval officers (Jon J. Chinen80). 
Changes in land tenure were enabled by western law and the imposition of western concepts, 
Trask alleged, and MacKenzie added that it was western influence that caused the change.81 
Kameʻeleihiwa argued that the king’s foreign advisors on the privy council and on the land 
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commission convinced Kauikeaouli that a change in land tenure practices was necessary in order 
to ensure the kingdom’s future prosperity.82 
It was the board commissioners, however, who identified the most persuasive driver for 
change. The commissioners concluded that Hawaiʻi’s land tenancy system was incomprehensible 
to foreigners because the rights of different classes to occupy and/or use the land “were not very 
clearly defined, [even though they were] universally acknowledged [by Hawaiians].” Thus the 
commissioners judged that foreigners’ own clear property title practices would likely prevail 
over Hawaiian land tenure claims in contested disputes.83 Indeed, as King Joerger recognized, it 
was British support for Charlton’s claim to the Pūlaholaho land that alerted Kauikeaouli and the 
chiefs to the dangers inherent in their traditional land tenure system.84 Similarly, Van Dyke 
described that the loss of control of the government to Paulet largely because of a land dispute 
had been “clearly traumatic” for Kauikeaouli. Although Van Dyke agreed that the king’s foreign 
advisors “eagerly promoted” the change to fee simple ownership, he also concluded that 
Kauikeaouli purposefully “set to work to find a method of protecting his own interests, as well as 
those of his people.”85 
Support for that position comes from Wyllie’s explanation to Miller of the reasoning 
behind the privy council resolutions of June 18, 1846 which began: “That it is contrary to the 
usages and laws of these Islands, and to the laws of nations, that any foreign nation, whatever, 
should pretend to adjudicate upon titles to real estate, within the King’s Jurisdiction.”86 Four 
days later, Wyllie advised Miller that “you wholly misunderstand their feeling [about Charlton’s 
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claim]. Upon this question it is, and ever has been, intense – and no wonder because it involves a 
principle whereby they themselves might be dispossessed of their lands by the Agent of a foreign 
Nation, and all redress, in the Courts of their own Country absolutely prevented.”87 
This insight into the reasoning of the king and his chiefs explains why they took the step 
of converting their land tenure system to fee simple ownership. The enactment of the law to quiet 
all other land claim titles—known and unknown—was the first step to eliminate foreigners’ 
claims before converting to fee-simple title for all lands. 
 
Establishing the framework for both reforms 
An action to quiet a land title asks the court to confirm a particular person’s title to real property, 
thereby extinguishing all other persons’ claims to the same property. The five-person board of 
commissioners created by the act were charged to investigate and affirm or reject all claims of 
private individuals, whether natives or foreigners, to any landed property acquired before the 
passage of the act.88 The board intended to receive claims only for a two-year time period, and 
thus the practical application of the act was to extinguish by December 9, 1847 any and all 
foreigners’ claims to title for land obtained before December 10, 1845 that had not already been 
brought forward.89 Completion of that process would enable moving forward with a division of 
lands between the Hawaiians who claimed a use or occupation interest. 
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By early February 1846 the commissioners had formulated and adopted principles to 
guide them in their adjudication of claims.90 The commissioners found that the rights in the lands 
held by different classes had been unchanged since the reign of Kamehameha I, and that 
Kauikeaouli and several grades of chiefs possessed a joint ownership of the lands: “the King 
really owning the allodium, and the person in whose hands he placed the land, holding it in 
trust.”91 Chinen added to this that the 1840 Constitution reaffirmed that the land belonged to the 
present king through inheritance from Kamehameha I, but that “it was not his own private 
property. . . . it belonged to the chiefs and people in common.”92 The commissioners buttressed 
their finding of the king’s allodial right by citing British Admiral Russell’s 1836 agreement with 
Kauikeaouli that the kingdom’s lands were the property of the king. Having identified the 
different interests, it would then be the commissioners’ responsibility to ascertain the specific use 
or occupation rights of each interested party who had brought a claim before them.93  
With the land commission work underway, Ricord completed work on the second organic 
act in time for Kauikeaouli to announce its completion at the legislature’s 1846 opening 
ceremony held in a booth constructed for that purpose on the Palace grounds. A large concourse 
of people had gathered outside, and within the Palace grounds were gathered members of the 
legislature, foreign diplomats, their families, government officers, foreign residents, and 
members of the general public.94 Referring to the dissension fomented by Brown and Miller in 
1845 on behalf of American and British subjects, Kauikeaouli admonished those foreigners who 
had shown disrespect for his authority and the laws of the kingdom: 
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Ua hookoia na kanawai i keia makahiki maloko o ka pilikia nui, no ke kue ana o 
kekahi poe i na Ahahookolokolo, a no ko lakou koi ana i na pomaikai, a me na 
oluolu kupono ole ke haawi, a kupono ole i ka poe malalo o ko’u malu ke koi. 
Aka ke hoolana nei au i ka manao maikai o ka poe e noho la malalo o’u, a me na 
Luna a na aina e mai, e kinai i kela mau manao kipikipi a hoohaunaele i na kanaka 
o ko lakou mau aina iho.  
. . . .  
The administration of the laws during the last year has been rendered difficult by 
opposition to the jurisdiction of my tribunals and the assertion of rights and 
privileges incompatible with the respect due to my authority from all who live 
under it. . . . It is my desire that the tribunals should be rendered equal to the 
prompt and just decision of all questions arising within my jurisdiction.95 
 
The king encouraged the legislators to study Ricord’s act, “e hoolohe paha oukou i ka olelo a 
kanaka, a e hana hou, a e hoano e, a e hoopau e like me ka mea e pomaikai ai na kanaka malalo 
o’u. . . .listen to the public voice, and alter, modify or repeal [its provisions], as the interests of 
my faithful subjects shall require.”96 Although Keanu Sai describes the organic acts as a hybrid 
of English and American common law that include some aspects of civil law, he concludes that 
at their very core the new organic acts were Hawaiian in nature.97 
Kauikeaouli also expressed the hope that impartial application of the new code would 
persuade foreign agents to discourage their countrymen from asserting rights and privileges 
unsupported by Hawaiian law. No doubt remembering Thomas’ cautionary warning about 
British redress for injustices to the rights of British subjects, Kauikeaouli also announced that in 
cases of disputes arising between foreigners, Kauikeaouli would supervise lawsuits and seek 
counsel abroad to prevent any other dispute from escalating into a sovereignty threat.98 
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  Kuykendall pointed out that the governmental reorganization and new legal codes 
produced by Ricord were not welcomed by most of the foreign residents, including the consuls. 
Kuykendall cited a private meeting between British Admiral Seymour and the king during the 
admiral’s next visit in August 1846 (attended only by Richards, who acted as translator), at 
which Seymour challenged the king to explain the necessity for what he characterized as “the 
abundance and intricacy of the new laws.” The king replied that he could manage his own 
subjects very easily—even his word was always enough for them, “[but while] he had only a few 
foreign Residents, yet they belonged to great nations, and they required as many laws and as 
complicated as those great nations required.”99 Population figures compiled at the time confirm 
that in 1846 there were only about 1,000 foreigners (about 200 of whom were Tahitians) among 
a Hawaiian population of between 80,000 and 100,000.100 The exchange between Seymour and 
the king suggests that the admiral recognized that western jurisprudential codes and a well-
functioning court system shifted power and authority away from the British consul because they 
rendered extraterritorial judicial controls unnecessary. 
 
Judicial reforms are accomplished 
With the Oʻahu court calendar filled with cases between foreigners in September 1845 and 
Ricord occupied with drafting the organic acts, kingdom officials appointed a judicial candidate 
who lacked legal training, but whose character they knew well from his service with the SIM. 
The Rev. Lorrin Andrews, a graduate of Princeton Theological Seminary, had arrived in 1828 as 
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a member of the third company sent by the ABCFM and served as the principal at Lahainaluna 
Seminary, but who had left the mission in 1842 and established a Honolulu printing business.101 
After becoming a judge, Andrews filled the need identified by Alexander Simpson by authoring 
an extensive first edition of Hawaiʻi pleading and practice rules of court in June 1846.102 
However, there was still an urgent need for judges familiar with common law and 
western legal principles to adjudicate the increasing number and complexity of claims involving 
foreigners.103 Harvard-trained lawyer William Little Lee arrived unexpectedly in Honolulu in 
October 1846 while bound for the Oregon Territory with his good friend, Charles Reed 
Bishop.104 Bishop and Lee lingered in Honolulu while their ship underwent repairs.105 In 
December 1846, after much discussion on the part of the Hawaiian chiefs and the king, the privy 
council unanimously approved the cabinet council’s recommendation that Lee be appointed as a 
“Judge of Original and Appellate Jurisdiction for the Island of Oʻahu” with power to act jointly 
or severally with Andrews on the Superior Court at an annual salary of $2,500.106 Lee accepted, 
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and earlier that same day, the king in council removed any legal impediment to a non-citizen 
serving in that capacity by issuing Lee a letter of denization, which conferred upon him all the 
rights and privileges of a Hawaiian subject without requiring him to surrender his American 
citizenship.107 
The Superior Court was a court of record which held four terms per year, and the 
Hawaiian Reports legal series began regular publication of its decisions beginning with Lee’s 
first decisions in the January 1847 term.108 When the legislature opened again on April 28, 1847, 
the king announced Lee’s appointment and urged the legislators to consider changes in the laws 
that might be appropriate so that the law would be equally and justly applied.109 Ricord abruptly 
departed the kingdom in August 1847, leaving the unfinished “Act to Organize the Judiciary 
Department” for Lee to complete. The act restructured the Superior Court as the Superior Court 
of Law and Equity, and it took over the supreme court function previously performed by 
Kauikeaouli. John Papa ʻĪʻī joined Andrews as an Associate Justice on the court in January 1848, 
and Lee assumed the duties and responsibilities of Chief Justice.110 
Lee’s influence in the development of the legal system and the creation of a body of case 
law was paramount as neither ʻĪʻī nor Andrews were legally trained. Beginning with his first 
decision concerning the fraudulent transfer of a lease in Robert W. Wood vs. Benjamin Stark, Jr. 
1 Haw. 9 (1847), Lee drew on American case law from legal authorities such as William Powell 
Mason’s series on United States Circuit Court Reports,1816-1830, and he cited persuasive legal 
authorities and rules of law within the bodies of his decisions (such as the 1836 American 
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treatise by James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, an 1848 British treatise by Arnould 
entitled Law of Marine Insurance, and an 1850 British treatise by Lord Charles Abbott, A 
Treatise of the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen). Lee demonstrated solid 
professionalism and competent handling of all judicial aspects as he decided procedural and 
evidentiary cases, enforced judgments, defended the kingdom’s jurisdictional reach over all 
admiralty and maritime cases arising within its territorial waters, and settled questions of law.111 
A review of the litigants in cases from the January 1847 term through the May 1849 term 
demonstrates why the kingdom needed a western-style justice system to adjudicate cases 
between foreigners: during that period of time, Judge Lee decided fourteen cases with thirty-five 
named litigants, and none were Hawaiian.112 
 By 1848, the king’s emphasis on legal reform as a major policy initiative had been 
rewarded by firm administrative and legislative control of all aspects of juridical processes. A 
reliable framework had been established, a western legal code had been implemented, and a 
court system delivered justice to foreigners and Hawaiians alike. When foreigners became 
assured that their disputes would be settled according to rules they found acceptable, their 
hostility towards the courts diminished. Kauikeaouli’s brief references to the law and justice in 
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Land tenure reforms are accomplished 
Meanwhile, work continued on the land reform process. The initial two-year period allowed to 
file actions to quiet titles ended on December 9, 1847.114 It then became time to begin the next 
phase of the process, the māhele, or division work, to separate the relative rights of the king, the 
chiefs and their konohiki land administrators in all of the lands in the kingdom.115 Because the 
king held the allodium right to all lands, the board determined that he should dispose of his 
interest by “offer[ing] it first to the superior lord . . .who originally received the land in trust 
from the King.”116 Disposal by agreement to each division would be equivalent to a quitclaim 
action. 
Lee formulated rules to guide the process, and each rule was discussed individually and 
voted on by the king and the Hawaiian privy council members who were in attendance on 
December 14, 1847: Keoni Ana, Joshua Kāʻeo, John Papa ʻĪʻī, Aaron Kealiʻiahonui, Mataio 
Kekūanāoʻa, Caesar Kapaakea, Bennett Nāmakehā, and Analea Keohokālole.117 The king would 
keep all his private property and of the remainder, one-third would be set aside for the 
government, one-third divided among the chiefs, and one-third divided among the tenants 
according to the wishes of the chiefs and the king’s approval in council.118 Sai points out that 
during the division it was understood that the king would participate in his private capacity and 
not as head of the government, and Sai describes the process as it unfolded.119 There were three 
divisions: first, the division between the king and the chiefs, then the creation by the king of 
                                                 
114 Although it was extended. 
115 Note that the overall process is referred to as the Māhele, or Great Māhele, while the divisions themselves are 
māhele. 
116 Thurston, ed., “Principles,” Fundamental Law, 140-1. 
117 Minutes, 14 December 1847, Series 421, vol. 4, Privy Council, HSA. 
118 Minutes, 14 December 1847, Series 421, vol. 4, Privy Council, HSA. 
119 Sai, “The American Occupation,” 81-6. 
172 
 
government lands, and lastly the creation of the king’s own personal lands. When the divisions 
were completed, the recordation book was closed and no further entries were made.120 
Kauikeaouli, the highest-ranking chiefs, and 240 konohiki land administrators joined in the work 
to reach agreement on dividing their interests in all lands throughout the kingdom.121 The 
agreement for the first division was signed on January 27, 1848, and the last was signed on 
March 7, 1848.122 At that point, all land in the kingdom was held in fee simple title. 
Measles, whooping cough and influenza epidemics caused 10,000 deaths as they ravaged 
the kingdom in 1848 and 1849, and there were renewed fears that France would seize sovereign 
control of the weakened kingdom. Those fears materialized in August 1849 when French 
Admiral de Tromelin attacked Honolulu, and in September 1849 the king sent Judd, Alexander 
Liholiho Kamehameha, and Lot Kamehameha on a diplomatic mission to the American and 
European capitals to negotiate terms that would strengthen international commitments to respect 
Hawaiian sovereignty. Given those disruptions, it was not until December 20 and 21, 1849 that 
the king and privy council took one last action resulting from the Great Māhele divisions. Privy 
council members at those meetings were the king, the queen, Keoni Ana, Caesar Kapaakea, 
Mataio Kekūanāoʻa, Joshua Kāʻeo, Charles Kanaʻina, Paul Kānoa, Bennett Nāmakehā, Abner 
Pākī, John Papa ʻĪʻī, Miriam Kekauʻōnohi, Robert Wyllie, Richard Armstrong, William Lee, and 
attorney Asher Bates. Together they agreed on the need to give makaʻāinana occupants of lands a 
kuleana (homesite) grant of fee simple title to the lands they occupied.123 
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On August 6, 1850, the Kuleana Act formalized the privy council’s commitments. Fee 
simple titles free of commutation fees or restrictions were granted to all native tenants who 
occupied and improved any portion of any government land or any other lands held by the king, 
a chief, or a konohiki. A portion of the government lands was set aside to be disposed of in lots 
from one to fifty acres in fee simple to makaʻāinana not otherwise furnished with lands at a 
minimum price of fifty cents per acre. The act guaranteed gathering rights and access to the 
mountains and the sea, and at Kauikeaouli’s insistence, the act also protected konohiki fishing 
rights.124 The commissioners’ powers were extended to adjudicate kuleana and konohiki 
rights.125 
The division of lands between the king, the high chiefs and their konohiki land 
administrators did not in itself confer title. Each claimant was required to present his claim 
before the land commission, receive an award, and pay a commutation fee. Many konohiki, 
however, had not completed the process by the time that the board dissolved on March 31, 1855. 
Commenting on this failure, Kameʻeleihiwa explained that many of them “simply did not 
understand the capitalist uses of private ownership.”126 Successive legislatures granted several 
extensions to those konohiki whose awards were listed in the Māhele Book of 1848, and most 
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As discussed in Chapter 7, Britain’s revised treaty with Hawaiʻi ratified as of May 1852 lifted 
the economic and jury duty extraterritorial restrictions that had been imposed by the 1844 and 
1846 treaties between Britain and Hawaiʻi.128 That left the French Treaty of 1846 as the only 
remaining obstacle to the king’s free exercise of his sovereign powers.129 Before that, however, 
the Hawaiian court reforms and a decline in French merchant shipping and population had 
removed the political and practical impact of those extraterritorial restrictions.130 
 Silverman and Merry credited the American lawyers Ricord and Lee as the architects and 
driving forces behind the legal reforms but failed to notice Kauikeaouli’s leadership role.131 
While it is indisputable that the contributions of both lawyers were critical to realizing success, it 
was the king who had guided the enabling legislation that empowered them to act. It was 
Kauikeaouli’s determination to use the professional skills of white ministers even in the face of 
strong objections from foreign consuls and his own subjects that had delivered the political 
results he needed to strengthen his functional authority over the rule of law. Kauikeaouli’s 1845 
and 1846 legislative speeches and his recorded conversations in 1846 to Stockton and Seymour 
are alone sufficient evidence of Kauikeaouli’s leadership role.   
Judge Lee’s suggested Rule 7 for the division of the interests of the king, the chiefs, and 
the konohiki administrators proposed that Kauikeaouli’s private lands would be recorded in a 
separate book from all other private, fee simple titles. That caused the king to ask, “if a foreign 
power should take the islands. . . would they take possession of his lands?” Lee assured him that 
                                                 
128 “Treaty with Great Britain,” Treaties and Conventions, 31-39. 
129 Chapter 6 discusses the revision negotiations at length. 
130 King Joerger, Political Biography, 103-4. By the early 1850s, the French population numbered 36. 
131 Silverman, “Western Judicial System,” 48; Merry, Colonizing Hawaiʻi, 3. 
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in the case of conquest, a foreign power would respect the king’s right to his private property, to 
which the king replied, “during the French revolution, were not the King’s lands confiscated?” 
Wyllie replied that they were, but that was by the French king’s own rebellious subjects. 
Kauikeaouli decided, however, that his private lands should be recorded in the same book as all 
other fee simple titles, and that the only separate book should be that of government lands.132  
The Hawaii Supreme Court in an 1864 adjudication of the case In the Matter of the Estate 
of His Majesty Kamehameha IV., Late Deceased, 2 Haw. 715, 722 cited that December 1848 
privy council discussion to conclude that Kauikeaouli had held an “anxious desire to free his 
lands from the burden of being considered public domain, and as such, subjected to the danger of 
confiscation in the event of his islands being seized by any foreign power.”133 But other evidence 
led the Court to rule that Kauikeaouli’s one million acres of personal lands which had descended 
to Kamehameha IV were the property of his heir Kamehameha V and not his widow Queen 
Emma.  
MacKenzie related the unintended result of that Supreme Court decision. In 1865, the 
Hawaiian legislature transformed those personal lands into inalienable Crown lands. Thereafter, 
the lands continued to descend to the successor to the throne. But just as Kauikeaouli had feared 
should his private lands be recorded separately, when Queen Liliʻuokalani was deposed by 
rebellious subjects and the Republic of Hawaiʻi was founded (1894-1897), the Republic’s leaders 
used its constitutional provisions as their justification to seize the former Hawaiian government’s 
Crown lands without compensation.134 
                                                 
132 Minutes, 18 December 1847, Series 421, vol. 4, Privy Council, HSA.  
133 Kamehameha IV had died intestate. This seems to be the genesis for Banner’s conclusion in his “Chapter 4: 
Hawaii Preparing to be Colonized,” Possessing the Pacific.  
134 MacKenzie, Native Hawaiian Rights, 11-3. 
176 
 
As with any major cultural and institutional change, there were differences of opinion 
among native Hawaiians about the Great Māhele and other of its unintended consequences. 
Writing in 1846 before the Great Māhele or the Kuleana Act had taken place, Davida Malo 
endorsed the idea of private land ownership in a letter to Richards because he believed it would 
encourage the virtues of hard work and love of country.135 Writing in 1869 after the land 
distributions had ended, Kamakau reported that many people chose to remain on the lands of 
their chiefs and serve them. When the chiefs sold their lands, however, the people without a 
kuleana were set adrift and had nowhere to go.136  
Modern Hawaiian scholars call attention to the disastrous consequences that the 
transformation to fee-simple title had on the Hawaiian people. MacKenzie observes that only 
twenty-six percent of the adult male population received kuleana awards.137 Trask believes that 
the Great Māhele and private property land tenure spelled the death knell of the makaʻāinana as 
the bulk of the land found its way into the plantation economy run by haole hands.138 
Kameʻeleihiwa expresses the outrage and sorrow that Hawaiians still feel over the loss of their 
communal access to the land, and their pain over the subsequent ease with which land ownership 
passed into foreign hands. “The Aliʻi thought they were sharing the Land,” Kameʻeleihiwa 
related, “and, by extension, sharing their control of the sovereignty of Hawaiʻi, with their 
makaʻāinana, rather than ‘dividing’ the Land.”139 
                                                 
135 Van Dyke simply cited Malo’s letter in a footnote without comment, See Van Dyke, Who Owns the Crown 
Lands? 28, at fn. 95; see also, Davida Malo to William Richards, 02 June 1846, Series 402-17-386, Chronological 
File, FO&EX, HSA. 
136 Kamakau, Ke Aupuni Mōʻī, 250.  
137 MacKenzie, Native Hawaiian Rights, 8. 
138 Trask, “Colonization and De-colonization,” 156. 
139 Kameʻeleihiwa, Native Land, 9, 15, 208-9. 
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Silva and Beamer, however, both suggest that recent scholarship gives grounds to rethink 
the results of the Māhele. Silva concludes from research done by Hawaiian scholar Keanu Sai 
that the king and chiefs had attempted to protect the rights and interests of the makaʻāinana by 
enacting and enforcing laws that permitted the makaʻāinana to file claims for land purchases at 
low rates even after the official deadlines had passed.140 Beamer claims that the 1840 
codification of their vested rights in the land together with the large amount of acreage (195,948 
acres) that was purchased by makaʻāinana between 1850 and 1893 demonstrated that the Māhele 
process actually secured their rights, not severed their relationships with the land. The Kuleana 
Act and the Māhele were hybrid laws, Beamer argues, intended to move makaʻāinana back to the 
land so that cultivation could thrive again, and they perpetuated and codified many traditional 
relationships between people and property.141 
After Thomas imposed extraterritorial legal restrictions and Britain refused on Charlton’s 
behalf to acknowledge Kauikeaouli’s allodial rights, changes became a matter of urgent political 
necessity. The tactical reforms that Kauikeaouli implemented averted both dangers: legal reforms 
shifted power away from consular jurisdiction because they provided a western-style forum to 
address foreigners’ concerns, and the distribution among Hawaiians of allodial interests 
alleviated the threat of land seizures under the guise of spurious title claims. Just as he had with 
his policy of hiring white ministers, Kauikeaouli’s tactical decisions and persistence in enacting 
his own agenda ensured that by the end of the decade he held sufficient sovereign control over 
the law to ward off similar challenges in the future.  
 
 
                                                 
140 Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 42. 





TACTICAL USE OF PRINT MEDIA 
 
Kauikeaouli had been blind-sided by the effectiveness of the array of charges that Richard 
Charlton and Alexander Simpson had presented to British authorities alleging his inability to 
rule. The thirty-five written complaints from British residents about the kingdom’s jury system 
that Charlton carried to Mazatlán had launched Paulet’s investigation, and Simpson’s 1843 
London publication detailing even more abuses had influenced London authorities.1 In fact, 
British recognition of the kingdom’s independence had almost been derailed by a statement 
submitted to its foreign office that mischaracterized Kauikeaouli’s support for the Belgian 
colonization project brokered by Ladd & Co.2 Kauikeaouli’s emissaries prevailed, however, and 
secured recognition from the three maritime powers.  
But as 1844 progressed, British and American diplomats at Hawaiʻi again used legal 
disputes as platforms to attack the integrity and competency of the king and his white ministers. 
When the diplomats repeated their criticisms of the king’s governance in their official diplomatic 
letters, the international reach of their written criticisms posed as grave a threat to Kauikeaouli’s 
governance as did the prosecution of the disputes themselves. Recognizing the danger, 
Kauikeaouli made the tactical decision to purchase the Polynesian weekly newspaper and its 
printing press to publish official government news and notices to an international readership. 
                                                 
1 MacAllan, “Sir George Simpson,” 71-2. A. Simpson, Sandwich Islands, 47. Richards referred to Alexander 
Simpson’s publication in a February 28, 1844 letter to Aberdeen, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2, Hawaiian Officials 
Abroad, FO&EX, HSA. See Chapter 5 for a full discussion. 
2 To His Majesty from T. Haʻalilio, W. Richards, and J. F. B. Marshall, 18 August 1843, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2, 
Hawaiian Officials Abroad, FO&EX, HSA; see also Appendix, “To His Majesty from T. Haʻalilio, W. Richards, and 
J. F. B. Marshall, August 18, 1843,” Ladd Arbitration, 118-20. See Chapter 2 for a full discussion. Although the 
author is unnamed in the cited document, the statement no doubt was prepared by Charlton or Alexander Simpson. 
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One year later partisan political attacks prompted Kauikeaouli to initiate a policy to 
publish the documents from both sides of ongoing diplomatic disagreements because he believed 
that full disclosure to the world at large would focus attention on his proper exercise of his 
sovereign powers. As Miles Ogborn pointed out, circulation of the king’s arguments in the 
government newspaper would be simultaneously local and mobile, available to domestic and 
international friends and foes alike, and pamphlets with the same arguments also could be 
broadly distributed through normal correspondence channels.3 With a two-pronged policy firmly 
in place, print media became a diplomatic tool that Kauikeaouli used in tandem with other 
strategic measures.  
 
The Polynesian rejoins the public forum 
English-language newspapers had been published at Honolulu since 1836, when the Sandwich 
Islands Gazette and Journal of Commerce began weekly Saturday evening issues on July 30. 
Intended as a vehicle to publicize traders’ interests at Hawaiʻi, the Gazette evolved into a 
political organ that severely criticized Kauikeaouli’s anti-Catholic policies. The Gazette enjoyed 
an international reach, with favorable mentions in the London Evening Chronicle, the Journal de 
Havre, and the New York Evening Star. Publication of the Sandwich Island Mirror and 
Commercial Gazette succeeded the original Gazette in 1839, but folded after a year.4 
 A literary and scientific English-language periodical was published quarterly from 1838 
to 1839 under the title Hawaiian Spectator with articles about topical news events, such as James 
                                                 
3 Miles Ogborn, Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago, 2007), 12, 22. 
4 Helen P. Hoyt, ”Hawaii’s First English Newspaper and its Editor,” Sixty-Third Annual Report of the HHS for the 
Year 1954 (Honolulu, 1955), 5-18. 
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J. Jarves’ report on LaPlace’s 1839 visit.5 Jarves began his own commercial enterprise in June 
1840 with publication of a weekly English-language newspaper named the Polynesian for the 
kingdom’s foreign residents. Although Jarves had financial support from the Sandwich Islands 
Mission, subscription sales, and advertising, the Polynesian folded in 1841. 
Jarves returned to Honolulu in 1844 and on May 18 resumed weekly Saturday 
publication of the Polynesian as an independent English-language newspaper. The Polynesian 
printed articles of general interest, letters to the editor, shipping news, and advertisements at an 
annual single-subscription cost of $6.00.6 However, facing the same profitability challenges as 
he had during his earlier failed publishing venture, Jarves soon agreed to sell the newspaper and 
its press to the government. When he announced the change in ownership in the July 13 edition, 
Jarves underscored the diplomatic role that the newspaper would play in Kauikeaouli’s strategy 
to defend Hawaiian sovereignty: the newspaper would serve as “an authentic organ to the public, 
of the views and opinions of His Majesty’s Government which will enable the Government 
transactions to go to Europe and America, and there announce the policy of His Majesty’s 
Government, so that the world can judge for itself of its capability to conduct its relations with 
Foreign nations.”7 Although the French protectorate government at Tahiti also began publication 
in May 1844 of an official government newspaper named L’Oceanie Francaise,8 the Polynesian 
was the first government organ dedicated to serving the political interests of a Polynesian 
monarch. 
                                                 
5 Jarves, “l’Artemise Account,” 352-5. 
6 Bob Dye reported that Jarves was Judd’s nephew but gave no source for this information. See Dye, “ ‘A Memoria 
of What the People Were,’ The Sandwich Island Institute and Hawaiian Spectator,” HJH 31 (1997):64. Jarves 
makes no mention of their relationship in the preface to the third edition of History. 
7 “To the Public,” Polynesian, 13 July 1844. 
8 Editorial, Polynesian, 15 June 1844. 
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As the government press, the Polynesian printed the kingdom’s treaties, diplomatic 
correspondence, legislative proceedings, Supreme Court decisions, local adjudications, 
government appointments, official laws, notices, and miscellaneous news.9 Its editors presented 
the government’s point of view in editorials on topical political questions. Weekly issues were 
four to eight pages in length. Like the Gazette, the Polynesian quickly developed an international 
reach. A November 1844 article in the New York Tribune, for example, copied news items from 
the prior June 22 edition of the Polynesian, including coverage of a social event U. S. 
Commissioner Brown had hosted.10 Judd broadened that international reach by announcing to the 
kingdom’s newly-appointed commissioner to the European courts that the Polynesian had been 
purchased to be the government organ, and that its issues “will be sent to you regularly in future 
as occasions allow. Whatever appears in its columns goes forth under the sanction of 
Government.”11  
In June 1845, Jarves announced that individual subscriptions to the newspaper had been 
“constantly and regularly increasing, particularly by subscriptions from abroad.”12 Local 
subscriptions also numbered more than they had before the government’s purchase. And another 
New York newspaper, the New York Daily Herald demonstrated the Polynesian’s continuing 
reach by publishing several news items in its July 1845 edition which it had picked up from the 
Polynesian’s February 1845 edition.13 
At that time, the Friend was the only other Honolulu newspaper to which English-
language residents could turn for information. Edited and published by the Rev. Samuel C. 
                                                 
9 “To the Public,” Polynesian, 13 July 1844. 
10 “From the Polynesian,” New York Tribune, 16 November 1844.  
11 G. P. Judd to Sir George Simpson, 01 July 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 2, Letters, Consular Correspondence, 
HSA.  
12 “Official Journal of the Hawaiian Government,” Polynesian, 28 June 1845. 
13 “Interesting from the Sandwich Islands,” New York Daily Herald, 11 July 1845. 
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Damon for the American Seamen’s Friends’ Society, the Friend had begun monthly publication 
at Honolulu in January 1843 as a vehicle to promote temperance among seamen. The paper 
underwent several name changes before Damon settled on the Friend in 1845. At that point, the 
newspaper’s format broadened to include local and international news as well as serialized 
articles of interest about other geographic locations in the Pacific. Occasionally Damon even 
reprinted official government news from the pages of the Polynesian.14 Damon began semi-
monthly editions in 1845, and the size of each edition increased to eight pages, swelled by 
international coverage, shipping news, and advertising. The cost in the first year had been 25 
cents for ten issues, and by October 1846 the price had increased to a single annual subscription 
cost of $2.50. Damon printed on the mission press. 
Issues of the Friend also circulated internationally. Judd, for example, had sent copies of 
articles in the Friend announcing the execution of the Treaty of Lahaina (February 20, 1844 
edition) and Attorney General Ricord’s appointment (March 25, 1844 edition) to the British 
Consul at Washington, D.C. for the consul to deliver to the President of the United States.15 Both 
newspapers achieved worldwide distribution through the sale of annual subscriptions, single-
issue circulation to other ports by naval and merchant crew members, single-issue mailings by 
residents to family and friends in widespread locations, and purposeful dissemination by 
Hawaiian government agents to diplomatic allies abroad. Although precise figures are not 
available, readership for both newspapers was reported to be extensive not only in Honolulu, but 
also throughout the Pacific Ocean, Europe and America.16 
                                                 
14 “Official,” Friend, 01 July 1846, where Damon reprinted text and public documents from the June 27 edition of 
the Polynesian about the arrival of U. S. Commissioner Anthony Ten Eyck and Brown’s departure. 
15 G. P. Judd to R. C. Wyllie, 23 September 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 3, Letters, Consular Correspondence, 
HSA. 
16 “Report of the Minister of the Interior,” Polynesian, 08 August 1846. 
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As the Gazette had done before them, both the Polynesian and the Friend gleaned 
international political and commercial news from newspapers brought in by ships or mail. The 
May 17, 1845 issue of the Polynesian, for example, reprinted news from Europe and the U. S. 
from as recently as March 1845 about Polk’s election as U. S. President, the admittance of 
Texas, Florida and Iowa as states of the union, and the U. S. treaty with China. The July 16, 1845 
issue of the Friend reprinted items from the April 26 edition of the New Orleans Picayune about 
the British House of Commons debate regarding the Oregon boundary negotiations with the 
U.S., an assessment of the instability of French Foreign Minister Guizot’s administration, and the 
information that British naval officers had succeeded in lifting the French blockade of ports at 
Raiatea. 
Hawaiian-language readers received their news from Ka Nonanona, a four-page semi-
monthly edition which published from 1841 until 1845, then reemerged under the name Ka Elele 
Hawaii (Ka Elele). Unlike the Māori-language newspaper Ko te Karere o Nui Tireni (The New 
Zealand Messenger) which had begun in 1842 as a government organ “for the instruction of the 
natives,”17 Ka Nonanona printed articles intended to be of interest to its Hawaiian readership. 
Edited by missionary Richard Armstrong (known at the newspaper by his Hawaiian name 
“Limaikaika”) and printed on the mission press, Ka Nonanona delivered hard news about local 
events, such as Paulet’s takeover and Kauikeaouli’s speech to his subjects in the March 7, 1843 
edition.18 Armstrong continued the tradition of publishing hard news in Ka Elele and printed in 
its April 8, 1846 edition, for example, side-by-side Hawaiian-language texts of the 1846 treaties 
                                                 
17 Jenifer Curnow, “A Brief History of the Maori-Language Newspapers,” in Rere Atu, Taku Manu!: Discovering 
History, Language, and Politics in the Maori-Language Newspapers, eds. Jenifer Curnow, Ngapare Hopa, & Jane 
McRae (Auckland: Auckland Univ. Press, 2002), 17-9. 
18 “No ka Lilo o ke Aupuni,” Ka Nonanona, 07 March 1843. 
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with Britain and France.19 While Ka Nonanona had charged $1.00 for an annual single 
subscription, Ka Elele announced a sliding-rate scale, with prices ranging from $1.00 annually 
for chiefs and haoles to 25 cents for makaʻāinana maoli (native Hawaiians).20 In 1846, readership 
for Ka Elele was reported to be three thousand.21 
 
Publishing to the world 
The Polynesian’s first edition on July 20 as the government’s press organ carried front-page 
coverage in Hawaiian and English of the June 29 enactment of a Code of Etiquette patterned 
after the 1814 Congress of Vienna ranking system of diplomatic agents and government officials 
establishing their order of recognition at court.22 There was also front-page English/Hawaiian 
coverage of a listing of principal chiefs, privy council members, nobles, princes and chiefs, and 
judges on all islands. Under the new page 2 column heading “Official Journal of the Hawaiian 
Government” there was a notification published in Hawaiian, French, and English from French 
Consul Jules Dudoit announcing that France had taken political control of Futuna, Wallis islands, 
and Gambier islands. Justice court news and news about the comings-and-goings of the king 
were also featured. 
Three weeks after becoming the government press, the Polynesian published its first 
article about an ongoing diplomatic dispute—a private legal opinion rendered by an American 
attorney which contradicted a key evidentiary position taken by the British consul in the Charlton 
                                                 
19 “Na ke Aupuni,” Ka Elele, 08 April 1846. 
20 “Ka Elele Hawaii,” Ka Elele, 01 April 1845. 
21 “Report of the Minister of the Interior,” Polynesian, 08 August 1846. 
22 The Code of Etiquette also established meeting protocols. Ricord ranked U. S. Commissioner Brown ahead of 
Consul General Miller because Brown’s credentials had been presented first and the U. S. recognized the kingdom 
in 1842 before Britain did in 1843. That led to an international brouhaha between Miller and Ricord, and Ricord was 
forced to reorder them so that Miller had precedence. See Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:241 at fn. 62. 
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case in opposition to the Hawaiian government.23 More important than the attorney’s opinion, 
however, was the message that its publication conveyed. Public exposé violated the diplomatic 
niceties of timing, then-British deputy-consul Wyllie advised Judd, because “the usual course in 
Diplomacy, is never to publish any thing relating to a negotiation still pending.”24 Judd replied 
that the government would continue to focus attention on disputes at any stage of negotiations 
because it was “a question whether or not a Govt as dependent on the good opinion of the world 
as this might not give earlier information of its positions to the world than a Govt capable of 
maintaining its rights by force of arms.”25 
Judd’s reply reinforced Jarves’ earlier announcement that the newspaper would play an 
important role in publicizing the king’s sovereign rights and privileges to an international 
audience. While Kauikeaouli engaged in personal diplomacy and his ministers communicated 
through traditional channels, Jarves emerged as a forceful spokesman who used his editorial 
platform to join public debates and promote the king’s policies. Diplomatic press coverage 
necessarily centered on the actions of U. S. Commissioner Brown and British Consul General 
Miller because of their deliberate, protracted attempts to throw the courts into confusion and 
discredit the king’s white ministers. The nations that Brown and Miller represented were key 
international allies whose support was critical to Kauikeaouli’s ability to sustain his sovereign 
                                                 
23 Connecticut attorney Thomas S. Perkins concluded after a review of pertinent documents that Miller had exceeded 
his consular instructions when he attempted to dictate what evidentiary rules should apply to the examination of the 
purported deed. See “Opinion of T. S. Perkin in the Matter of Richard Charlton’s Claim upon the Government of the 
Hawaiian Islands,” Polynesian, 03 August 1844. Perkins had journeyed to Hawaiʻi for his health; however, it 
continued to decline, and he left Honolulu in July 1844. He died October 14, 1844 aboard a ship sailing from 
Valparaiso to Hamburg. See “Obituary,” Friend, 15 August 1845. 
24 R. C. Wyllie to G. P. Judd, 03 August 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 2, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
Miller was in the South Pacific tending to consular duties at his other stations. 
25 G. P. Judd to R. C. Wyllie, 06 August 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 2, Letters,  Consular Correspondence, HSA.  
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prerogatives, and bringing their attempts to destabilize his administration to the attention of 
policymakers in London and Washington, D.C. was of paramount importance. 
The first press battle was centered around the abusive attacks made by U. S. 
Commissioner Brown on the king’s white ministers and his court battles over the selection of a 
jury for the trial of an American, John Wiley, charged with rape of a Hawaiian woman. Brown 
demanded a jury composed entirely of foreign residents selected by the consul, just as British 
citizens enjoyed under the terms of the 1844 Treaty of Lahaina. The court, however, selected 
Wiley’s jury in accordance with Hawaiian law: one-half of the jury was selected from among 
other resident Americans, and the other half from among Hawaiians.26 U. S. Consular Agent 
William Hooper, who was also a principal in Ladd & Co., had filed the first complaint about jury 
selection in August 1844 and represented Wiley throughout his first trial.27  
Brown and Hooper continued to argue over jury selection processes, but it was Brown’s 
ad hominem attacks on Judd, Ricord, and native Hawaiian judges and his insistence that 
Americans have the same jury provisions as British citizens without a treaty commitment that led 
to the king’s decision to request Brown’s recall.28 Judd arranged for the printing of Brown’s 
correspondence together with documentary evidence disproving Brown’s allegations in a 78-
page pamphlet entitled Correspondence between H.H.M. Secretary of State and the U.S. 
Commissioner, in the Case of John Wiley, an American Citizen, and the resulting pamphlet 
accompanied Kauikeaouli’s letter to U. S. President Polk in support of his complaint about 
                                                 
26 Laws and Regulations, 11 August 1843, Series 418, Folio 8-3, Early Laws, HSA; “Review of Correspondence 
between H.H.M.ʼs Secretary of State and the U. S. Commissioner in the case of John Wiley,” The Friend, 14 
November 1844 Extra; “Convention between Great Britain and the Sandwich Islands,” Friend, 20 February 1844. 
27 Wyllie, Table, 5-7; “By Authority,” Polynesian, 21 September 1844; “Official Journal of the Hawaiian 
Government, Polynesian, 23 November 1844. 
28 Chapter 4 discusses Brown’s projection of his anger onto the king’s white ministers; “Official Journal of the 
Hawaiian Government,” Polynesian, 05 April 1845. 
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Brown.29 Apparently learning that Judd had also given the British and French consuls copies of 
the pamphlet, Brown himself demanded that Judd present the “whole facts…before my 
government and European courts.”30 
In late September, Brown created an international incident by persuading the U.S. 
Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces in the Pacific Captain James Armstrong not to salute the 
Hawaiian flag while in port or to offer the customary courtesies at the foreign office. The affront 
was public knowledge at Honolulu, of course, so that when it was publicized in the Polynesian as 
an insult delivered by a high-ranking American naval officer to the sovereign head of the 
Hawaiian kingdom, the Polynesian’s coverage was aimed directly at Washington, D.C. 
policymakers.31 
What began as a pamphlet about Brown’s conduct that had been prepared for the king’s 
use grew into a vehicle which publicized Brown’s antagonistic rhetoric well beyond the confines 
of private diplomatic correspondence. A literary review of the pamphlet on the front page of the 
November 2 Polynesian rebutted Brown’s arguments point-by-point.32 Within days, Jarves 
ensured its broad distribution by advertising in the Polynesian that copies of the pamphlet were 
for sale at a price of 50 cents.33 When the Friend’s editor Damon acknowledged that Jarves had 
succeeded in publicizing Brown’s correspondence “to the world” and pushed back with his own 
                                                 
29 The September 4 trial record already had been printed “by authority” in the Polynesian on September 7. See 
“Before the Governor of Oahu, assisted by Hon G. P. Judd and J. Ricord, Esq., H. H. M. Att’y General, at the Fort, 
Sept. 4, 1844,” Polynesian, 07 September 1844; Correspondence in the Case of John Wiley (1844); Kamehameha III 
to President of the United States (John Tyler), 20 September 1844, Series 410, Box 1, Book 3, Letters, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA; see also the discussion in Chapter 4. 
30 G. P. Judd to R. C. Wyllie, 17 September 1844 and G. P. Judd to J. Dudoit, 18 September 1844, Series 410, Box 
1, Book 3, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA; G. Brown to G. P. Judd, 18 September 1844, Series 410, Box 1, 
Book 3, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
31 “By Authority,” Polynesian, 28 September 1844, extra dated 02 October. 
32 “Literary Review: Correspondence between H. H. M.’s Secretary of State and the U. S. Commissioner in the Case 
of John Wiley, an American citizen. Printed by order of Government. Government Press: Honolulu, 1844,” The 
Polynesian, 02 November 1844. 
33 “Important Correspondence,” Polynesian, 16 November 1844. 
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six-page review in defense of Brown’s arguments, that only gave Jarves an opportunity to 
prolong the debate by rebutting Damon’s rebuttal, followed by a subsequent article strongly 
endorsing the king’s sovereign privileges: Brown should have simply stated the law, Jarves 
wrote, “and not argue[d] its propriety. . . [he] interpreted it for himself in direct opposition to His 
Majesty’s court, the law of the kingdom. . . Every nation makes and interprets its own laws, and 
is not bound, provided they do not conflict with the laws and good sense of nations, to show 
grounds for their propriety to foreign tribunals.”34 
Two more hard-hitting articles authored by Jarves in support of the king’s selection of 
white ministers appeared in the Polynesian in January 1845.35 Then in February, an editorial 
decried the bitterness and hostility of “some foreigners,” followed by another editorial labeling 
them “resident alien opposers.”36 In March, when Brown and officers from the U. S. S. 
Brandywine refused to accept a court verdict convicting one of the Brandywine’s seaman of a 
breach of the peace, an editorial in the pages of the Polynesian issued a direct challenge to the 
U.S. government:37 
the effrontery of those gentlemen in their dictation to the judge, is matchless. . . it 
remains to be seen whether the President of the United States has among the other 
duties of subordinate naval officers, given them instructions to establish 
themselves at will and where they please in a dictatorial tribunal or to terrify 
foreign judges into decisions in compliance with their views. . . They may rest 
assured, however, that this Government will strenuously and fearlessly assert the 
proper jurisdiction of her Court, and that nothing short of absolute conquest will 
coerce them to depart from the only policy which justice and honor dictate.38 
                                                 
34 Friend, 14 November 1844, extra; “Official Journal of the Hawaiian Government,” Polynesian, 23 November 
1844; Editorial, Polynesian, 30 November 1844. 
35 “Official Journal of the Hawaiian Government, Polynesian, 04 January and 18 January 1845. 
36 “Official Journal of the Hawaiian Government, Polynesian, 08, 15 February 1845. 
37 Brown attempted to address the judge at the conclusion of James Gray’s trial, and he encouraged the naval 
officers to reject the court’s judgment. See Polynesian, 08 March 1845. 
38 “To His Excellency M. Kekuanaoa,” Polynesian, 08 March 1845. 
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Jarves announced that the Polynesian would substantiate its criticism by printing the entire 
proceedings of the Brandywine seaman James Gray’s trial beginning in its March 22 edition to 
show “the manner in which the naval officers and resident consul handled it. . . [Brown] made an 
acrimonious assault upon the reputations of the highest officers of H. M.’s Government. . .[and] 
was sustained by two naval officers from the U. S. S. Brandywine.”39  
Brown’s strident criticisms also provided an opportunity to deliver a powerful defense of 
the kingdom’s court system. Using his position as the king’s spokesman, Jarves pointed out in an 
April 5, 1845 article that the need for a western-style judicial system arose because of the need to 
“maintain order and promote justice among contentious foreigners.”40 Coming as it did shortly 
before the king’s May 20 announcement of his policy initiative to reorganize the courts and 
reform the laws, Jarves’ straight-forward presentation informed local and international readers 
about the competing community interests and set the stage for Ricord’s comprehensive review. 
Brown’s abusive attacks continued unabated, however, and Kauikeaouli strongly 
suspected that Brown was involved in the 1845 flurry of petitions from Hawaiians praying for 
the removal of white ministers.41 While the discussion in Chapter 4 about Brown’s behavior 
focuses on his objections to the king’s policy of employing white ministers, here the focus is on 
the king’s use of print media to expose Brown’s actions both locally and internationally. 
When the privy council learned in late July that Brown had written the ABCFM at 
Boston to enlist their help in persuading the U. S. government to take action against the king’s 
administration, the alarmed council members concluded that Brown’s actions were intended “e 
                                                 
39 “Official Journal of the Hawaiian Government,” Polynesian, 15 March 1845. The transcript was printed in the 
March 22 and 29 editions. 
40 “Official Journal of the Hawaiian Government,” Polynesian, 05 April 1845. 
41 See Chapter 4 for a full discussion. 
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hoohaunaele, a e hooulu i ka mokuahana, aole hoi e malu ke Aupuni ke hoomanawanui hou aku . 
. . .  to create discord – to promote sedition, and can no longer be tolerated with safety to the 
Kingdom,” after which they resolved to end all official correspondence with Brown and agreed 
to publish his latest correspondence in the next issue of the Polynesian.42 The August 2 edition 
carried copies of Wyllie’s letters to Brown and the local consular corps announcing the king’s 
decision to interdict Brown and order him from the kingdom. In a separate column in the same 
edition, Jarves defended the king’s action because “no nation. . . [should have to] submit to such 
a continued series of threats, indignities, and unjustifiable interference in its civil and political 
concerns, as has been experienced here from Mr. Commissioner Brown.”43 Hooper lodged an 
official complaint about Brown’s interdiction that was printed without comment by the Friend 
on August 15, the Polynesian on August 16 and Ka Elele on August 26.44 The Polynesian also 
offered for sale another 153-page compendium of Brown’s correspondence and documents 
disproving his allegations entitled Correspondence between H.M.’s Minister of Foreign 
Relations and the U.S. Commissioner, in the Case of John Wiley, an American Citizen, 
Imprisoned at the instance of Viscount William de la Perrotiere, M.D., a French subject.45 
Another derogatory article about Brown had appeared in the Polynesian on July 26 in the 
form of a letter to the editor under the pseudonym “Alienus,” who the newspaper identified as “a 
highly respectable source, the author being an American.”46 Referring to Alienus’ letter, Brown 
                                                 
42 Minutes, 29 July 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Official texts. Attendees were the king, the kuhina 
nui, Judd, Wyllie, Ricord, Kanaʻina, Keahonui [aka Kealiʻiahonui], Leleiōhoku, Kekūanāoʻa, Kekauʻōnohi, Pākī, 
and Īʻī.  
43 Editorial, Polynesian, 02 August 1845. 
44 “Official,” Friend, 15 August 1845; Polynesian, 16 August 1845; “He Olelo Hoolaha,” Ka Elele, 26 August 1845. 
Hooper’s complaint was dated August 2. Hooper also filed a complaint about his title, preferring to style himself 
“Acting U. S. Commercial Agent.” See Wyllie, Table, 21 October 1844.  
45 Correspondence in the Case of John Wiley (1845). 
46 “Letter to the Editor,” Polynesian, 26 July 1845; see also, R. C. Wyllie to G. Brown, 29 July 1845, 
Correspondence in the Case of John Wiley (1845), 137. 
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protested vigorously that the government newspaper had printed “grossly infamous and false 
charges” about him.47 Brown had already made it clear that he well understood the international 
reach of the government newspaper: “the attacks on me in your communications, indeed would 
require no answer, were they to be made public only on these Islands; but copies of your letters, 
must go to the United States, where they most probably will be published.”48 Press coverage 
about Brown’s conduct in fact had spread internationally, for the writer of a December 1845 
article in the New York Journal of Commerce commented that the appointment of Brown is now 
“universally acknowledged to have been a great mistake.”49 
Hooper assumed Brown’s duties, and both he and Brown continued to hurl insults at the 
government, the courts, and the king’s ministers.50 Brown finally departed the kingdom in June 
1846 after his replacement Anthony Ten Eyck arrived.51 Shortly before he left, however, Brown 
made another scene in open court in May 1846 during an action for libel brought by Peter A. 
Brinsmade against Jarves. Kauikeaouli ordered Wyllie to write a letter of complaint to the U. S. 
Secretary of State about Brown’s attempts to intimidate witnesses, and Wyllie attached transcript 
copies from the court’s stenographic record along with issues of the Polynesian to illustrate 
Brown’s “anarchy and contempt for the King’s authority.”52 The Polynesian’s press reports were 
persuasive. It was later reported that U.S. Secretary of State James Buchanan expressed his 
                                                 
47 G. Brown to R. C. Wyllie, 28 July 1845 and R. C. Wyllie to G. Brown, 29 Jul 1845, Correspondence in the Case 
of John Wiley (1845), 135-7.  
48George Brown to R. C. Wyllie, 18 July 1845, Correspondence in the Case of John Wiley (1845), 80. 
49 “Americans in the Sandwich Islands,” New York Journal of Commerce, 18 December 1845, as reprinted in The 
Polynesian, 24 October 1846.  
50 Richard A. Greer, “A. G. Abell’s Hawaiian Interlude,” HJH 29 (1995): 62; R. C. Wyllie to A Ten Eyck, 06 
August 1847, Series 410, Box 3, Book 3, no. 12, part 1, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA.  
51 Minutes, 17 June 1846, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Brown never made it home. All hands and 
passengers were lost when his ship sank in Micronesia. See Newbury, “Commissioner George Brown,” 83. 
52 R. C. Wyllie to U. S. Secretary of State, 11 May 1846, Series 410, Box 3, Book 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
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disapproval of Brown’s conduct and commented that “the sympathies of the American 
Government were largely enlisted in . . . His Majesty and His Government, and all its apparent 
difficulties.”53  
 
Kauikeaouli sets the publication policy 
On August 9—only about a week after publication of Brown’s interdiction—Miller appeared at a 
privy council meeting in a state of “the most nervous excitement.” Miller’s agitation increased as 
he insisted that the king read the letters he had brought. Speaking in a “tremulous and very 
agitated voice,” Miller levied charges against the king’s white ministers and informed the king 
that he had been commanded “to insist” that the land which Charlton claimed should be 
delivered up to him even before the judicial process had concluded.54  
Miller’s demand contradicted the Earl of Aberdeen’s 1843 letter agreement and the Earl’s 
verbal commitments made to Haʻalilio and Richards while they were in London.55 Privy council 
members also learned that the British government had not received the king’s dispatches on 
Charlton’s claim that he had forwarded to Miller for transmission, even though Miller’s 
dispatches had been received. Privy council members suspected that Miller was acting in concert 
with Brown, and the king saw Miller’s demand as an attempt to manage the internal policy of his 
government. After Miller left, they discussed the matter at length and decided that everyone 
should reflect and consider again at the next meeting.56  
                                                 
53 “Extracts from Dispatches from Washington, on receipt of Mr. Brown’s last Dispatches, in December last, 
accompanying the Memorial,” Polynesian, 05 December 1846. 
54 Minutes, 09 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees were the king, the kuhina nui, 
Kekauʻōnohi, Pākī, Leleiōhoku, Kekūanāoʻa, Kanaʻina, Keliʻiahonui, Ricord, Richards, Judd, and Wyllie. Emphasis 
in the official notes. 
55 Aberdeen to Haʻalilio and Richards, 12 September 1843, Series 404, Box 61, vol. 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, 
FO&EX, HSA.  
56 Minutes, 09 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA.  
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Kauikeaouli and the privy council met again on August 13 at the king’s summer palace in 
Nuʻuanu to finalize the text of Wyllie’s reply to Miller’s demands.57 By that time, Wyllie had 
been told that Miller and Brown had colluded on a secret plan to overthrow the Hawaiian 
government. One facet of their plan involved coercing a U. S. naval squadron to force the king to 
dismiss all foreigners in his service. In the meantime, Brown would throw the courts into 
confusion and make it appear that American citizens could not obtain justice in them.58 Miller’s 
denunciation of the white ministers in the August 9 privy council meeting mirrored Brown’s 
denunciations, seemingly confirming the existence of the plan.  
Kauikeaouli voiced his concern to the privy council that Miller’s attempt to dictate the 
outcome of the Charlton claim before it had been adjudicated was “i ka hoomaka ana o ka hoole 
hana, ke hoi hou nei i ka wa o Lord George Paulet . . . . the beginning of the undoing of things, a 
return to what was done by Paulet.” No doubt remembering Captain Armstrong’s behavior 
during his 1844 port visit, privy council members also expressed fears that Brown “might 
deceive any American Naval Commander who might arrive.” Obviously determined not to be 
blindsided again by criticisms of his governance sent in secret diplomatic reports, Kauikeaouli 
ended the meeting by declaring “e pono ia’u ke hoouna aku i ka’u palapala, a me na mea hoike . . 
. . I must also send to the British Government my correspondence and evidence,” and it was so 
ordered.59  
                                                 
57 The remains of Kaniakapupu palace can be visited by a short walk through a bamboo forest bordering Nuʻuanu 
Pali Drive.  
58 “Private letter,” R. C. Wyllie to A. Bishop, 13 August 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Local, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. 
59 Minutes, 13 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Official texts. Attendees were the king, the 
kuhina nui, Pākī, Leleiōhoku, Kekūanāoʻa, Kanaʻina, Kealiʻiahonui, Ricord, Richards, Judd and Wyllie. Richards 
translated for the king and chiefs. Here the word “palapala” referred to the king’s own diplomatic correspondence 
and administrative correspondence. 
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On September 2, Kauikeaouli took the further step of securing a privy council resolution 
to issue a letter of instruction to Wyllie ordering Wyllie to publicly disclose the kingdom’s side 
in diplomatic disputes so that foreign powers could not be deceived by their consuls:60 
eia ko’u manao ia oe no ko kakou pilikia i keia wa i na Aupuni e, a no ka manao 
hoohihia wale mai o kekahi poe. E pono ke paiia na hihia a pau loa, a me na 
palapala oihana i pili pu i na hihia, ke ae like oukou ka poe hoa Kuhina ma ka 
oukou olelo malu ana.  
. . . .  
here is my thought about all our present troubles with foreign governments and 
the determination of certain persons to bring us into trouble without cause, it is 
my opinion that all cases which occur should be made public and all diplomatic 
correspondence be printed which relates to those difficulties, provided all the 
Ministers of the Cabinet are in consultation agreed thereto.61 
 
Disclosing the kingdom’s position to the world was a matter of great urgency, the king stressed, 
for the very preservation of the stability and security of the kingdom was at stake: “no ka mea, o 
ka nalo o ko kakou pono a me ko kakou aoao, oia auanei ka make o ke Aupuni . . . . for the 
hiding of our cause and our defense will be likely to prove the ruin of the government.”62 
Four days later, on September 6, the Polynesian began front-page publication of Miller’s 
correspondence with Wyllie about a variety of alleged claims, including the hotly-disputed 
Charlton land claim.63 Publication in the pages of the Polynesian of Miller’s diplomatic 
correspondence with Wyllie continued throughout the rest of September, and in all of the 
October editions. A pamphlet collection of the letters entitled Correspondence between H. H. 
M.’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul General, on the 
                                                 
60 It appears from the way the minutes are recorded that the letter had been prepared in advance and only awaited the 
passing of the resolution. 
61 Minutes, 02 September 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Official texts. Attendees were the king, the 
kuhina nui, Judd, Richards, Ricord, Pākī, ʻĪʻī, Kekūanāoʻa, and Kanaʻina.  
62 Minutes, 02 September 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Official texts.  
63 Polynesian, 06 September 1845.  
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subject of Richard Charlton’s Claim to Land (1845) was later offered for sale at a cost of 75 
cents.64  
To Wyllie’s relief, the U. S. Commander of the Pacific Squadron, Admiral John D. Sloat, 
arrived in port on September 24 for a routine visit “with no revolutionary ends” and enjoyed a 
courteous personal audience with Kauikeaouli.65 When Sloat questioned Wyllie about the 
purchase of the government press, Wyllie responded that  
it is true the Polynesian Press was bought by the Govt and that it is the Govt 
organ, but as is the case in London and Washington, the Editor retains a certain 
degree of independence, and I am not aware that he has exercised it with more 
than what is taken by the Govt organs in both of those Capitals. All articles 
appearing in the Polynesian under the heading “By Authority” are of course under 
the responsibility of Govt.66 
 
British Admiral George Seymour was less courteous in October during his routine port 
visit. Primed by Miller, Seymour addressed a scolding letter to Kauikeaouli and dressed down 
Judd in front of the king.67 Wyllie composed a reply to Seymour for the king about the various 
issues that had been discussed, but the admiral sailed during the night of October 10 before 
Wyllie could deliver the letter. Wyllie’s letter also had apprised Seymour that the king’s new 
publication policy ensured that “the proceedings of his courts, and the acts of His Government 
are published, so that the whole world may judge of the rectitude of his intentions & the conduct 
                                                 
64 “List of Pamphlets,” Polynesian, 27 November 1847. 
65 R. C. Wyllie to P. J. Gulick, 26 September 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Local, Consular Correspondence, 
HSA; R. C. Wyllie to Admiral J. Sloat, 04 October 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Letters, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. Sloat also initiated conversation about Brown’s interdiction and Wiley’s trial, but he appears 
to have accepted Wyllie’s explanations. See Wyllie, Table, 23-4. 
66 Wyllie to Sloat, 04 October 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA. Sloat also 
questioned Wyllie about the king’s belief that Brown was implicated in the petitions submitted by several thousand 
Hawaiians.  
67 Minutes, 07 October 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees were the king, Seymour, British 
Consul General Miller, the Rev. Armstrong as Seymour’s translator, Judd, and Wyllie. Chapter 4 relates the king’s 
reaction to Seymour’s threats that he would forcibly redress the grievances of British citizens on his return if 
Kauikeaouli did not resolve them first. 
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of his ministers.”68 Accordingly, on October 27, 1845 an extra edition of the Polynesian 
published Seymour’s intemperate letter and Wyllie’s undelivered October 10 reply right 
alongside a courteous exchange of letters with the American Admiral Sloat, whose visit 
overlapped with that of Seymour. 
Seymour’s rank as a naval admiral ensured that his actions carried the imprimatur of the 
British government. Not just the British in London read the Polynesian, of course. So too did the 
Americans in Washington, D.C. and the French in Paris. That meant that when the exchange of 
correspondence between Wyllie and Seymour became of public record in the government 
newspaper, it circulated in worldwide public forums and focused attention on British attempts to 
deny the king his right to exercise his sovereign duties and responsibilities. In a letter to Sloat of 
October 13, Wyllie predicted that Seymour’s conduct “[would soon] be apparent to the whole 
world when the Correspondence interchanged with you & with the Admiral [Seymour] is 
published, which it will be soon. .. .[and the danger posed by Seymour’s conduct] will not soon 
be forgotten by the King.” Then Wyllie added, “I will take care to send a copy to you.”69 
Wyllie thereafter routinely cited “an autograph order from the King himself dated 
September 1845” as his authority “to publish all official correspondence with the Agents of 
Foreign Nations, upon contentious matters, likely to involve this Kingdom in difficulty with their 
respective nations, as the only means of guarding against ex parte complaints, & of making 
certain in every case, the knowledge of both sides of the question.”70 The publication policy 
coupled with positive coverage of the king’s policies created a two-pronged approach that 
                                                 
68 R. C. Wyllie to Admiral G. F. Seymour, 10 October 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Local, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. 
69 Wyllie to Sloat, 13 October 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 1, Letters, Consular Correspondence, HSA. 
70 R. C. Wyllie to W. Dillon, 13 February 1849, Series 410, Box 3, vol. 13, part 2, Foreign Officials in Hawaiʻi, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA. Emphasis in the original. 
197 
 
became the standard procedure followed by the privy council. Wyllie’s habit was to place his 
drafted replies to consular agents before the king in council for discussion and approval.71 
Kauikeaouli, the chiefs, and the ministers jointly decided which diplomatic letters to publish.72 
Privy council members also reviewed and edited articles about the king’s policies prepared for 
publication in the Polynesian.73 
 
The government press broadens its reach 
The sale of pamphlets and special publications became another way to affirmatively publicize 
the kingdom’s rights and privileges to a broader audience than the Polynesian commanded, and 
they were available beyond the short lifespan of a newspaper issue. It became standard practice 
to publicize diplomatic disputes and contentious court cases first in the pages of the Polynesian, 
and then to present the government’s arguments along with the correspondence record in 
pamphlet form offered for sale in subsequent Polynesian issues. James Gray’s trial documents, 
for example, were printed in pamphlet form entitled Report of the Case of James Gray, an 
American citizen, Plaintiff in Appeal, v. the Hawaiian Government (1845) and sold for 50 cents. 
The government’s arguments refuting Seymour’s October 1845 evidentiary findings about the 
Charlton dispute also went up for sale in two different pamphlets:74 
1. Investigation pursued at the Palace, by command of the King and Premier, in the 
fall of 1845, in vindication of the course pursued by His Majesty relative to R. 
Charlton’s alleged claim to the land Pulaholaho, in Honolulu. 1845. 115 pages. 
                                                 
71 Minutes, 21 August 1846, Series 421, vol. 2, Privy Council, HSA. 
72 Minutes, 16 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. 
73 Minutes, 13 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. 
74 “List of Pamphlets,” Polynesian, 27 November 1847. 
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This pamphlet presents the results of the government’s own investigation into the 
validity of Charlton’s deed. Price: $1.00. 
2. First Supplement to the Investigation at the Palace, containing the particulars of 
the Inquiry before the King and Rear Admiral Sir George F. Seymour, upon the 
authenticity of Mr. Charlton’s Deed, and the Complaints of William Miller, Esq., 
H. B. M.’s Consul General, touching the caveats and the case of James Ruddack. 
1846. 85 pages. Price: 75 cents. The British government later relied on the 
judgment Seymour reached about the authenticity of Charlton’s deed, and the 
king’s ministers printed this pamphlet to demonstrate the false premise on which 
that judgment rested. 
Some of the pamphlet titles continued to be sold for several years. The 1845 pamphlet 
entitled Correspondence between H.M.’s Minister of Foreign Relations and the U.S. 
Commissioner, in the Case of John Wiley, an American Citizen, Imprisoned at the instance of 
Viscount William de la Perrotiere, M.D., a French subject, for example, still sold for 75 cents in 
1848. The pamphlet contained the kingdom’s defense of its juridical prerogatives, and those 
arguments continued to enrich debate during the treaty renegotiations with Britain and France 
over removal of extraterritorial restrictions.75 
Wyllie’s Table of Consular Grievances, 1843-1846 catalogued the number of complaints 
filed by American, British and French merchants, consuls and naval officers during those years 
over perceived legal and civil injustices suffered under Hawaiian governance. Over time, the 
number filed had grown to a bureaucratically unmanageable number, and “the king and his 
                                                 
75 “List of Pamphlets,” Polynesian, 16 December 1848. Chapter 7 discusses the treaty renegotiations. 
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chiefs are tired of being so worried by the Representatives of the Nations who are their best 
friends.”76 Consequently, Wyllie proposed and the legislature resolved in February 1846 that 
Wyllie should compile a three-year catalog of their complaints to be printed by the government 
press and forwarded to their governments as evidence of their harassing tactics.77 
Wyllie regularly sent copies of Miller’s correspondence to the kingdom’s commissioner 
at London Archibald Barclay, and in June 1846 he explained to Barclay that the practical impact 
from the filing of so many grievances by the Consul General and U. S. Commissioner was “to 
clog the machinery of Govt, render its working laborious or impracticable and keep alive that 
suspicion and distrust which are subversive of all regular authority.” The diplomatic impact was 
of even greater import. According to Wyllie, “the feeling thus engendered in the King and all the 
Members of his Govt, is one of the most feverish distrust of all the Consul General 
communications that relate to the concerns of these Islands.”78 Later that same month, Wyllie 
told Miller very plainly that “the painful conviction has forced itself on the King and his 
Government, that all your measures are combined with the views of exasperating the British 
government against the King’s administration.”79 
Special publications also included copies of the official reports of the king’s ministers as 
presented to the king and the legislature at opening sessions. The speeches were printed as news 
in the Polynesian, the Friend and Ka Elele at the time they were delivered, but copies of them 
                                                 
76 R. C. Wyllie to Archibald Barclay, King’s Hawaiian Commissioner at London, 14 March 1846, Series 410, Box 3, 
Book 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Consular Correspondence, HSA. Although French consul Dudoit, a long-time 
resident, filed few complaints.  
77 R. C. Wyllie to A. Barclay, 04 June 1846, Series 410, Box 3, Book 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. 
78 Ibid.  




also were offered for sale by the Polynesian for several years afterwards.80 In 1847 the 
Polynesian offered for sale at a price of 25 cents each copies of the official reports of the 
attorney general, interior minister, foreign affairs minister, and minster of public education from 
the years 1845, 1846 and 1847.81 The reports evidenced “to the world” the kingdom’s ability to 
govern itself and interact with other sovereign states. The attorney general’s reports, for example, 
reviewed at length the proposed reforms to the executive and judicial branches, and Wyllie 
annually reviewed the kingdom’s relationships with its treaty partners. The finance and interior 
ministers’ reports on the economic health of the kingdom were supported by commercial 
analyses appearing in the Polynesian such as the January 4, 1845 “Statistics of the Whaling Fleet 
for the Year 1844. Hawaiian Islands” and the January 30, 1847 “Statement of Imports, Exports, 
Duties, &c., at the port of Honolulu, Oahu, H. I., from January 1st to December 31st, 1846.” 
Wyllie also seized the diplomatic high-ground in his 1847 report when he publicized Admiral 
Seymour’s 1846 correspondence regarding the Charlton and Ruddack disputes by appending 
copies of Seymour’s letters to the Polynesian print edition of his report.82 
A three-page article written in 1846 by an unnamed author for the Boston publication 
Littell’s Living Age demonstrated the international reach of the Polynesian and the public 
relations utility of its pamphlet sales. The author’s bias was decidedly pro-American, and he 
sought to discover from Miller’s 1844-1845 correspondence with the Hawaiian government 
some hint that Great Britain intended to make an “unprovoked usurpation” of the islands to seize 
command of the Pacific. He obtained and studied the government pamphlets that printed reports 
submitted by the ministers of foreign affairs, interior and attorney general, the 1845 pamphlet of 
                                                 
80 In the Friend, see for example, 01 May 1847 and 01 May 1848. In Ka Elele, see for example, 08 June 1848. 
81 There is no explanation given for omission of the finance minister’s reports. 
82 “Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations,” Polynesian, 05 June 1847. 
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Miller’s correspondence entitled Correspondence between H. H. M.’s Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, and Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul General, on the subject of Richard 
Charlton’s Claim to Land, and the letters of an unnamed New York correspondent of the Union. 
The author also relied on “a file” of the Polynesian, which he characterized as a “very 
respectable paper which is published at Honolulu, and is the organ of the government.” Finding 
no evidence to support his hypothesis, however, the author satisfied himself with simply 
reviewing Miller and Wyllie’s correspondence.83 
The author of another 1846 article in an American paper also had been struck with what 
he described as the well-printed series of public documents on “various questions of public 
interest” produced by the Polynesian press. Run under the banner “Attorney General of the 
Sandwich Islands,” the article reported that the author was particularly impressed with the 
“Report on the Inferences of the Constitution” written by Ricord that Kauikeaouli read before the 
legislature in May 1845, opining that such an “able and enlightened document” augured well for 
the progress there of a civil society.84  
 
 An opposition press begins publishing 
Opposition among foreign residents to the editorial slant and reach of the Polynesian led a group 
of twenty to form the Sandwich Islands News Association in 1846 to produce their own English-
language newspaper. The Association bought a press, type, and other materials from the 
Sandwich Islands Mission for about $1,300, and published the first issue of the Sandwich Islands 
News on September 2 at a single-subscription cost of $6.00 per annum.85 The Association 
                                                 
83 “Correspondence, The Sandwich Islands,” Littell’s Living Age 9 (April 18, 1846): 148-50. 
84 “Attorney General of the Sandwich Islands,” no attribution, as reprinted by Polynesian on October 24, 1846. 
85 “Alexander G. Abell to G. Brown, August 25, 1846,” MS Brown Correspondence 1843-1846, HHS. 
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presented an international editorial board: an American, the U. S. Consul A. G. Abell, a British 
businessman, R. C. Janion, and a Belgian lawyer, J. B. de Fiennes.86 Janion took charge of 
selling subscriptions and soliciting news items, while Abell took charge of producing the 
issues.87 Brinsmade, a former Ladd & Co. principal and a former U. S. consul appointed in 1844, 
soon took an active editorial role.88 The editors promised fair reporting: “A mistaken idea 
appears to have gone forth among a certain class that it is commenced expressly for the purpose 
of opposition to the government, and is necessarily to be hostile to it and all its measures. 
Nothing can be further from the truth.”89 
Like the Friend and the Polynesian, the News listed ships’ arrivals at island ports and 
carried international news, such as British policy regarding the Oregon boundary dispute.90 An 
October 7, 1846 issue signaled that there would be broad geographic distribution of its issues 
when it informed that British Admiral Seymour and American Commodore Biddle had 
purchased subscriptions. Privately, Abell confirmed that the Association’s intent was to 
disseminate the paper abroad widely, and to send copies of it to Atlantic newspapers “with a 
‘please exchange’.”91 The newspaper soon sold more than 300 subscriptions. Together with 
income from job printing, the venture enjoyed financial success.92 
                                                 
86 de Fiennes acted as Charlton’s attorney in his contested land claim.  
87 Greer, “Abell,” 68. 
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Private correspondence from Abell the following April, however, contradicted the public 
statements of impartiality: “I have to do most of the editing for the paper I send you—the 
‘Sandwich Islds. News.’ It was established by the foreign residents to prevent the government 
newspaper—the ‘Polynesian,’—from lying too much, & to protest themselves by giving 
publicity to the many unjust & arbitrary acts which have been committed by the men who control 
the King & his government.”93 Jarves observed that by then the News had become “an organ of 
virulent abuse of the government, missionaries, and their patrons. . . . .[and] by its misstatements 
numbers of benevolent individuals abroad were led [astray].”94 
The Americans Abell, Hooper and Brinsmade took a prominent role in placing malicious 
articles about the king and his white ministers in the pages of the News.95 Articles satirizing 
Richards, Ricord, and Judd as the bumbling ministers of an imaginary South Seas kingdom 
appeared in a six-part series spitefully entitled “Tongataboo Letters.”96 Judge Lorrin Andrews 
was characterized as “that personification of judicial imbecility.”97 After Brinsmade authored a 
March 1847 article in which he suggested that the actions of Kauikeaouli’s white ministers may 
well give Britain cause to reevaluate its commitment to the independence of the islands, 
allegations surfaced that Miller (who was a member of the Association) had supplied Brinsmade 
with material for the article.98 Fearing that the comments were calculated to “induce some other 
                                                 
93 A. G. Abell to his sister, 20 April 1847, M-442, Alexander Guron Abell, U. S. Consul, Manuscript Collection, 
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University, 1970), 66-7. 
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Nation to seize the islands, upon the plea that Great Britain is only waiting time and occasion to 
seize them,” the cabinet ministers resolved in a March 25 meeting to publish all of Miller’s 
correspondence to show that the opinions and views as printed in the News were directly 
opposed to the opinions and views of the British government.99 Publication began three days 
later captioned with a strong statement from Wyllie that the insinuations made in the News about 
British intentions “are utterly false.”100 
When another of Brinsmade’s articles published in late March slandered a Hawaiian 
judge who had presided over the Ladd & Co. arbitration, the ministers disgustedly decided that 
the character of the editors was “too low to justify any notice of them,” unless they assert 
falsehoods about a foreign government or the king’s safety in his relations to those 
governments.101 Better to permit the News to continue to publish, Wyllie later explained to Ten 
Eyck, to prevent dissident residents from alleging that “no one under this Government could 
express his mind fully without injury and persecution.”102 
But the onslaught of nakedly political attacks proved too fierce to tolerate, and in April 
and May 1847 the Polynesian retaliated with full-page editorials protesting Brinsmade’s 
conflicts of interest and outright falsities in his coverage for the News of the Ladd & Co. 
arbitration.103 After that, Wyllie lodged two formal complaints with U. S. Commissioner Ten 
Eyck during late July about the content and authorship of the News articles, and he asked Ten 
                                                 
99 R. C. Wyllie to W. Miller, 24 March 1847, Series 410, Box 3, Book 3, no. 12, part 2, Letters, Consular 
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Eyck to forward his complaints to the U. S. Secretary of State.104 On August 4, 1847 the king 
ordered Wyllie to complain directly to the U. S. Secretary of State that writers for the News were 
slandering government officials.105 Because editor Janion was British, Wyllie repeated his 
allegations in a complaint to Miller for him to forward to Lord Palmerston in London. Wyllie 
also informed Miller that Section 4 of the Hawaiian Statutes granted the government the power 
and right to suppress and punish licentious journalists.106 While Wyllie advised Miller that the 
government preferred to handle instances of libel through the appointed commissioners and 
consuls, he cautioned that the government might be compelled to prosecute Abell, Hooper, 
Brinsmade and Janion.107 By that time, Abell had left his consular position for a business venture 
marketing Hawaiian produce and other goods in California, and he finally departed the kingdom 
bound for California via Tahiti and Valparaiso in September 1848.108 Hooper also departed the 
kingdom in 1848. 
Great Britain’s final decision ruling in favor of Charlton’s claim was communicated by 
Miller to Wyllie on August 13, 1847, and the related correspondence between the two 
announcing the decision was printed in the Polynesian’s September 11 and September 18 
issues.109 Government anger over Britain’s decision was intense, and Wyllie attached a scathing 
letter to the September 18 article accusing Miller of numerous improprieties and pointing out that 
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British claims of the deed’s authenticity rested on a false premise.110 Pamphlets about the two 
investigations into the deed’s authenticity went on sale within the week, and by December 16, 
1848 five different pamphlets about the dispute laying out different aspects of the government’s 
case against Charlton’s claim were made available for sale by the Polynesian.111 
Without explanation, the News abruptly ceased publishing as of August 25, 1847. When 
publication resumed on November 11 with a new publisher, the libelous attacks resumed also. 
After Judd exposed Ten Eyck as the probable author of especially slanderous articles that had 
been appearing about the king and his white ministers, Ten Eyck attacked Judd in an open letter 
printed in the News on December 11, 1848.112 At that, Kauikeaouli ordered that all 
communication with him as U. S. Commissioner cease, and notice to that effect appeared in the 
December 16 Polynesian. The council also resolved to publish all of Ten Eyck’s pertinent 
correspondence in the Polynesian and sell it in pamphlet form.113 Wyllie advised Ten Eyck of the 
king’s commands and that copies of his printed correspondence also would be sent to all 
diplomatic agents at Honolulu and abroad.114 
This became the standard approach followed by Kauikeaouli and his council throughout 
the remainder of his reign: file written diplomatic complaints which are later made public 
through print media, publish all pertinent correspondence in the Polynesian, and sell copies of 
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the correspondence in pamphlet form to ensure broad distribution both locally and 
internationally. 
The News still published in January 1848 when the new French Consul William Patrick 
Dillon arrived bringing the 1846 French treaty for the king to ratify.115 As covered at length in 
the next chapter, Dillon soon became combative over the import duty assessed on French 
wines.116 By mid-October his hostility towards the king had become intense, and in early 
November several articles appeared in the News that the council members believed he had 
written.117 On November 9 the king and council resolved to inform Dillon that his 
correspondence would be published in pamphlet form and copies sent to all foreign 
representatives locally and abroad as well as to French Rear Admiral Ferdinand-Alphonse de 
Hamlin.118 The Polynesian’s new editor Charles E. Hitchcock continued the same page layout 
style begun by Jarves when publication “by authority” of Dillon’s letters began in the January 6 
edition.119 Dillon protested their publication in a letter printed in the News on January 11, 1849, 
but Wyllie replied that he had the king’s authority to publish so that both sides of the issue would 
be placed in the public forum.120  
The relationship with Dillon remained strained, and on April 23, 1849 the king ordered 
Wyllie to direct all of his correspondence to the French government in Paris and to request 
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Dillon’s recall.121 Admiral de Tromelin’s subsequent sack of the town in August 1849 and 
Dillon’s part in it are discussed at length in Chapter 7 “Treaties and Secret Orders.” The 
Polynesian played a key role in disseminating news to the world at large about the French 
atrocity by publishing the full exchange of correspondence and the full text of Dillon’s defensive 
pamphlet.122 
Meanwhile a September 1848 editorial in the Polynesian about the News noticed that its 
ad hominem attacks had caused its list of subscribers to fade away “so its very existence is now 
dependent on charity,” and the News editor was in fear that an earlier, unflattering article in the 
Polynesian would ruin his paper’s reputation abroad.123 Defeated as much by its own invective 
as by the Polynesian’s exposure of its writers’ falsities and misrepresentations, the News finally 
ended publication as of April 14, 1849. 
 
Measuring success 
Kauikeaouli used print media to confound his critics by focusing international attention away 
from their complaints on to his proper exercise of his sovereign prerogatives. “So that the world 
may read” became the administration’s rallying cry as editor Jarves’ perfected the use of the 
Polynesian as a diplomatic tool to influence public opinion abroad.124 Newspaper reports from 
America and Europe support a conclusion that the paper’s public exposure of Kauikeaouli’s 
governance favorably influenced international opinion. In a December 18, 1845 editorial in the 
New York Journal of Commerce about the complaints from resident Americans in an August 
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1845 Memorial addressed to the U.S. government, the editor concluded that “the Sandwich 
Islands Government is clearly in the right. . . . the complainants are factious men, seeking for an 
irresponsible liberty, which no government ought to allow.”125 From an article in a newspaper 
described as a “London city paper” of August 28, 1849 came affirmation that Kauikeaouli had 
acted within his sovereign rights to protest French import duty provisions on wines because of 
his moral opposition to the importation of liquor.126 
Kauikeaouli’s print publications policy also turned the Polynesian into a diplomatic 
weapon aimed at the agents of its key international allies. Subsequently, reams of 
correspondence from Ten Eyck, Miller and Seymour about contentious issues were reproduced 
in its pages “for the world to read.” One series of correspondence between Wyllie and Miller 
printed in the September 11, 1847 edition ran 9-1/2 columns with 31 separate items, while the 
exchange with Ten Eyck printed in the December 30, 1848 edition ran 9 columns with 29 
separate items. 
Word about Ten Eyck’s attempts to destabilize the administration reached the American 
press. Apparently learning from the Polynesian’s December 30 issue about Judd’s seizure of Ten 
Eyck’s malicious manuscripts, the editor of the February 1, 1849 Alta California concluded that 
although Judd should not have taken the letters, “the Hawaiian Government is justified in 
making use of the information obtained . . . [it is obvious] that the foreign representatives have 
interfered improperly in the internal affairs of Hawaii, that they have mistaken their position, and 
allowed themselves to be drawn into a partisanship where they should have observed a strict 
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neutrality, and that the Hawaiian Government owed it to its position as a nation to act as it 
has.”127 
Brown had already been recalled for similar behavior, and in an April 12, 1849 edition, 
the New Orleans Daily Crescent suggested that Ten Eyck also should be recalled. The Daily 
Crescent’s editor cited doggerel from one of Ten Eyck’s offending articles that had been printed 
in the News on November 16 and opined that “of course this Government will at once cease to 
recognize [Ten Eyck] as the representative of the United States. . . .Here the guilty party is 
receiving the odium that is so justly his due.”128 Indeed, policymakers in Washington, D.C. did 
recall Ten Eyck, just as they had Brown.129 
No doubt it was the international exposure of his scolding letter to the sovereign head of 
the independent Hawaiian kingdom that prompted Admiral Seymour to change his adversarial 
tone. During a private meeting with Kauikeaouli which the king arranged during the admiral’s 
return visit in August 1846, Seymour promised to devote a full week to personally investigate the 
complaints from British citizens that Miller had collected and to work directly with Kauikeaouli 
to resolve them.130 Miller’s own relationships with Kauikeaouli and Wyllie improved after the 
contentious Charlton dispute concluded, and he continued as Britain’s consul general at Hawaiʻi 
until his death in 1861.131 
While the role of print media in sustaining the kingdom’s independence during the 1840s 
has largely been overlooked, it was of paramount importance to the success of Kauikeaouli’s 
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overall strategy. When Jarves identified the Polynesian as the platform which would announce 
the king’s views and opinions to an international audience, the government press became what 
Ogborn termed the “mode of influence” that extended Kauikeaouli’s political reach into Europe 
and America.132 Kauikeaouli’s tactical use of the two-pronged print media policy developed 
favorable international diplomatic opinion for his governance while it simultaneously exposed 
the partisan agendas of foreign agents. Without those political results, the king could not expect 
to prevail in treaty renegotiations with Great Britain and France, and without the removal of 
extraterritorial treaty provisions, Kauikeaouli could not secure the kingdom’s economic future or 














                                                 




TREATIES AND SECRET ORDERS 
 
Kauikeaouli knew full well the political value that Great Britain, France and the United States 
placed on Hawaiʻi’s geographically-strategic location. By 1843, Hawaiʻi’s ports had become 
indispensable for the profitable conduct of commerce between the Pacific Northwest, the South 
Pacific, and Asia. In 1844, French foreign minister François Guizot remarked publicly that “the 
independence of the Sandwich Islands is a grave fact in ‘Oceanie,’ for there is no one who has 
looked at the chart that does not see that that small Archipelago, possesses great importance in 
the commercial relations of that part of the world.”1 But as the volume of shipping traffic 
increased, so too did the need for harbor and community infrastructure and services. The 
kingdom’s ministers struggled to develop revenue streams to meet increased expenditure needs, 
but the largest revenue potential—import duties—was restricted by extraterritorial agreements 
imposed by France in 1839 and by Great Britain in 1844. In 1846, Great Britain and France 
forced new mirror-image unequal treaties on the kingdom that continued to impose those same 
extraterritorial terms. 
When French gunboats attacked Honolulu in 1849 to force additional political 
accommodations, Kauikeaouli and the privy council devised a bold multi-stage diplomatic plan 
to restore full functional sovereignty and guarantee protection from repeated hostile attacks. The 
plan relied on using the negotiation of a fair and equitable treaty with the United States to draw 
Britain and France into a new treaty pattern without extraterritorial restrictions. Should that fail, 
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then the king would let it be known that he intended to use the only negotiating leverage he 
had—possession of sovereign control—and alienate it to a rival maritime nation. It was the 
ultimate threat: protect my sovereign independence or lose navigational and commercial access 
to my kingdom’s harbors and markets to a rival power. In 1854, when resident Americans 
agitated for annexation to the U.S, Kauikeaouli used his negotiating leverage once again and 
disarmed their plans by appearing to grant their demands. 
Chapter 7 examines the interplay between treaty negotiations, threats to alienate 
sovereignty, and Kauikeaouli’s avoidance of additional hostile attacks through his skillful 
manipulation of well-known international rivalries.  
 
Extraterritorial treaty terms depress revenues 
An extraordinary increase in the numbers and values of imports to Hawaiʻi occurred immediately 
following recognition of its independence: imports grew in gross value from $223,383.33 in 
fiscal year 1843 to $546,941.72 in fiscal year 1845.2 The import duty amount which the kingdom 
could assess on British and French goods was limited by treaty restrictions to a ceiling of 5% ad 
valorem, and goods from the United States enjoyed the same rate even without a treaty 
commitment. As the value of imports increased so too did the duty revenue, from $5,270.74 in 
1843 to $19,465.12 in 1845.3 Nevertheless, public debt still amounted to $60,000, and the credit 
of the government was at a low ebb.4 Stringent fiscal measures implemented by Judd after he 
took over as Minister of Finance in March 1845 coupled with the fortuitous return by France of 
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the $20,000 that LaPlace had extorted in 1839 alleviated the cash flow crisis by March 1846 and 
worked to reduce the public debt.5 The kingdom’s revenues in the fiscal year ending March 31, 
1845 equaled $64,045.55, but Judd predicted that increased governmental staffing needs would 
necessitate substantially higher annual revenues of at least $100,000.6  
Trade with whaling ships from several nations that refreshed and refitted in island ports 
was the foundation of the economy, and more than 19,000 seamen visited island ports in 1845.7 
The foreign population of 1,000 which dominated trade in the kingdom also benefited from the 
community infrastructure of public services funded by the Hawaiian government from all 
revenue sources, such as the sale of bonded licenses for liquor establishments, import duties, poll 
taxes, stamps, and rents.8 Import duties were a major revenue contributor, and Kuykendall 
pointed out that the large size of the whaling fleets in 1845 and again in 1846 stimulated heavy 
importations of goods to service the fleet in anticipation of a continuing business boom.9 Relief 
from the British and French treaty restrictions became more pressing as increased trade 
necessitated an increase in staffing for positions like customs agents, harbor pilots, and police. 
Relief seemed in reach when French diplomat Louis Emile Perrin arrived unexpectedly 
on March 21, 1846 with a revision of the 1839 LaPlace treaty.10 Miller had received the mirror-
image English text styled as a revision of the 1844 Lahaina treaty, and they had been instructed 
to present their revised treaties separately.11 But the revisions presented by Perrin on March 23 
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and Miller on March 25 proved disappointing to the king, his cabinet and the privy council.12 
Although jury composition rules under Article III had been somewhat relaxed by permitting the 
consul to propose the names of native residents as jurors along with foreigners, the king and 
chiefs were disturbed to learn that the rules had been extended by the French to include 
misdemeanor trials as well as criminal trials. The only change in Article VI (imports and import 
duties) had been the removal of liquor and other intoxicating drinks from the 5% ceiling.13 
Kuykendall’s extensive analysis of the negotiations described the jury composition terms 
in Article III as the major stumbling block for the king and his advisors because of the on-going 
dispute with American agents over the composition of the Wiley jury.14 Privy council minutes 
and consular correspondence, however, suggest that the restrictions of Article VI were of greater 
concern. While the article continued to depress revenue potential by its low duty rate, it also 
continued to mandate unrestricted imports of treaty partners’ goods without reciprocal provisions 
for the importation of Hawaiian staple products into Britain and France at the same duty levels.  
Judd reported in 1845 that the government sought new commercial enterprises to sustain 
the economy, and marketing Hawaiian products abroad like sugar, molasses, tobacco and coffee 
increased in importance.15 In 1846, however, the value of Hawaiian exports of staple products 
only amounted to $33,425.00,16 and sugar exports had declined to 300,000 pounds from a 1843 
high of 1,145,010 pounds during the peak of operations at the Ladd & Co. plantation on 
Kauaʻi.17 Kuykendall saw the search for duty-free markets as a factor leading to the annexation 
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ambitions of Americans.18 Kauikeaouli, however, saw the need from the standpoint of his own 
subjects whose labor brought the products to market. Without reciprocal agreements to stimulate 
exports, the king argued in privy council discussions, his subjects would be left with no income 
and no means to pay for the goods imported into Hawaiʻi.19 Kauikeaouli also cautioned council 
members that the unchanged duty ceiling would continue to so strictly limit the kingdom’s 
revenues that it would force him to levy higher taxes on his citizens to fund the government.20 
Wyllie communicated the king’s concern to Dudoit, and asked him to inform Guizot that the 
ceiling on the import tax limited revenue such that it “imposes on His Majesty the necessity of 
continuing the Poll tax and the Labor tax on his native subjects whom he is anxious to relieve so 
far as the indispensable support of his government will allow.”21 
Perrin and Miller, however, had stressed that the treaty terms were not negotiable.22 After 
Kauikeaouli and the chiefs privately discussed their options, the king ratified the treaties on 
March 31 and returned them with letters stating his several objections.23 Kuykendall confirmed 
the importance that the king and his ministers placed on obtaining further treaty revisions, 
observing that it became the “fixed aim” of the government to free the king’s sovereignty 
completely from the extraterritorial limitations placed on it by Articles III and VI of the two 
treaties.24 
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Correspondence, HSA. 
22 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:370-1 
23 Minutes, 27 March 1846, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council Records, HSA. Attendees were the king, the kuhina 
nui, Pākī, Kāʻeo, Kanaʻina, Gov. Pitt (Leleiōhoku), Kekūanāoʻa, Ricord, Wyllie, Richards, Judd, ʻĪʻī; Minutes, 31 
March 1846, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council Records, HSA. Attendees were the king, the kuhina nui, Gov. Pitt 
(Leleiōhoku), Kekauʻōnohi, Kekūanāoʻa, Pākī, Kanaʻina, Kāʻeo, ʻĪʻī, Judd, Ricord, Richards, and Wyllie. 
24 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:373. 
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The treaties became effective as soon as the king ratified them, however, and the revised 
Article VI permitted a duty at any level on wines, brandies, and other liquors so long as the duty 
was not so high as to prohibit importation. The legislature quickly enacted a graduated scale 
ranging from fifty cents a gallon to ten dollars a gallon depending on the alcoholic content of the 
beverage and published the new duty levels in the Polynesian on April 4, 1846. Miller and 
Dudoit both protested vigorously, with Miller claiming that British ale, porter, beer and cider 
were not spiritous drinks, and Dudoit claiming that the duty on French brandy was so high that it 
was tantamount to rendering imports prohibitive.25 Both consuls also informed their 
governments. By July, however, Judd was able to report to the legislature that the increase in 
import duties on spiritous liquors had already positively affected the kingdom’s revenue.26 
 
“The French outrage” 
There matters stood when the new French consul William Patrick Dillon arrived in January 1848 
bringing with him the French king’s ratification of the March 26, 1846 treaty without 
Kauikeaouli’s requested changes.27 Although he had been instructed to behave with moderation, 
Dillon soon became embroiled in arguments about the duty scale on French wines and the 
alleged mistreatment of a Catholic priest and other French citizens. When Dillon threatened to 
suspend ratification of the 1846 treaty, the king through Wyllie threatened back that he would 
                                                 
25 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:369-73. 
26 “Finance Minister,” Polynesian, 08 August 1846. For fiscal year 1846, import values grew by 9.4%, while import 
duty revenue grew by 63%.  
27 The treaty had been ratified by the French king Louis Philippe in 1847. Louis Philippe was deposed within days of 
Dillon’s departure and Dillon switched his allegiance to Prince-President Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte; Jean Charlot, 
“An 1849 Hawaiian Broadside,” HJH 4 (1970):96-7. Charlot recorded that Dillon arrived in February. See cabinet 




prefer that action as he had only signed the revised treaty under protest.28 As the government had 
already acquiesced to British demands and reduced the duty on English malt liquors and cider to 
5%, however, the privy council consented to reduce the duty to 5% on French wines of less than 
18% alcohol.29 
Dillon and Wyllie soon quarreled violently, and Dillon’s relations with other Hawaiian 
officials were also hostile.30 Matters reached an impasse, and on April 23, 1849 the king ordered 
Wyllie to direct all of his correspondence to the French government in Paris and to request 
Dillon’s recall.31 Dillon’s angry reports to the Paris Ministry had already prompted the Ministry 
to invoke the specter of Guizot’s 1844 warning about the importance of Hawaiʻi’s independence 
to French interests. Dillon was advised to remain calm, and “on reconnait qu’il est fatal que les 
iles tombent sous l’influence americaine” (remember how unfortunate it would be for the islands 
to fall under the influence of the Americans).32 The ministryʼs last dispatch dated August 24, 
1849 advised Dillon to adopt a posture as moderator between “l’influence americaine et les 
pretentions anglaises” (the influence of the Americans and the pretensions of the English).33 
That dispatch did not arrive, however, before matters had escalated in mid-August 1849 
when French Rear Admiral Louis Legoarant de Tromelin arrived aboard La Poursuivante to 
                                                 
28 R. C. Wyllie to W. P. Dillon, 28 February 1848, Series 410, Box 3, vol. 13, part 1, Foreign Officials in Hawaii, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA; Minutes, 23 January 1848, Series 422, vol. 2, Cabinet Council, HSA.  
29 Appendix, “The Late Outrage at the Sandwich Islands (From the New York Journal of Commerce of January 12, 
1850), reprinted in Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Presented at the Forty-
First Annual Meeting, Held in Oswego, New York, Sept. 10-13, 1850 (Boston: T. R. Marvin Press, 1850), 211-2. 
30 Appendix, “Late Outrage,” 212. 
31 Minutes, 23 April 1849, Series 421, vol. 3A, Privy Council Records, HSA. Attendees: the king, kuhina nui, 
Wyllie, Judd, Armstrong, Pākī, Nāmakehā, Kanaʻina, Kapaakea, ʻĪʻī, Kānoa, Kāʻeo, and Lee.  
32 Rèponse du Ministre des Aff. Etrang. français a Dillon, August [October?] 24, 1849, France, Ministère des 
Affaires Etrangères, “Transcripts from the French Archives, Documents copied from Archives du Ministère des 
Affaires Etrangères, correspondence politique, îles Sandwich,” Vols. 5-10 (1846-1852), (Hamilton Library, Univ. of 
Hawaiʻi), 7:126. Handwritten notes copied at the direction of R. S. Kuykendall. The date is not clearly written. My 
own translation. 
33 Rèponse du Ministre des Aff. Etrang. français a Dillon, August [October?] 24, 1849, “Transcripts from the French 
Archives,” 7:126. My own translation.  
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enforce Dillon’s demands.34 Dillon and Tromelin presented themselves as acting under “formal 
instructions of the French government” in their August 22 communication containing ten 
grievances, including a reduction in liquor duties and the resolution of affronts to several French 
citizens. Tromelin warned the Hawaiian government that unless his demands were resolved 
within three days, he would use force to obtain satisfaction.35 The Hawaiian government 
declined, however, and on August 25 the admiral landed troops from La Poursuivante and its 
sister-ship Gassendi. By his own account, Tromelin sacked the waterfront fort in Honolulu, 
destroyed fortifications, made off with the king’s yacht, and occupied the ministerial offices.36 
Damages were estimated at $98,000.37 
No doubt remembering that LaPlace had forced treaty terms on him in 1839 after he 
acquiesced in the face of similar threats, this time Kauikeaouli turned Tromelin’s attack into 
what Jean Charlot called a “one-sided war.”38 The king’s instructions to Governor Kekūanāoʻa 
on the eve of Tromelin’s assault called for passive resistance: “I na ki mai na Palani i ka Pu, mai 
ki pu aku mai i kue aku, ina lele mai lakou mauka nei me na pu, mai hana aku, ina lakou e hana 
mai, mai olelo aku a kue aku, aka, ina olelo lakou e huki ka hae ilalo mai hana pela, na lakou e 
huki ilalo, a iole ia e lawa mau no ia.”39 Charlot translated the king’s order in his blow-by-blow 
account of events: “Make no resistance if the French fire on the town, land under arms, or take 
                                                 
34 Charlot, “Broadside,” 98. 
35 Polynesian, 08 September 1849; Charlot, “Broadside,” 100. 
36 Rapport de l’amiral français Tromelin a le Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies, September 5, 1849, “Transcripts 
from the French Archives,” 7:140-305. 
37 Appendix, “Late Outrage,” 218. 
38 Charlot, “Broadside,” 101. 




possession of the Fort; but keep the flag flying ‘till the French take it down.’”40 The king 
remained unyielding throughout it all.41 
Kauikeaouli’s strategy of passive resistance prevented Tromelin from gaining any 
political advantage, and the admiral soon had on his hands a kingdom at a standstill. With 
government offices shuttered, ships unable to enter or leave Honolulu harbor, and no enemy in 
sight, Tromelin was forced to either run the government or withdraw. On September 5, Tromelin 
took Dillon aboard and ordered La Poursuivante to sail for San Francisco while the Gassendi 
sailed for Valparaiso and Europe.42 Kauikeaouli later explained that he acted in accordance with 
the firm opinion held by himself and his ministers that “he could not consent to the demands of 
the French,” and that his policy “had been simply to confine himself to not acceding to those 
demands.”43 
The king was well-informed about Admiral Petit Thouars’ unauthorized seizure of Tahiti 
in 1842 by what Colin Newbury termed “a mixture of threats and bluff” and the admiral’s return 
to annex the kingdom in 1843.44 Kauikeaouli learned through personal correspondence with 
Pōmare of her unsuccessful effort to marshal international support to regain her kingdom. 
Merchant and naval ships brought news from Tahiti regularly, and the Polynesian and the Friend 
frequently reported on activities in the provisional protectorate established by the French. Word 
                                                 
40 Charlot, “Broadside,” 100. 
41 Minutes, 24-30 August 1849, Series 421, vol. 3A, Privy Council Records, HSA. Attendees varied. At every 
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also must have circulated in Honolulu from Brown, who had met Pōmare when he spent several 
weeks at Tahiti in 1843 awaiting passage to Hawaiʻi,45 and Miller, who made regular trips there 
in his capacity as British Consul for Tahiti and the Society Islands. Commenting on the strong 
British missionary and commercial presence at Tahiti, Stephen Henningham noted that Petit 
Thouars’ action “almost sparked a war” between Britain and France.46 The only armed conflict 
that developed, however, was a war between Tahitian patriots and French naval forces assisted 
by Tahitian collaborationists that lasted from 1844 to 1847. When Miller visited Pōmare in 
January 1845, neither Miller nor visiting British naval officers held out any hope of British 
intervention to restore her kingdom.47 
Hawaiʻi’s relationships with foreigners in 1849 mirrored Tahiti’s situation in 1843 in 
several key areas. Newbury analyzed Tahitian society during the last months of Tahitian 
independence and found that although the government had been open to foreign settlement and 
trade, it had also encountered opposition when it applied Tahiti’s civil and criminal code to 
foreign residents and transients. According to Newbury, Tahitians’ efforts to control the liquor 
trade generated additional ill-will among whalers who trafficked in cheap liquor as part of an 
exchange system participated in by American, British and French crews.48 And in a disturbing 
similarity to Tromelin’s demands of Kauikeaouli, when Tahitian patriots in 1846 appealed for 
assistance to Great Britain and the United States, they blamed Tahiti’s troubles with the French 
                                                 
45 Newbury, “Commissioner Brown,” 83. 
46 Stephen Henningham, “France in Melanesia and Polynesia,” Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the 
Twentieth Century, eds. K. R. Howe, Robert C. Kiste, and Brij V. Lal (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaiʻi Press, 1994), 
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47 Colin Newbury, “Resistance and Collaboration in French Polynesia: The Tahitian War: 1844-7,” Journal of the 
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48 Newbury, “Commissioner Brown,” 84-5. 
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government and traders on Tahitian liquor laws and French allegations that they had mistreated 
Catholics.49 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Ritchie, Starkey and Thomson examined the use of maritime 
violence in the nineteenth century and concluded that states deliberately sanctioned the policy to 
achieve trade advantage.50 Kuykendall furthered that understanding with his conclusion that 
French consular and naval officers in Hawaiʻi acted in accordance with official French policy, 
and that their deliberate use of pressure was “applied time after time [to precipitate] crisis after 
crisis.”51 On the other hand, other historians concluded that French naval and consular agents in 
the Pacific frequently acted contrary to official policy. J. R. Baldwin, for example, cited Guizot’s 
condemnation of Petit Thouars’ seizure of Tahiti in 1842,52 and Oscar Chapuis documented 
several similar occasions in Vietnam in the 1840s when French naval officers relied on their 
distance from Paris to take unauthorized gunboat actions against local authorities.53 A reading of 
the cautionary dispatches sent to Dillon by the French ministry supports a finding that Dillon and 
Tromelin acted without orders. Miller’s remarks to Kauikeaouli and the council on September 4 
affirm that conclusion: the French government no doubt would disavow Tromelin’s actions, 
Miller told the king, but “it was not an uncommon thing for officers and agents of foreign 
governments to commit errors of judgment and even acts of indiscretion abroad.”54  
  
 
                                                 
49 Newbury, “Resistance,” 21. 
50 Ritchie, “Government Measures,” 23-4; Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise, 254-9; Thomson, Mercenaries, 
Pirates, and Sovereigns, 3-5. 
51 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:388. 
52 Baldwin, “England and the French Seizure of the Society Islands,” 220. 
53 Oscar Chapuis, The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Doc to Bao Dai (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
2000), 4-5. 
54 Minutes, 04 September 1849, Series 421, vol. 3A, Privy Council Records, HSA.  
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 A plan and secret orders 
Miller’s remarks must have aroused very unpleasant memories among his Hawaiian listeners of 
Paulet’s unauthorized 1843 gunboat seizure and Britain’s refusal to indemnify the kingdom for 
their property losses. Whether France disavowed Tromelin’s actions or not, Kauikeaouli did not 
have the forces or firepower to protect the kingdom against a naval assault should Tromelin 
return as Petit Thouars had done at Tahiti.55 Instead, the king took several actions that evidence a 
well-thought out, multi-staged diplomatic plan. Should French naval forces again threaten the 
kingdom, British and American officials would be urged to safeguard their citizens’ substantial 
commercial interests by ordering their own navies to defend Hawaiʻi’s independence. 
Meanwhile, the king’s ministers would negotiate a commercial treaty with the U.S. that did not 
impinge on his sovereign powers. Because American interests predominated in the Hawaiian 
marketplace, a favorable U.S. treaty could be positioned as the competitive pattern that British 
and French treaties should follow.56 
At a privy council meeting called the same day that Tromelin sailed, Kauikeaouli and the 
council acted to put part of that plan into play. Judd was appointed as a Special Commissioner 
and minister plenipotentiary to travel to the United States where he would negotiate a new treaty, 
and then to France and England to submit a claim with France for reparations and to negotiate 
terms with both nations to “better secure the independence of the Hawaiian Islands.”57 
                                                 
55 Mrs. Judd named this as a paramount concern. See Laura Fish Judd, “A Suppressed Chapter of Hawaiian 
History,” Read by Prof. W. D. Alexander, HHS Report 10 (1903): 9. 
56 Minutes, 05 September 1849, Series 421, vol. 3A, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees were the king, the queen, the 
kuhina nui, Judd, Armstrong, ʻĪʻī, Kānehoa, Pākī, Kekūanāoʻa, Kapaakea, and Kanaʻina. Also evidenced by Judd’s 
01 August 1850 letter to Palmerston and Clayton.  
57 Ibid. Notably absent were Wyllie and Lee. Given their involvement in the development of the secret order, they 
no doubt were closeted together creating it. Anthony Ten Eyck had replaced Brown as the U. S. diplomatic 
representative in June 1846 with authority to negotiate a treaty. Ten Eyck, however, quickly joined the party 
opposed to the king’s ministers, was censured by the U. S., and was recalled in 1849. 
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Kauikeaouli also executed a document entitled Kauoha Malu (Secret Instructions) drawn up by 
Judge Lee for Judd to carry with him that commanded and empowered Judd “to make the best 
bargain possible for disposal of sovereignty of the Islands.”58 Although the privy council minutes 
do not mention the secret instructions, Judd’s wife Laura Fish Judd (who many years later 
revealed the document’s existence and the circumstances of its creation) saw the document and 
described it as having been “approved,” and that it bore the king’s signature and seal. Mrs. Judd 
believed that the orders represented Kauikeaouli’s attempt to control the ramifications of an 
unavoidable loss of sovereignty by transferring sovereignty to the nation of his own choosing, 
and M. A. Brown saw the creation of the orders as a political strategy that would be engaged in 
through several crises.59 While Judd’s instructions spelled out the situations that could trigger the 
transfer of sovereignty, they did not specify which foreign power to approach:  
Ina paha e hooiaio ole ia ko’u Kuokoa ana, ina e popilikia paha no ka hana ana a 
kekahi Aupuni, a e lilo ana paha ko’u Alii ana i mea ole a i mea kulanalana loa 
paha, a e pilikia hou (ko’u) Aina Hooilina Alii i ke Kaua kumuole, a ina paha no 
kekahi kumu e ae e ike ai oe he pono keia kauoha ke hanaia; Ke Kauoha, a ke 
Haawi aku nei au ia oe, ma ko’u aoao, e hoohalahala a e hooholo i Kuikahi me 
kekahi Alii, Peresidena, Aupuni, a Luna Aupuni paha, no ka hoolilo ana i ko’u 
Pae Aina malalo o ka hoomalu ana, a o ke Alii ana o kekahi Aina e. 
. . . . 
In case our Independence be not fully recognized, be endangered by the acts of 
any other Government, or our Sovereignty in peril or rendered of no value, our 
Royal Domain being exposed to further hostile attacks without just and good 
reasons, or from any other cause you may find these Instructions necessary. These 
are to command and empower you, on your behalf to treat and negotiate with any 
King, President or Government or Agent thereof for the purpose of placing our 
Islands under foreign Protection and Rule.60 
                                                 
58 L. F. Judd, “Suppressed Chapter,” 8. Existence of the kauoha malu was first revealed in W. D. Alexander’s report 
on the suppressed chapter. 
59 L. F. Judd, “Suppressed Chapter,” 9; M. A. Brown, Facing the Spears of Change, 115. 
60 L. F. Judd, “Suppressed Chapter,” 10-2. Note this is the English translation in Mrs. Judd’s text; no doubt it was 
the translation that Judd took on his mission.  
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Issuing the order to threaten alienation of sovereignty was a negotiating strategy designed 
to turn the kingdom’s military weakness into political strength, and its terms are reminiscent of 
the implied threat discussed in Chapter 1 that Kauikeaouli made in 1846 to U.S. President Polk, 
where the king suggested that if American agents continued to obstruct his courts, he could lose 
sovereign control to another power, and that would mean that the U. S. could lose access to the 
kingdom’s lucrative trade markets and geographically-important ports.61 In this case, if French or 
British intransigence over the removal of the burdensome extraterritorial treaty terms imperiled 
the kingdom’s independence, then the king intended to transfer sovereignty to one of their 
commercial rivals. Just the revelation that the king contemplated transferring sovereignty could 
be used to obtain concessions, but Judd would keep the existence of his orders confidential until 
the need arose to use that negotiating threat. Leaving open the nation which would receive the 
transfer broadened Judd’s ability to exert pressure on any one of the maritime powers.  
The privy council also took immediate steps to publicize the kingdom’s position for 
refusing Tromelin’s demands. The Polynesian printed by authority the official exchange of 
correspondence in its September 8 issue along with the king’s formal diplomatic protest and 
letters of support from Miller and the American consul Joel Turrill protesting the admiral’s 
actions. The Polynesian’s editorial described the French actions as being a case  
where right has had to submit to might; and in the most perfect spirit of non-
resistance to stand up in the face of the world and boldly assert its inalienable 
rights however disastrous the circumstances, while its public property was being 
destroyed, and the sovereignty of His Majesty, guaranteed by France herself, was 
being trampled under foot by a military force, armed as against a belligerent 
opponent.62 
                                                 
61 Kamehameha III to Polk, 30 September 1846, Series 410, Box 3, Book 2, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. 
62 Editorial, Polynesian, 08 September 1849. 
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Furthermore, the size of the resident French population was very small. The Polynesian also 
reported the following week that in 1849, only twelve French citizens (excluding French priests) 
lived in the kingdom and there was only one French merchant and one French tavern keeper.63 
That editorial set the tone for what became known in the U.S. press as “the French 
outrage at the Sandwich Islands.” Newspapers from Massachusetts to California picked up the 
story and reported on the unprovoked French attack over “Catholic rights and brandy.”64 The 
Alta California newspaper stated flatly “The French Admiral has been guilty of a startling 
outrage.”65 On January 12, 1850, the New York Journal of Commerce published a lengthy point-
by-point denunciation of French actions beginning with Dillon’s arrival in 1848 and ending with 
the September 5 departure of the Poursuivante. The New York Journal noted that the French had 
failed to extort a single concession from the Hawaiian government and that the Hawaiians were 
not “provoked into a single act of resistance, or even of discourtesy, which can be used as an 
apology for exacting higher terms of them.”66 The ABCFM published an extensive account in 
the February 1850 issue of its widely-circulated Missionary Herald and reprinted the New York 
Journal’s article in another of its publications in September 1850.67 Newspaper editors in 
Australia, Peru, New Zealand, England, and Chile also denounced the French aggressions and 
expressed support for the Hawaiian government.68 
                                                 
63 Daws, Honolulu: the First Century, 192. 
64 See for example, Alta California, 01 October 1849, Easton, PA Northampton Democrat, 13 November 1849, and 
the New York Weekly Tribune, 17 November 1849. The quotation is from the Springfield (Mass.) Daily Post, 13 
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66 Appendix, “Late Outrage,” 210-8. 
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In April 1849, the privy council also had authorized Jarves (who had left his position as 
editor of the Polynesian in 1847) to negotiate a U.S.—Hawaiʻi commercial treaty, and Jarves 
was in Washington when news arrived of Tromelin’s attack.69 Kuykendall reported that U.S. 
Secretary of State John M. Clayton alluded to Americans’ significant commercial interests in the 
kingdom when he told Jarves that the French outrage had made his government even more 
determined to execute a fair and equitable treaty to demonstrate the United States’ support for 
the king’s independence.70 Hawaiian governmental records show that in 1849, American-flagged 
ships comprised the greater part of merchant traffic at Hawaiian ports with 57%, whereas the 
British-flagged share of merchant traffic was 40%, and French-flagged traffic trailed with only 
3% of the total.71 American ships also dominated the whaling industry and relied on Hawaiian 
ports for their Pacific base of operations.72 Kenneth E. Shewmaker pointed out that the Mexican-
American War of 1846-1848 and the settlement with Great Britain of the northern Oregon 
boundary in 1846 had delivered four deep-water ports on the Pacific coast into American 
territory at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Portland which greatly enhanced the 
geopolitical significance of Hawaiʻi as the U.S. moved to expand its Pacific presence into China 
and Japan.73 
Judd drafted a treaty with U.S. Commissioner Charles Eames during his stopover at San 
Francisco in October, and Jarves separately negotiated a treaty with Clayton in December, 
neither of which contained the extraterritorial restrictions found in the British and French 
                                                 
69 Minutes, 23 April 1849, Series 421, vol. 3A, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees were the king, the kuhina nui, 
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70 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:379. 
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72 Shewmaker, “Forging the ‘Great Chain’,” 239.  
73 Ibid., 244. 
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treaties. Imports and exports between the U.S. and Hawaiʻi had more than doubled since Tyler 
announced his 1842 doctrine, so that the new treaty’s reciprocal duties both increased the 
government’s revenue and stimulated the production and exportation of Hawaiian products.74 
The two versions were combined, and Judd presented a copy to British Lord Palmerston upon his 
arrival in London.75 
Palmerston, however, did not immediately commit to treaty renegotiations and offered 
Judd only perfunctory help with the French. Before traveling on to Paris, a disappointed Judd 
advised Wyllie that the British government appeared to view Tromelin’s actions “with the most 
perfect indifference.”76 Palmerston was constrained, however, by French resistance to on-going 
British activities in Greece, and had little political space in which to maneuver.77 
When French ministers condoned Dillon’s behavior and Tromelin’s attack, Judd feared 
that the French would attack again, and he arranged to publicize the king’s intent to transfer 
sovereignty should that occur. Archibald Barclay (the Hawaiian ambassador in London) at 
Judd’s request planted an unfavorable article in the February 23, 1850 edition of the London 
Times about Tromelin’s attack which contained the tag line that unless the French guaranteed 
against a repetition, “the attempt to maintain the independence of the islands may ultimately be 
abandoned by the people, and that they may prefer to pass, for the sake of security to the 
government of the U.S.”78 Palmerston then validated that potentiality in a conversation with the 
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French ambassador, who reported to Paris that Palmerston favored a solution between France 
and Hawaiʻi and “craint que Judd solicite une intervention des Ėtats Unis; il pense que toutes les 
questions, sauf celle de la langue, pourraient être reglées facilement” (fears that Judd seeks an 
intervention of the United States; he thinks that all the issues, except [use of the French] 
language, could be easily resolved).79  
The French, however, were unswayed by the threat of a U.S. takeover or Palmerston’s 
suggestions. Negotiations stalled. After several fruitless months, Judd abruptly left Paris.80 The 
French ministry dispatched Perrin to follow Judd to Honolulu and continue negotiations. While 
at Panama, Judd learned that Perrin awaited a warship there which would carry him to Honolulu 
“with full powers to settle the differences, by compelling the Hawaiian Government to yield to 
the claims of France.”81 
Learning that, Judd executed the diplomatic plan’s defensive stratagem. He dispatched 
letters to London and Washington calling on Britain and the U.S. to deploy their naval forces to 
defend Hawaiʻi’s independence. Before Judd had left Europe, Palmerston moved away from 
Britain’s treaty pattern with France and agreed to structure a new British treaty using the U.S. 
treaty as a template.82 From Palmerston, then, on August 1 Judd demanded British naval help to 
prevent “the mischief which is to be apprehended.”83 Shewmaker’s research showed that several 
of the 75 American mercantile houses doing business at Hawaiʻi had direct links with California, 
the newest U.S. state, and in his August 1 letter to Clayton, Judd pointedly linked Hawaiian and 
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American interests: “[Hawaiʻi’s] proximity to California renders it for the interest of the U.S. 
that they be entirely free from foreign control.” Judd also requested that Clayton ensure “that the 
Commodore of the California Station may be instructed to repair thither, with a sufficient force, 
and discretionary powers.”84 Perrin arrived in Honolulu in late December aboard the armed 
French corvette La Sérieuse, and Judge Lee opined to Turrill that if the government refused his 
demands, Perrin “will probably seize Hawaiian Vessels, blockade our port, and, for a while at 
least, ruin our Commerce & cripple our Agriculture.85 But the U.S.S. Vandalia arrived in 
February and stationed itself in port as a cautionary warning against hostile action, remaining 
until the corvette departed on April 29.86 
 
The French provoke new secret orders 
Wyllie replaced Judd as the lead negotiator. When Perrin resurrected most of Dillon’s 
demands,87 Wyllie put into use the threat from the confidential order that Judd had carried, 
warning Perrin in February 1851 that “the sovereignty of the King would not be worth having 
with the constant hostility of France, as in fact His independence could not be maintained 
without her friendship.”88 In another letter to Perrin a week later, Wyllie made the king’s threat 
more explicit by citing Vattel’s Law of Nations: “When a nation is not capable of preserving 
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itself from insult and oppression it may procure the protection of a more powerful state.”89 
Perrin, however, still refused to amend his demands, and in early March 1851 rumors circulated 
that the French fleet was about to make another naval assault on the kingdom.  
Still committed to the tactics from the plan they had strategized in September 1849 
immediately after Tromelin’s attack, on March 10 the privy council formalized the king’s threat 
in a second secret order to transfer sovereignty. But this time, the threatened transfer would last 
only until the kingdom’s independent state could be secured, and the new order placed full 
responsibility for its need on France’s unremitting hostility.90 Although the receiving nation was 
again unnamed, a blank space was left in the original document so that it could be inserted later.  
Kauikeaouli then sought to place the kingdom under British protection, asking Miller in 
front of the privy council: “Will the British government assist me if I will hoist your flag?” But 
Miller equivocated, protesting that he had spoken with Perrin and did not think the French would 
attack, then refusing based on the 1843 commitment between Britain and France to respect 
Hawaiian sovereignty.91 Next Kauikeaouli approached the new U.S. Commissioner Luther 
Severance who agreed to exchange a promise of U.S. naval protection against a French assault 
for what came to be called a provisional deed of cession.92 At that point, the name “Amerika 
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Huipuia” (United States of America) was entered into the already-prepared proclamation and it 
was executed by both parties:93 
Me ka lohe a me ka ae ana o Kuu Kuhinanui, a me ke kuka pu no hoi me kuu mau 
alii maoli. . . aole hoi o’u manao e loaa mai ana ia’u ka pono i ko Ferani; Nolaila, 
ke hai aku nei au i ko’u manao a me ko’u makemake, e lilo ko’u pae aina, a me 
ko’u mau pono apau ma kuu ano Moi maluna iho, ma ka lae hoolahaia ’i keia 
olelo ia AMERIKA HUIPUIA nana e hoomalu a hiki i ka wa e hooponoponoia’i 
na pilikia me Ferani, a ku pono i ko’u ano ku okoa, mamuli o na kanawai maluna 
o na aupuni a pau, a mamuli hoi o na kuikahi me na aupuni e;  
. . . .  
By & with the advice and consent of our Kuhinanui and council of native chiefs. . 
. and despairing of Equity and justice from France; Hereby proclaim as our Royal 
Will and pleasure, that all our Islands, and all our rights as Sovereign over them, 
are from the date hereof, placed under the protection and safeguard of the 
UNITED STATES OF AMERIKA [sic] until some arrangement can be made to 
place our said relations with France upon a footing compatible with my rights, as 
an independent sovereign, under the laws of nations, and compatible with my 
treaty engagements, with other foreign nations;94 
 
Resolution of the impending danger could still affect the final decision, however; and the king 
provided that the provisions for transfer of sovereignty should be kept confidential and 
implemented only under the following conditions:  
the emergency of any sudden danger, and not be acted upon or even mentioned, 
if. . . France and other maritime powers will engage to let Him alone, with power 
to govern and seek the protection of his people in his own way, and to protect 
foreign residents and their interests without persisting in exacting of him greater 
responsibilities than can be required of any Sovereign under the laws of nations.95 
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This time the threat had its intended effect. Word of the secret provisions circulated around 
Honolulu. Miller alerted Perrin, and Perrin also received warnings from several other quarters 
“that his persistence would throw possession of the islands into the hands of the United States.”96 
Perrin then modified his demands, reached an accommodation on the assessment of liquor duties 
and returned to Paris in May 1851 for new instructions.97 
Meanwhile, Wyllie and Severance jointly appealed to the President of the United States 
on behalf of the king who acknowledged “his utter want of power to protect the citizens of the 
United States and their large interests in His islands” against French depredations. The two 
ministers reported that the king sought to enter into the union merely because of foreign 
aggression, and that he sought military protection only until another arrangement could be made 
that would protect the kingdom as an independent state. On June 21, to ensure the king’s 
constitutional right to do so, the legislature passed a resolution granting the king full authority to 
place the kingdom under the protection of “some friendly state” according to His Majesty’s best 
judgment.98 
News of Perrin’s demands and the secret provisions authorizing the transfer of 
sovereignty reached the American press. The New York Herald, for example, on May 19, 1851 
printed a lengthy article extolling the desirability of annexation to support Americans’ expanding 
Pacific commercial interests. The Daily National Intelligencer, a Washington newspaper, 
published France’s demands in its May 27, 1851 edition. Alarmed by news of the events from 
American officials at Hawaiʻi, Secretary of State Daniel Webster reconfirmed Severance’s 
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promise of American naval support and copied the French, British and Hawaiian governments on 
his July 14 order conveying what Shewmaker described as the message that “the United States 
was prepared to use military force to protect Hawaiian sovereignty and to uphold its paramount 
interests in the islands.”99 Press reports such as the one in the Burlington Hawk-Eye July 31, 
1851 edition then published Webster’s diplomatic stance. By that time, Webster had also 
privately directed Severance to return the signed provisions to the Hawaiian government and ‘not 
to encourage’ any further expectations by the kingdom.100 Severance explained that the 
Hawaiians “never desired annexation per se, but as an alternative” to French domination.101  
While awaiting Perrin’s return and monitoring French naval activity around the Pacific, 
the king and his ministers learned in mid-November 1851 of an entirely different threat from a 
group of California freebooters—called filibusters—rumored to be intent upon collaborating 
with resident Americans to seize the government either to rule it themselves or to annex it to the 
U.S.102 The privy council spent several days debating how best to defend the kingdom, Wyllie 
alerted the U.S. Commissioner, and Governor Kekūanāoʻa armed the Oʻahu militia. Plans were 
drawn up to muster 5,050 men who would be deployed on all of the islands under the immediate 
command of the governors, and Alexander Liholiho and Lot Kamehameha were appointed 
Honorary Colonels of Regiments. Although some twenty-five suspicious persons arrived from 
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San Francisco under the mistaken impression that the kingdom was ripe for revolution, nothing 
came of their threat.103 Nevertheless, rumors of their imminent return continued to circulate.  
The 1852 legislature took advantage of its ongoing constitutional revision work to codify 
the June 21, 1851 resolution that granted the king the authority to take defensive actions should 
another sudden emergency arise: 
E hiki no i ka Moi me ka ae pu o kona Ahakukina a me ka Ahakukakuka Malu i 
ka wa i kauia mai, a haunaele paha no ke kipi, ke hoolilo i kona Aupuni a pau, a i 
kekahi hapa paha, malalo o ke Kanawai koa; a e hiki no hoi ia ia ke haawi loa aku 
i kona Aupuni, ke maopopo, oia ka mea e pau ai ka hoinoia mai a me ka 
hookaumahaia mai e kekahi Aupuni e ae.  
; 
The King, by and with the approval of His Cabinet and Privy Council, in case of 
invasion or rebellion, can place the whole Kingdom, or any part of it under 
martial law; and he can even alienate it, if indispensable to free it from the insult 
and oppression of any foreign power.104 
 
Meanwhile, Britain’s revised treaty of July 10, 1851 which patterned after the U.S. treaty 
and lifted the restrictions of Articles III and VI arrived for the king’s ratification in April 1852. 
That left the 1846 French treaty as the only obstacle that remained to the king’s sovereign right 
to determine the kingdom’s import duty levels.105 Because the commercial treaties with other 
nations contained “most favored nation” clauses, however, those treaty partners still could 
choose to invoke the French duty rate and thereby curtail a significant revenue source for the 
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kingdom. Military expenses incurred to defend against the filibusters were costing $2,000 per 
month, and the treasury again had “not a dollar to spare.”106 
The terms of the secret provisions to transfer sovereignty were deemed to have lapsed by 
the time that Perrin returned in early January 1853. But on advice from the privy council, Wyllie 
was not to publicly confirm or deny its existence—particularly to Perrin—even though news of 
the purported cession agreement had been published in American newspapers.107 Resident 
Charles R. Bishop reported that this time the French are “very friendly now…. probability is, in 
my opinion, that they are afraid of driving us to annexation.”108 Lee opined that “I think France 
will let us alone, lest we ask Pierce & Cabinet for Protection.”109 Shewmaker concluded 
similarly, that Webster’s enforcement of Tyler’s 1842 doctrine had “succeeded in producing 
unequivocal assurances of French respect for Hawaiian sovereignty.”110 In fact Perrin had been 
instructed to declare openly that France had no hostile intentions, and he carried instructions to 
negotiate a new treaty without the jury restrictions of Article III.111 Fears resurfaced, however, 
when Wyllie’s contacts reported that a large French fleet had been spotted in the Pacific in June 
1853, and the king appointed Wyllie as his Minister of War.112 
When a smallpox epidemic ravaged the Honolulu community in the summer of 1853, the 
inhabitants closed the produce markets and fled the town by the hundreds. More than 6,000 cases 
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were reported, and there were at least 2,500 deaths.113 The board of health’s facilities and 
services were quickly overwhelmed, and a group of dissident Americans blamed the spread of 
the contagion on the incompetence of the king’s white ministers Judd and Armstrong.114 Bitter 
attacks were made on Judd and Armstrong at public meetings attended by members of the 
foreign community. Another dissident faction also emerged which supported the filibusters and 
agitated for annexation to the United States, but “the idea of annexation is not a pleasant one to 
the Chiefs,” Lee wrote Turrill in July, “and they will only take such a step as a dernier [last] 
resort.”115 During August, the king received petitions purportedly signed by 260 foreigners and 
12,220 Hawaiians demanding the ouster of Judd and Armstrong from the cabinet, followed by a 
petition signed by nineteen American merchants and planters who urged annexation to the 
United States as the only alternative to community disorder.116 Miller and Perrin advised 
Kauikeaouli on September 1 that annexation to the U.S. would be in contravention of the 
kingdom’s treaties, and they published a joint letter in the October issue of the Friend urging the 
king not to take that step, while Severance published his own letter in the same issue that 
defended a sovereign state’s right to make that decision.117 Judd’s dismissal from government 
service in early September helped settle the political climate, but civil unrest broke out again in 
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November when hundreds of American seamen aggrieved by the town’s police regulations 
threatened to riot and set fire to Honolulu.118 
Pauline King noted that these several disruptive events combined to cause “intense 
pressures on so many levels of government” that resonated well beyond the actual events.119 The 
Hawaii Historical Commission in 1926 examined what were called the “disturbed political 
conditions” at length, and positioned them as the backdrop against which a larger movement of 
agitation emerged to threaten the kingdom’s independence.120 Severance already had concluded 
in the summer of 1853, however, that the king understood that the American dissidents would 
not cease agitating until annexation had been accomplished.121 Thus an examination of what 
happened next leads to a conclusion that Kauikeaouli not only recognized the dangers that lay 
ahead, but that he had already strategized how to apply his 1849 diplomatic plan to meet this new 
threat. 
 
Filibusters spark new negotiations 
U. S. President Franklin Pierce appointed David Lawrence Gregg to replace Luther Severance as 
the U.S. Commissioner to the Hawaiian kingdom. A member of a conservative faction of the 
Democratic party in Illinois, Gregg had practiced law prior to entering politics and had served as 
a United States attorney, Illinois legislator, and Illinois Secretary of State.122 When Gregg arrived 
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in Honolulu on December 19, 1853, Honolulu had a permanent population of about 12,000, 
about 3,000 of whom were foreign residents, mainly from the United States.123 Three-quarters of 
the businesses were American-owned, and the chief market for island products was the Pacific 
coast.124 Regular mail service routes had been established with the United States and Tahiti.125 
Prince Alexander Liholiho, the natural son of deceased Kuhina Nui Kaʻahumanu II Kīnaʻu and 
Governor Kekūanāoʻa and the hānai son of Kauikeaouli, had been named as Kauikeaouli’s 
successor.126 Impressed by the social activities that he and his family found, Gregg wrote a friend 
that “nearly every house, from that of the King down to the poorest foreign resident, is furnished 
with a piano, and society seems almost music-mad.”127 The king exhibited “shrewdness & 
intelligence, even on general subjects,” Gregg remarked to a friend, and the prince is “well 
educated & intelligent, [with] easy & graceful manners & elegant address.”128  
King explained that U.S. President Franklin Pierce’s administration (1853-1857) had 
ushered in an expansionist period with an aggressive foreign policy that looked favorably on the 
annexation of the kingdom to buttress its expanding continental territory.129 While Gregg had 
been instructed by U.S. Secretary of State William Marcy before leaving Washington that many 
influential resident Americans suggested transferring sovereignty to the United States, Marcy 
also had cautioned that it was not the policy of the United States to accelerate such a change 
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unless doing so became unavoidable or should it appear likely that sovereignty would transfer to 
another power.130 At the same time, Gregg understood that he should refer any practicable 
proposal for annexation to Washington if it were offered by the Hawaiian government.131  
During a stopover in San Francisco on his way to Honolulu, Gregg met with P. A. 
Brinsmade, the former U.S. consul to the kingdom who had authored derogatory articles about 
the king and his ministers for the Sandwich Islands News. Brinsmade suggested that any effort to 
coerce Kauikeaouli to alienate sovereignty would push the king into the camp of France and 
Great Britain. The proper course, Brinsmade advised, would be for the United States to quietly 
await the progress of events “and when the apple falls from its own ripeness, to pick it up.”132 On 
January 4, Judd—no longer a member of the king’s administration and apparently referring to 
the existence of the 1849 and 1851 secret orders—told Gregg that the king had “frequently 
wished to propose annexation to the U.S.” and that the chiefs “generally concurred.”133 Later that 
same day, two members of the pro-annexationist “Committee of 13” petitioners told Gregg that 
they were prepared to use peaceful agitation methods to compel the king to cede his sovereignty 
to the U.S. or they would engineer a revolution and establish a republic.134 From these several 
meetings, Gregg concluded on January 6 that “one thing appears certain, a crisis is at hand.”135 
King Joerger reported that Gregg believed that most Hawaiians favored annexation. 
Gregg saw it as a moment of great opportunity for the U. S. and determined on a legal, 
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diplomatic course of action designed to accomplish annexation.136 In a remarkable 
foreshadowing of the course he intended to follow, Gregg recorded in his January 7 notes that 
no great effort would be necessary to induce the government to make an offer of 
annexation. . . .The true policy to be pursued is to keep the fears of the chiefs and 
people thoroughly excited. They already apprehend domestic disturbances, and 
“filibustering” expeditions from California, and by the aid of inducements 
skillfully held out in an indirect way, an exigency could be precipitated and 
annexation speedily consummated.137 
 
Kauikeaouli, of course, already had put a plan of his own in place in 1849 that had an 
alienation stratagem designed to convince international naval powers to protect the kingdom’s 
independence in just those sorts of hostile situations. Thus, when it became evident that Gregg 
favored the annexationists’ plans—as Kauikeaouli surely would have learned—the king’s 
acceptance on January 9 of a new annexation petition from 56 American businessmen appeared 
designed to move the agitators’ plans along. Gregg had already privately concluded that 
Kauikeaouli was “a very clever sort of personage. . . far more intelligent about political affairs 
than might be expected,”138 and the king’s act gives every appearance of being a ruse to bring 
matters to a head.139 
The tenor of Elisha H. Allen’s conversations with Gregg on January 10 and 11 suggests 
that Allen had been coached to further that impression. Allen, who had arrived at Hawaiʻi as the 
U.S. Consul but then became a citizen and replaced Judd as Minister of Finance, told Gregg on 
January 10 (presumably speaking in confidence) that the privy council favored annexation, and 
he suggested that Gregg pass that information along to the Committee of 13. If it was Gregg who 
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gave out that information, Allen suggested, the committee members would infer that 
arrangements for annexation actually were in place. On January 11, however, Allen sought out 
Gregg again and told him a different story, reporting that the question of annexation agitated the 
chiefs considerably. What Allen said next was a replication of the strategy the king used during 
the 1851 emergency: the king and privy council understood that foreign military guarantees must 
be obtained to protect the kingdom against the agitators and filibusters, Allen stated, and he 
wanted to forewarn Gregg that the council might propose a treaty to take effect in the case of an 
emergency. And in an apparent bid to arouse international rivalries, Allen added that, if the U.S. 
would not grant protection, then the king would seek the aid of England and/or France.140 Judd 
had his own informants within the ministerial ranks, and on February 1, Judd told Gregg that he 
believed it would not be long before the government would propose annexation to end the 
commotion in the community.141 
Suddenly and without further provocation, Kauikeaouli did just that. On February 6, he 
declared that the filibuster threat “if carried out would be wholly subversive of Our Sovereignty, 
and would reduce Us to the most deplorable of all states, a state of anarchy” and commanded 
Wyllie to ascertain on what terms a treaty of annexation with the United States could be 
negotiated. With the stage set for a showdown confrontation between American agitators and the 
king’s ability to rule free from foreign endangerment, Kauikeaouli named Alexander Liholiho as 
his personal representative and a voting member in the cabinet deliberations.142  
Kauikeaouli’s order triggered a flurry of correspondence between Wyllie, Gregg, 
Kauikeaouli, cabinet council members, and members of the U.S. government. Gregg’s diaries 
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edited by historian Pauline King comprise the most complete record of the American side of the 
annexation negotiations conducted between January and December 1854.143 W. D. Alexander’s 
account with its supporting documentation adds the perspective of Kauikeaouli and his ministers, 
and Kuykendall’s detailed analysis blends the several points of view.  
Historians differ on whether or not Kauikeaouli ever intended to execute an agreement to 
transfer sovereignty. W. D. Alexander, for example, concluded from the several letters and 
documents he examined that Kauikeaouli “strongly favored annexation.”144 Laura Fish Judd, a 
witness to the unfolding events, also believed that Kauikeaouli was committed to consummating 
an agreement.145 King, on the other hand, suggests that these 1854 negotiations were undertaken 
as a maneuver to achieve the same result as had the 1851 secret treaty: “And since the secret plan 
for an American protectorate had proved so successful [in 1851], Kamehameha III instructed 
Wyllie to make preparations for the use of similar measures in anticipation of future 
emergencies.”146 The success that the 1851 order realized, of course, was that the threat 
evaporated when the U.S. committed to use American naval power to defend the Hawaiian 
kingdom from French assault without the necessity of transferring sovereignty, and the 
subsequent course of the 1854 negotiations leads to the conclusion that Kauikeaouli intended to 
provoke a similar result this time. 
Negotiations began between Wyllie and Gregg on February 8.147 Judge Lee’s framing of 
the basis for negotiations served as the starting point for several protocols and included the 
condition that Hawaiʻi enter the union as a sovereign state, not a territory. It was agreed that the 
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treaty would first be approved diplomatically by plenipotentiaries Wyllie and Gregg, then 
submitted for ratification according to the constitutional requirements of both nation-states. 
According to Alexander’s account, however, by June 1 Wyllie and Gregg had met only six times. 
After that an interval of two months passed when very little progress was made.148 Secrecy could 
not be maintained, and editorials endorsing the negotiations appeared in at least two U.S. 
newspapers over the summer.149 
Reports circulating in the community that a treaty was being prepared sparked alarm 
throughout the Hawaiian community. Alexander Liholiho and John Papa ʻĪʻī held meetings at 
Kawaiahaʻo Church from March through August at which they assured their fellow-Hawaiians 
that the king would not annex his kingdom without first informing them.150 Petitions against 
annexation from Hawaiians on every island arrived at the House of Representatives in April and 
May, and it became widespread knowledge that the majority of the people were “consistently 
and vigorously opposed” to surrendering the kingdom’s independence. In July members of the 
House of Representatives demanded that Wyllie appear to discuss the negotiations.151  
Members of the Hawaiian negotiating team erected stumbling blocks. Kauikeaouli 
continued to insist that the kingdom enter the union as a state despite Gregg’s explanation that 
the terms of the U.S. Constitution prevented it, and the $300,000 size of the annuities to be 
distributed among the king and the chiefs for life was significantly larger than Gregg had 
anticipated. Hawaiian negotiators insisted upon the insertion of a “separate and secret article” 
which provided that at any time prior to U. S. ratification the king could place the kingdom under 
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temporary U. S. protection merely by signing the treaty himself. Pauline King concluded that the 
Hawaiian negotiating team purposefully introduced delays and the most favorable terms possible 
as a deliberate policy to forestall arriving at an agreement on terms, while at the same time 
preserving its ability to seek U. S. protection at will should a treaty actually be finalized.152  
Gregg concluded by mid-July that Alexander Liholiho was purposely delaying 
negotiations; indeed, although the prince communicated with the king and Lee sub rosa, he made 
himself unavailable for other consultations. Wyllie agreed to proceed without the prince, and a 
draft was finalized. But another delay arose when Wyllie received an August 29 note from the 
king in Alexander Liholiho’s handwriting asking for copies “in native” of the treaty and all 
protocols so that the king might study them before Wyllie signed the treaty. Kauikeaouli 
received the copies in a cabinet council meeting on September 4, and then announced that he 
intended to take time to consult with his chiefs.153 Meanwhile, Alexander Liholiho left for 
another island and could not reached. 
Gregg interpreted the king’s August 29 note as an attempt by Alexander Liholiho to 
quash the whole negotiations, and his belief seems to have been what precipitated the circulation 
of a new rumor that several hundred filibusters were on their way to invade Honolulu.154 Gregg’s 
notes of January 7 confirm that he intended to pursue deliberate actions if necessary “to keep the 
fears of the chiefs and people thoroughly excited,” and something about the rumor led Wyllie to 
suspect that Gregg may have been behind it.155 Wyllie wrote Lee (who was on Maui at the time) 
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on September 7 that “I am at a loss, whether to look upon the whole as a ruse to frighten the 
King into immediate ratification of the treaty, or as a forewarning of real danger.”156 The king 
was not frightened, of course, and there was no invasion. Apparently sensing that the chance to 
reach agreement was slipping away, on September 12, Gregg complained to Wyllie that the king 
and his ministers were procrastinating, and he threatened to withdraw from any further 
negotiations.157 
 
International support materializes 
In a remarkable turnabout, Perrin joined Miller on September 18 to plead with the king, begging 
that he not proceed with annexation and insisting that France and Great Britain had instructed 
them that their two governments would act together as guarantors of the kingdom’s sovereignty 
under their joint 1843 agreement. Miller personally assured Kauikeaouli that French and British 
ships were on the way from San Francisco to protect him and his islands from an expected 
invasion, and that Kauikeaouli would have the personal protection of the British flag.158  
As early as 1852, British and French diplomats in Washington had attempted to secure 
guarantees of Hawaii’s independence by entering into a three-party agreement with the U.S., but 
nothing had materialized. Again in 1853, after word of the August 1853 annexation petition and 
Miller’s meeting with king reached them, British and French diplomats met with Marcy and 
made another offer to enter into a tripartite agreement. Marcy, however, rejected the idea.159 By 
August 1854, the news from Honolulu suggested that annexation was imminent, and Marcy 
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alleged to the British and French diplomats that the U.S. government was taking that action only 
because the Hawaiian government was not able to maintain its independence. British and French 
ministers at Washington insisted that was a false premise, and Kuykendall reported that the 
British ambassador lodged a strong formal protest with the U.S. State Department and argued 
that—although the U.S. had refused to formally join a three-party agreement committing to 
Hawaiian independence—in fact its policy statements over the course of several years had in 
effect made that pledge.160 
At that point in time, annexation to the U.S. presented Great Britain and France with their 
worst possible outcome: loss of access to a key geographic port which suddenly had become 
even more indispensable to their political empires. The Crimean War had broken out in October 
1853, with Great Britain and France allied with Turkey against Russia. British and French 
warships visited Honolulu ports on their way north during the summer of 1854, and the king’s 
ministers worked with the two consuls on the precise wording of Hawaiʻiʼs neutrality 
proclamation.161 Although most of the military action occurred on the Crimean Peninsula, naval 
combatants fought smaller actions in September 1854 in the North Pacific.  
 Unbeknownst to the diplomats in Washington, however, the Hawaiian team had 
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Gregg’s final inducement 
Although Miller and Perrin had formalized British and French guarantees of military protection, 
what the kingdom faced were both internal and external threats posed by Americans. For that 
reason, the kingdom’s independence would remain endangered without a similar guarantee from 
the U.S. After evaluating the import of Miller’s September 18 guarantees, Kauikeaouli and his 
ministers decided on September 27 to await Alexander Liholiho’s return before proceeding. 
Wyllie, however, did not inform Gregg of the reason for further delay until October 27.162  
Having become convinced that Kauikeaouli was not committed to arriving at a bargain, 
Gregg wrote Wyllie on November 1 that he intended to break off negotiations and withdraw U.S. 
warships from Honolulu harbor despite the impending danger from filibusters.163 There is no 
record that Wyllie responded, but the record does show that on November 12, Gregg and the 
senior American naval commander in port, Captain Dornin met with Wyllie and made one last 
attempt to use fear to induce an agreement.164 Gregg and Dornin told Wyllie a tale that filibusters 
already had arrived, more were on their way, and that they would soon attack. Unless Wyllie 
permitted several Americans to make one last attempt to persuade the king to sign, the kingdom 
would be plundered and the town set afire.165 Wyllie refused their suggestion to involve the king 
and immediately sent for and received commitments of British and French naval help from 
Miller and Perrin.166 
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But in fact, no filibusters had landed, and no attack occurred. Sensing a trap, Wyllie 
suspended negotiations. Wyllie recognized, however, that he could use their dire warning to 
position Dornin and the American naval ships in port as guarantors of the kingdom’s safety, and 
he demanded and received assurances of protection from both Dornin and Gregg.167 Together 
with the joint guarantees he had already received from Miller and Perrin, Wyllie seized his 
opportunity and announced on the king’s behalf that a tripartite protection agreement of the 
kingdom’s independence existed between Great Britain, France, and the United States.168 
Alexander Liholiho returned to Honolulu on December 1.169 On December 8, with the 
independence of his kingdom once again assured, the king issued the following Proclamation:170 
PROCLAMATION 
Whereas, it has come to My knowledge from the highest official sources, 
that My Government has been recently threatened with overthrow by 
lawless violence; and,  
Whereas, the Representatives at My Court, of the United States, Great 
Britain, and France, being cognizant of these threats, have offered Me the 
prompt assistance of the naval forces of their respective countries; 
I HEREBY PROCLAIM My acceptance of the aid thus proffered in support 
of My Sovereignty. My independence is more firmly established than ever 
before.  
KEONI ANA    KAMEHAMEHA III. 
R. C. WYLLIE 
   PALACE, December 8, 1854. 
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Then occurred one of those unexpected events that alter the balance of political influence. After a 
brief illness, Kauikeaouli died December 15, 1854. The new King Kamehameha IV, Alexander 
Liholiho, immediately ended negotiations with the United States.  
 
Afterthoughts 
Merze Tate, who studied British policy regarding Hawaiian sovereignty, credited Miller’s 
September 18 plea in his audience with the king and the combined British/French diplomatic 
offensive in Washington as instrumental in defeating the proposed treaty.171 Certainly they 
played a significant part, but Marcy afterwards wrote Gregg that “the President would never 
have approved of a treaty, admitting the Islands into the Union as a State, to say nothing of other 
objections of minor importance.”172 Marcy’s admission confirms Daws’ theory that 
Kauikeaouli’s American-trained lawyer William Lee had deliberately ensured that the U.S. 
would have to reject the treaty in the unlikely event that it had become necessary for 
plenipotentiary Wyllie to actually sign it.173 And other than Wyllie’s protestations to Gregg, 
there is no evidence that Kauikeaouli ever ordered Alexander Liholiho to return; neither was 
there a constitutional requirement that the heir to the throne approve the treaty.  
When Lee learned of the false reports of filibuster landings communicated by Gregg and 
Dornin, he opined that “it was a mistake they made in setting up that scare-crow. The King and 
chiefs are neither fools nor cowards.”174 In fact, what the record suggests is that Kauikeaouli’s 
February 6 order to engage in negotiations was set up as a straw-man designed to defeat the 
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annexationist ambitions of resident Americans. In the end, the Proclamation evidences that the 
king, the prince, and their ministers turned the “exigencies” of imminent filibuster invasions 
designed by Gregg to ‘keep their fears’ excited into just the opposite—they became the 
exigencies that the Hawaiian team used to unite Great Britain, France and the United States in a 
common pledge to defend the kingdom’s independence. 
 The political disruptions of 1853-1854 prevented meeting with Perrin to negotiate a new 
treaty. Negotiations finally began during the reign of Kamehameha IV, and on September 8, 
1858 the parties executed a revised treaty between Hawaiʻi and France. Extraterritorial 
restrictions on jury duty composition under the prior Article III were removed, and the 
inequalities in import trade and duties of the prior Article VI were replaced by reciprocal trade 
and duty levels pegged no higher than that granted to “the most favored” foreign nation. With 
that, the last objective of Kauikeaouli’s multi-stage 1849 diplomatic plan was achieved. 
 Other non-western states burdened in the nineteenth century by similar extraterritorial 
restrictions also focused their foreign diplomacy efforts on negotiating for the removal of the 
restrictions. Gonschor examines the tactics that Egypt, Japan, China, Siam, Johor and 
Madagascar used and found evidence of similar westernizing reforms made to hybridize their 
traditional institutions.175 Cemil Aydin describes similar efforts by Japanese leaders during the 
Meiji period of the 1870s and 1880s to enact reforms which modernized but at the same time 
harmonized with Japanese traditions.176 Scholars generally credit Japan with being the first non-
western country to use its reforms to successfully negotiate for the removal of all extraterritorial 
restrictions by 1899. Overlooked, however, is Hawaiʻi’s earlier success. First burdened by 
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restrictions in the treaty that the French Captain LaPlace imposed in 1839, and then burdened 
again by Great Britain’s 1844 Treaty of Lahaina, Hawaiʻi successfully negotiated the removal of 



































                                                 





CONCLUSION: SOVEREIGNTY SECURED 
 
Kauikeaouli lay mortally ill on December 15, 1854. He was forty-one years old, and in the 
thirtieth year of his reign. Privy council members Keoni Ana, Bennett Nāmakehā, Abner Pākī, 
Joshua Kāʻeo, John Papa ʻĪʻī, William Lee, Mataio Kekūanāoʻa, Richard Armstrong, Iona 
Piʻikoi, Robert Wyllie, and Asher Bates assembled at 9 a.m. to wait together. Lorrin Andrews 
arrived late, after Wyllie had started to offer prayers for the king’s soul, “likely soon to be 
released from its Earthly Tabernacle.” The privy council remained in permanent session “to 
await the decree of God.” At 11.45 a.m., “it pleased the Almighty in his mercy to call His 
Majesty to another, and the council reverently hope, a better world.”1 
 Then the members set about taking care of the necessary tasks. They made notes of the 
things to do, and a public proclamation of Kauikeaouli’s passing was prepared in Hawaiian and 
English. By 12:45 p.m., Alexander Liholiho had been publicly proclaimed the new king, 
Kamehameha IV. 
Members Keoni Ana, Abner Pākī, John Papa ʻĪʻī, Iona Piʻikoi, Bennett Nāmakehā, 
Joshua Kāʻeo, Richard Armstrong, Elisha Hunt Allen, Robert Wyllie, Mataio Kekūanāoʻa, 
William Lee, and Charles G. Hopkins assembled again with Alexander Liholiho at 11:00 a.m. on 
December 16 for an “Extraordinary Privy Council.” Lorrin Andrews was absent; someone had 
failed to inform him. Lee opened and read Kauikeaouli’s will in Hawaiian; Armstrong read it in 
English. Pākī and Nāmakehā had witnessed the will when it was drawn up, and they certified that 
the copy Lee read was genuine. Kauikeaouli had named his hānai son Alexander Liholiho as his 
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successor under Article 25 of the Constitution, and Judge Lee immediately administered the oath 
of office:  
Ke hoohiki nei au imua o ke Akua mana loa, e malama loa au i ke Kumukanawai 
o keia Aupuni, a e hooponopono no au i ke aupuni mamuli o ke Kumukanawai a 
me na kanawai. 
. . . .  
I solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, to maintain the Constitution 
of the Kingdom whole and inviolate, and to govern in conformity with that and 
the laws.2 
 
It was arranged that Kamehameha IV would formally take the oath on January 1, 1855, at 
12 noon, a Monday, in the large stone church of Kawaiahaʻo. A public notice was given to the 
newspapers. Kamehameha IV gave orders that all government officials should continue in their 
positions until further notice from him.3 
 Kauikeaouli’s last official act had been to issue a Proclamation on December 8 
announcing that Great Britain, France, and the United States had agreed to use their own naval 
forces to protect the kingdom from any assault on its independence.4 
 The state of the kingdom was sound. 
 
 But Kauikeaouli had waged a long, hard-fought campaign to achieve that final success. It 
had required guile, tenacity, and a well-crafted strategy. My dissertation focuses narrowly on 
specific tactics of the king’s strategy, fitting them into the political circumstances that the king 
faced and highlighting his own speech authorizing the tactics. The following overview presents 
the tactics as a cohesive strategy with three distinct phases. First, Kauikeaouli put the tools he 
needed into place. Then he made the reforms that would guarantee international support of his 
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sole jurisdiction over key functional areas in which foreigners had worked to usurp his authority. 
And finally, the king challenged each of the maritime powers to negotiate equal treaty terms or 
face a loss of access to the kingdom’s ports and facilities. 
 
Phase one: the tools 
Kauikeaouli’s first tactical move in March 1844 was to begin to fill ministerial positions with 
western-educated foreigners.5 The kingdom had just emerged from the after-effects of British 
Captain Paulet’s unauthorized seizure the previous February. Although Admiral Thomas had 
restored Kauikeaouli’s rule on July 31, 1843, the admiral lingered until February 1844 waiting 
for the new British Consul General William Miller to arrive. When he did, Miller forced the king 
into the unequal Treaty of Lahaina as Britain’s condition for full restoration of his sovereign 
powers. The British treaty imposed extraterritorial provisions restricting the operation of the 
kingdom’s courts and the king’s ability to determine import levels and duties. The new U.S. 
Commissioner George Brown also had arrived, and he promptly demanded the same favorable 
terms for Americans despite the fact that the U. S. had rebuffed the kingdom’s requests to 
negotiate a treaty.6 
When Miller resurrected Charlton’s claim for a prime Honolulu waterfront lot and Brown 
filed a diplomatic claim to apply the British jury composition terms to an American defendant, 
Kauikeaouli hired an American lawyer, John Ricord, to manage the kingdom’s legal defense. Six 
months later in September 1844, Kauikeaouli advised U. S. President Tyler that he intended to 
follow that policy for other functional areas: “the auxiliary aid of intelligent foreigners will be 
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called in who [have] sworn allegiance to me.”7 To Queen Pōmare IV of Tahiti, who in 1845 was 
engaged in a war with French troops and dissident Tahitians over France’s 1842 seizure of her 
kingdom, Kauikeaouli confided how he personally was guarding against any future seizure 
attempt: “I am now assisted by good whitemen and think that by this means my Government will 
stand firm in case of being brought into difficulty again by foreigners.”8  
Ricord’s employment on March 9 signaled the king’s decision to place western-educated 
whites into key positions in ministries that interfaced with western nations, and this first tactical 
move turned out to be the most controversial.9 When thousands of Hawaiians engaged in a 
petitioning campaign in 1845 praying for the dismissal of the foreign ministers, the king stood 
before his subjects to explain why he had hired them: “[The ministers of white skin] know more 
than we, and I have chosen them for the sake of their knowledge.”10 
Opposition by Hawaiians to the white ministers subsided after 1845, but opposition from 
resident foreigners grew as the ministers took firm control of enforcing the king’s sovereign 
authority. Judd was accused of threatening American merchants, and Ricord was widely disliked 
for his prosecutorial success in the courtroom. In 1845, a group of resident Americans petitioned 
President Polk to defend them against the actions of “unprincipled men” who had persuaded the 
“simple native rulers” to implement legislation that harmed their business interests.11 The 
following year, Miller became so irate over Ricord’s success at defending against Charlton’s 
claim that he physically attacked Ricord at the king’s birthday party and Keoni Ana had to step 
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between them.12 Criticism of the ministers continued, and in 1847, the editor of the Sandwich 
Islands News alleged that “the white ministers control the king and the government,” and he 
published malicious articles satirizing Richards, Judd, Ricord, and Andrews.13  
Kauikeaouli, however, steadfastly refused to countenance any criticism of the people he 
had selected to serve him. He delivered a stinging rebuke to Brown that “of the confidence he 
ought to repose in his Ministers, His Majesty is the sole judge.”14 In response to a complaint 
from Miller, the king firmly declared that all of his officers acted “i ka hana malalo ona a no laila 
he poe luna lakou nona. . . . by His Authority, and consequently were His Authorities”.15 And in 
1847, he ordered Wyllie to complain directly to the U. S. Secretary of State that American 
writers for the Sandwich Islands News had slandered his government officials.16 While the 
protests of resident foreigners continued to the end of Kauikeaouli’s reign, he never wavered in 
his support and his public endorsement of his ministers’ official acts. 
After an outbreak of smallpox ravaged the kingdom in 1853, foreign residents accused 
Judd and Armstrong of responsibility for the disease’s introduction and prevalence. Petitions 
were got up—some in favor, some opposed. Privy council minutes record the members’ 
deliberations over the petitions. Although a committee appointed by the king exonerated Judd 
and Armstrong, the chiefs were divided in their opinions as to whether or not the two ministers 
should resign. Judd’s conduct during and after the investigation, however, led to his resignation 
                                                 
12 Minutes, 20 and 21 March 1846, Series 422, vol. 1, Cabinet Council, HSA. 
13 Greer, “Abell,” 69-70; A. G. Abell to his sister, 20 April 1847, M-442, Alexander Guron Abell, U. S. Consul, 
HSA. 
14 G. P. Judd to G. Brown, 08 March 1845, Series 410, Box 2, Book 2, U.S. Officials in Hawaii, Consular 
Correspondence, HSA. 
15 Minutes, 13 August 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Official texts. Attendees were the king, kuhina 
nui, Pākī, Leleiōhoku, Kekūanāoʻa, Kanaʻina, Kealiʻiahonui, Ricord, Richards, Judd, and Wyllie. Judd acted as the 
Secretary. 
16 R. C. Wyllie to A. Ten Eyck, 04 August, 06 August 1847, Series 410, Box 3, Book 3, no. 12, part 1, Letters, 
Consular Correspondence, HSA.  
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from the privy council. Issues of the Polynesian from July 23 to September 10 covered the 
developing events, and the petition and committee report were printed in the Polynesian’s 
August 20 issue.17 
Several historians embraced the 1845 memorialists’ complaints that the white ministers 
exerted an undue influence over the king’s policies because it fit their own narratives that the 
king and his chiefs were hapless victims. Kameʻeleihiwa offers the harshest assessment. She 
characterized the advice given by Richards, Judd, Lee, and Wyllie as “treacherous,” given only 
to promote their own self-interests.18 Echoing the complaints made in the 1840s by resident 
foreigners, Kameʻeleihiwa broadly describes Kauikeaouli and the chiefs as having “learned to 
doubt themselves and to be afraid of making any decisions contrary to the advice of their [white 
advisors].”19 But Kameʻeleihiwa later cites an anecdote which disproved her own point, showing 
where Hawaiian privy council members argued against and rejected a resolution about foreign 
laborers proposed by the white members.20 
Osorio corroborates Kameʻeleihiwa’s findings and concludes that the king had been led 
astray by advice from Richards, Armstrong and Judd to make fundamentally transformative 
decisions about the law, land and the economy.21 Trask describes “aggressive Americans” who 
forced their way into the government and pressured the chiefs and the king to make sweeping 
land tenure changes so that they could enrich themselves.22 
                                                 
17 Minutes, 03 August to 06 September 1853, Series 421, vol. 7, Privy Council, HSA; “By Authority: Petition, 
Report of Committee,” Polynesian, 20 August 1853. 
18 Kameʻeleihiwa, Native Lands, 198, 208-12.  
19 Kameʻeleihiwa, Native Lands, 197. 
20 Kameʻeleihiwa, Native Lands, 213; Minutes, 23 October 1847, Series 421, vol. 4, Privy Council, HSA. The 
resolution would have encouraged northern European laborers to emigrate and staff agricultural operations. 
21 Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui, 13, 36. 
22 Trask, From a Native Daughter, 6-7. 
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Kuykendall did not describe the white ministers as self-interested, but neither did he 
recognize their employment as a deliberate, tactical move initiated by Kauikeaouli. Instead, 
Kuykendall inferred that it was Judd who had instituted the policy, citing a letter Judd wrote in 
July 1844 in which he remarked that “it will be necessary to employ a few foreigners of high 
character, in offices of trust and responsibility in order to sustain the relations of the Government 
with other Governments.”23 For example, even though Kuykendall later cited another part of the 
king’s September 1844 letter to Tyler, he made no mention of Kauikeaouli’s clear reference to 
his authorship of the hiring policy.24 
My examination of political documents shows that hiring white ministers was in fact a 
deliberate policy, and that it was Kauikeaouli who directed the policy. Kuykendall, however, 
appeared to disregard evidence that the king had constructed a broad defensive strategy in favor 
of a narrative of the progressive inevitability of western civilization led by foreigners. Beamer 
notes that the aliʻi purposefully engaged foreigners so that they could gain knowledge as part of 
the chiefs’ larger plan to conduct politics on the international level—so long as the foreigners 
could be trusted—and Kauikeaouli’s steadfast support of his chosen ministers indicated his belief 
that they could be.25 The white ministers only engaged in politically authoritative speech because 
Kauikeaouli empowered them to do so, and they did so in support of his policy positions. “The 
king my master,” is how Judd referred to Kauikeaouli in an 1844 letter to Brown that laid out the 
kingdom’s position on Brown’s complaints.26 Rather than engaging in subversive activity to 
further their own agendas, the kingdom’s political records demonstrate repeatedly that Ricord, 
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recall. 
25 Beamer, No Mākou Ka Mana, 131 




Judd, Wyllie, Richards and Lee battled other, unscrupulous foreigners and loyally worked to 
accomplish the king’s objectives and safeguard the kingdom’s sovereign powers. For example: 
• Ricord’s strident defense of the kingdom’s interests in the Charlton, Wiley 
and Gray cases as he battled Brown, Hooper and Miller in court proceedings 
• Wyllie’s persistent attacks on Miller for promoting false claims in an effort to 
validate Charlton’s purported deed 
• Strong support from Lee and Judd as the king formulated his responses to 
Tromelin at the time of the French admiral’s 1849 assault on the kingdom 
More proof that Judd defended the king’s interests comes from a letter he wrote in December 
1846 to the ABCFM Secretary Dr. Rufus Anderson. Judd told Anderson that he and Richards 
promoted policies in the nation’s councils that would preserve the Hawaiian race and “keep off 
all aliens or crush them by wholesome laws impartially administered.”27 While the king accepted 
Judd’s resignation from his ministerial post in 1853 during the smallpox epidemic, it was for 
reasons unrelated to his official duties. 
Certainly, the white council members received the most publicity as they were the 
government’s policy leaders for the initiatives implemented by their ministries. Executive actions 
and policy decisions, however, could not be implemented without the approval of the king and 
the attestation of the kuhina nui, and the king’s approval would not be given without the 
concurrence of the other privy council members, a majority of whom were Hawaiian. At the 
September 2, 1845 meeting, for example, when the king requested a resolution ordering Wyllie 
to implement a publications policy for consular correspondence, six out of ten members voting 
                                                 
27 Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 1:257. 
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for the resolution were Hawaiian chiefs.28 On December 14, 1847, nine Hawaiian chiefs joined 
with three white ministers to approve the resolutions framed by Judd authorizing Lee and Judd to 
prepare recommendations to guide the process for land divisions between the king, the chiefs, 
and the konohiki administrators.29 
The second tactical move that Kauikeaouli made was to buy an English-language 
newspaper. Sovereignty recognition from Britain, France and the United States brought new 
international responsibilities as well as increased scrutiny of the kingdom’s internal affairs. 
There was already one English-language newspaper at Honolulu with an international 
circulation, the Friend, but the king wanted his own communications platform so that he could 
publicize favorable reports about the kingdom’s political affairs. The Polynesian newspaper 
purchase included its own press and came with an experienced editor, James J. Jarves. 
Editor Jarves announced Kauikeaouli’s acquisition on July 13, 1844 in the pages of the 
Polynesian’s first issue as the government organ. Kauikeaouli had purchased the press to express 
the views and opinions of his government, Jarves reported, “so that his transactions will go to 
Europe and America.” The king himself later emphasized to his council how imperative it was 
that they use the Polynesian’s communications network to “make known the kingdom’s 
justification for the rights we claim,” and he authorized publication in the press of all 
correspondence exchanged with foreign diplomats about contested issues. Alluding to the danger 
that Brown and Miller might succeed in destabilizing the government, the king warned that “o ka 
                                                 
28 Minutes, 02 September 1845, Series 421,K vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees were the king, the kuhina nui, 
Judd, Wyllie, Richards, Ricord, Pākī, John ʻĪʻī, M. Kekūanāoʻa, and Kanaʻina. 
29 Minutes, 14 December 1847, Series 421, vol. 4, Privy Council, HSA. Attendees were the king, the kuhina nui, 
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nalo o ko kakou pono a me ko kakou aoao, oia auanei ka make o ke Aupuni . . . . the hiding of 
our cause and our defense will be likely to prove the ruin of the Government.”30 
 Benedict Anderson theorized that the manner in which a newspaper covered events could 
create among its readers a sense of the existence of a modern nation state along with a favorable 
image of it, and Jarves’ eloquent, hard-hitting editorials in support of the government and his key 
reporting on topical events had just that effect.31 International circulation of the Polynesian’s 
reports exposed the partisanship of Kauikeaouli’s critics and created the kind of image that 
Anderson described as a nation with a fully-operative, modern governance structure.32 Press 
coverage from abroad confirmed that the Polynesian had succeeded in extending the reach of the 
king’s political influence into Europe and America. Although the editors of the Sandwich Islands 
News attempted to undercut the kingdom’s positive international image, their efforts failed and 
the News folded. 
 What is noteworthy about the execution of this first phase is that it evidences that 
Kauikeaouli understood that the success of his strategy would rest on his ability to command the 
same knowledge, skills and communications tools that his western critics possessed. As Beamer 
pointed out, Kauikeaouli had made a similar tactical decision several years earlier when he 
gained political advantage from drawing on Richards’ knowledge and skills about political 
economy. My research has demonstrated that the king’s deliberate staffing of ministerial 
positions with western-educated whites also gained him valuable political advantage.33 When the 
Polynesian began publication as the government press in July 1844, the people and 
                                                 
30 Minutes, 02 September 1845, Series 421, vol. 1, Privy Council, HSA. Official texts.  
31 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 24. 
32 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 19, 24, 33. 
33 Beamer, No Mākou Ka Mana, 131-2. 
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communications tools were in place for Kauikeaouli to tackle reforms of the two key functional 
areas where foreigners had worked to usurp his authority. 
 
Phase two: the reforms 
Paulet’s seizure of the kingdom over legal disputes and Thomas’ subsequent criticisms of the 
kingdom’s legal system had impressed on Kauikeaouli how critical reform was to his ability to 
retain sovereignty over key governance areas. Research by Tracey Banivanua Mar shows that 
chiefs at Tahiti, Tonga, Fiji and New Zealand reached similar conclusions. Banivanua Mar 
studied what she termed an “outbreak of expressions of sovereignty” throughout the Pacific after 
1840 that manifested as modernizing reforms implemented by chiefly rulers as a way to insist 
that imperial powers respect their sovereign rights and privileges.34 Aydin describes how 
Japanese leaders during the Meiji period of the 1870s and 1880s also faced a similar need to 
modernize in order to free Japan from unequal treaties so that it could remain sovereign. Like 
Hawaiians, Japanese leaders hired foreign experts, and they crafted reforms that were compatible 
with Japanese traditions but which still met the needs of a modernized state. Aydin reports that 
these Japanese measures became a model for ideological change in the Ottoman state, Egypt, and 
India, paralleling the experience in Oceania that Banivanua Mar had described.35  
My research found that those were the results that Kauikeaouli hoped to achieve when he 
employed white ministers. The king had cautioned Wyllie at the time of his appointment as the 
foreign relations minister in March 1845 that Wyllie should align the kingdom’s treaty 
relationships and duties with “the peculiar local policy of our Government” as would from time 
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to time be developed by the legislators, the courts, and his executive decrees.36 Similarly, when a 
June 24, 1845 joint resolution of the legislative council authorized Ricord to recommend 
statutory changes to organize the courts, ensure a division of powers, and create a digest of the 
laws, Ricord was instructed to accommodate his recommendations to “ko kakou ano, a me ko 
kakou noho ana. . . . our condition and circumstances.”37 
Ricord had already begun work on the legal reforms by the time that British Admiral 
Seymour visited in October 1845. However, when the admiral threatened to forcibly redress 
specific grievances lodged by British subjects, Kauikeaouli cautioned the privy council that the 
need had become urgent: the situation was dangerous, he told them, because “o ke ano o keia 
olelo, oia ka lawe i ke Aupuni, a olelo mai ke Lii oiaio no ia me ka lohe ole hoi i ka oiaio e 
maopopo ai ka pono . . . the meaning of the whole address made by the Admiral [Seymour] is to 
take possession of the kingdom; it is so, even without the semblance of enquiry into Justice.”38 
Just as alarming was the fact that by April 1846, British Consul General Miller’s behavior had 
become so aggressively hostile that the cabinet ministers believed the king could not trust the 
consul to control his temper should they meet privately.39 
By the time that the 1846 legislative session opened, the first organic act had been 
adopted and Ricord was ready to submit his draft of the second organic act for review and 
                                                 
36 Commission of Robert C. Wyllie as Minister of Foreign Relations, March n.d., 1845, Letter Book 1 at 6-9, 
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amendment. The chiefs had actively participated in the enactment of earlier statutes, including 
the 1840 revisions, and legislators expected to “olelo pu me na lii” (discuss together with the 
chiefs) those changes that would benefit the kingdom.40 Members of both houses debated the 
proposed changes several times during the course of three readings “section by section with 
patience and critical care, altering and amending them in numerous essential respects” before 
passing them.41 The resultant statutory changes defined the duties and responsibilities for each of 
the executive ministries, established a law enforcement agency under the attorney general, 
defined judicial practices and processes, and added new courts to handle foreigners’ disputes.42 
When challenged by Admiral Seymour in 1846 about the scope and complexity of the 
new statutes, Kauikeaouli responded that he had made legal reforms to satisfy the wants and 
needs of foreign residents, telling the admiral that since the foreign residents belonged to great 
nations, “they required as many laws and as complicated as those great nations required.”43 Next 
Kauikeaouli demonstrated Banivanua Mar’s point that reforms were undertaken by Pacific 
islands’ rulers as a way to insist that imperialists respect the rulers’ sovereign rights: the king 
invited Seymour to umpire British complaints, and if the admiral found that no wrong had been 
committed which would be “cognizable as grounds of national complaint by the laws of 
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nations,” then Kauikeaouli expected Seymour would respect his government’s appropriate 
exercise of its power and authority.44 
Ricord’s reform work concluded with the 1847 Act to Organize the Judiciary that created 
a separate judiciary department with courts of record. The new justice system established by the 
act included uniform judicial processes with fixed judicial practices and clearly defined law 
codes, all of which centered legal authority firmly in the kingdom’s hands.45 Once judges on the 
new superior court began reaching verdicts according to court and evidentiary rules that 
foreigners found acceptable, foreign hostility diminished, and sovereignty over the law and the 
courts was preserved. 
Hawaiians also easily accepted the new law codes and court procedures. From her studies 
of activity at the Honolulu District Court in 1844 and 1845, Mari J. Matsuda concludes that 
native Hawaiians actively used the law and the courts to settle their disputes. Hawaiians also 
turned to the courts to settle their disputes with foreigners. When a Catholic priest disputed the 
taking of his land and house lot in March 1849, for example, Hawaiʻi island Governor Kapeau 
responded ‘take it to court—that’s the right way.’46 Unlike the superior court, district court 
proceedings were conducted entirely in Hawaiian before Hawaiian judges, and most of the 
parties were Hawaiian.47 
Land reform was carried on simultaneously. No reform enacted during Kauikeaouli’s 
reign has engendered more modern-day public debate than land reform. Modern Hawaiian 
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scholars write eloquently of their sense of enormous cultural loss and the devastating economic 
effects that land tenure changes had on the makaʻāinana. Anger and a sense of betrayal color 
their analyses. Kameʻeleihiwa, for example, cites numerous land transfer records to demonstrate 
that the principal beneficiaries of the land transformation were the king’s foreign advisors.48 
Silva finds that the makaʻāinana were left without the means to make a living.49 
 Kauikeaouli’s own thinking about the traditional land system underwent a radical 
transformation. In 1835, he cautioned Governor Kaikioʻewa not to sell land to a foreigner, but to 
lease it: “alaila no lawe mai, mai haawi lilo loa oe i ka aina” (and at that time take it back, don’t 
give land away without restrictions).50 Ten years later, however, the king approved the enactment 
of the quiet title legislation that set in motion the process that would convert all land to fee 
simple ownership. Scholars speculate about what caused the king to change his mind. Trask 
describes a “weary and frightened King Kamehameha III” who yielded to his foreign advisors.51 
Chinen claimed that the “vigorous actions” of foreigners and warship commanders forced the 
king and his chiefs to review their land policies.52 Kuykendall put it more delicately: the king’s 
attitude changed because new ideas from the outside world caused a breakdown in the 
purportedly “feudal” conception of land use.53 
It is far more likely, however, that the king’s mind was changed by the political 
circumstances he faced. Paulet’s gunboat threats together with Britain’s refusal to credit sworn 
testimony from ranking chiefs about the validity of Charlton’s deed showed the king just how 
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vulnerable to foreign challenge his land possession was under the traditional system. Chiefly 
anger over Britain’s stance was intense, and Wyllie let Miller know why: “because it involves a 
principle whereby they themselves might be dispossessed of their lands by the Agent of a foreign 
Nation, and all redress, in the Courts of their own Country absolutely prevented.”54 Certainly 
there was pressure from foreigners to acquire lands for agricultural development, and French 
imperialists’ designs in the Pacific also alarmed the king and his chiefs. There is also support to 
conclude that the king had initiated land reform to protect native Hawaiians’ ability to sustain 
themselves.55 While several factors may have influenced the king’s decision, it was the strong 
possibility that Hawaiians would lose their land piece by piece that emerges as the principal 
factor which moved Kauikeaouli to begin the process to change his allodial title to western-style 
fee simple ownership. 
As Beamer points out, the king had successfully used European-American ideas about the 
law as a tool to retain control over the kingdom’s courts and maintain the kingdom’s 
independence.56 Silva also notes that the creation of law codes grounded in western 
jurisprudence bolstered foreigners’ views of Hawaiʻi as an independent kingdom.57 With the 
administration of justice reformed and land possession changed to fee simple ownership, phase 
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Phase three: negotiate fair treaties 
Accomplishing the goals of the first two phases of his strategy had been within Kauikeaouli’s 
unilateral power to direct, but removing unequal terms from existing treaties depended on the 
willingness of the British and French treaty partners. The king began with a conventional 
bargaining approach: express a desire to renegotiate and come to better terms. By 1846, 
Kauikeaouli had cause to believe that approach would be successful: his white ministers could 
defend the kingdom’s political and economic positions in western forums, favorable articles 
about his governance circulated internationally in the pages of the Polynesian, and legal and land 
reform initiatives had been publicized and were well underway. 
International trade had increased after the 1843 recognition of Hawaii as an independent 
sovereign state, and with increased trade came an increased need for infrastructure. Import duty 
restrictions in the British and French treaties, however, limited the kingdom’s ability to raise 
revenue. Although Judd and Wyllie had lobbied for removal of the restrictive clauses, in March 
1846 French and British diplomats presented what were again mirror-image, non-negotiable 
treaties containing the same restrictive extraterritorial provisions.58 By colluding with each other 
on treaty language, Britain and France didn’t just ensure their own favorable trading terms at the 
economic expense of a less powerful partner—they also ensured that neither of them would gain 
an advantage over the other one for trade in Hawaiʻi’s lucrative markets.  
Kauikeaouli, however, continued with his conventional, good-faith negotiating approach 
by ratifying both treaties and returning them with his personal requests for specific changes. 
Meanwhile, the legislature moved on the only economic accommodation the new treaty had 
provided and raised import duty rates on intoxicating liquors. Urged on by the new French 
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envoy’s anger over the duty rate on wine, French Admiral de Tromelin attacked Honolulu in 
August 1849 but failed to gain any political concessions. The “French outrage” was well-
publicized by the Polynesian and generated strong international support for the kingdom.  
Together with his privy council, the king then devised an entirely different strategic 
approach that built on the kingdom’s key location along global trade networks. 59 
Acknowledging that Hawaiʻi did not have the forces or firepower to resist a naval assault, 
Kauikeaouli set into motion a strategy to shift negotiating power to the kingdom by dividing the 
interests of the three maritime powers. He used three tactics: 
First, urge British and American officials to safeguard their citizens’ commercial 
interests by ordering their navies to defend Hawaiʻi’s independence should France 
threaten again;  
Second, negotiate a favorable treaty with the U. S. and position it with Britain and 
France as the new competitive pattern; and 
Third, threaten to alienate sovereignty to a negotiating partner’s rival; if played at 
the right moment a credible bluff could be used to obtain concessions from the other 
negotiating party. 
 Judd and Jarves negotiated a fair treaty with the U.S., and British diplomats amended 
their treaty to meet the new pattern. The French declined to do the same, however. When rumors 
surfaced in 1851 that another French assault was imminent, Kauikeaouli let word out that he 
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would place the kingdom under U. S. protection if France attacked, and the French envoy backed 
off from his demands.  
Dissident resident Americans were emboldened by learning that the king had authorized 
entering into negotiations to place the kingdom under U.S. protection. Some dissidents sought 
outright annexation, while others joined with filibusters from California to topple the king’s 
government from within. But Kauikeaouli had one last bluff and one last negotiating trick to 
play: in February 1854 he opened negotiations with the Americans for annexation, and then 
sabotaged the negotiations with delays and conditions the U. S. could not accept. When rumors 
of an assault by the filibusters resurfaced in November 1854, Britain and France pledged to use 
their own naval power to protect the kingdom. U. S. naval assets in port were pressured to do the 
same, and Wyllie, acting for the king, issued the December 8 Proclamation announcing that a 
tripartite protection agreement existed. 
  By the time of his passing on December 15, 1854, Kauikeaouli’s well-crafted strategy 
under his personal leadership had led to the implementation of governance, political and 
diplomatic measures that safeguarded his administration’s ability to exercise functional 
sovereignty and delivered to his successor a kingdom whose future territorial integrity was 
guaranteed by the three maritime powers. 
                                                     * * * * 
As the 1845 reply by the legislators to the Lahaina petitioners pointed out, there was no 
practical way to keep foreigners from coming ashore.60 Instead, the key to the kingdom’s 
survival lay in finding a way to manage their impact. Kauikeaouli found that way by harnessing 
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what Banivanua Mar calls ‘imperial literacy’ and turning the kingdom’s international legal and 
diplomatic discourses into expressions of his sovereign rule over an independent nation state.61 
During his reign Kauikeaouli survived two assaults by French naval forces and a British 
occupation, sent two deputations to America and Europe to press for recognition and favorable 
treaties, provided a written constitution and legal reforms that established the rule of law, 
changed land tenure from its traditional Polynesian character to western fee simple ownership, 
broke Britain and France’s extraterritorial hold on the kingdom’s courts and revenue income 
potential, fended off foreigners’ attempts to overthrow his government from within, and turned 
his maritime treaty partners into a coalition of allies pledged to provide naval support to defend 
his kingdom’s territorial security. It was an extraordinary leadership performance, one that had 
no parallel in any other Polynesian kingdom. My dissertation’s analysis of the tactics used by the 
king to accomplish his strategy contributes to a reevaluation of Kauikeaouli’s leadership and an 















                                                 





HOUSE OF NOBLES (Na’lii malalo o ke Alii nui)1 





























                                                 
1 Official titles and membership from the 1840 Constitution, Ka Hoʻoilina, 27. By 1845 it had come to be called 






REPRESENTATIVE BODY (Ka Poe i Kohoia)1 

























                                                 
1 Official title from the 1840 Constitution, Ka Hoʻoilina, 31. By 1845, it had come to be called “Ka Poeikohoia e na 
Makaainana o Hawaii nei.” See “Olelo Mua a Ka Mea Nana i Kakau [Compiler’s Preface],” Statute Laws of 
Kamehameha III, 1:5. 
2 Robert C. Lydecker, Roster Legislatures of Hawaii 1841-1918, Constitutions of Monarchy and Republic, Speeches 





THE CABINET COUNCIL (Na Kuhina)1 
Formed as of March 1846 after implementation of the 1845 Act 
 
Members are 
Kuhina Nui, Chair, functioning in his role as the Minister of Interior Affairs 
Minister of Foreign Relations 
Minister of Finance 
Minister of Public Instruction 
Attorney General (vacated after 1847)  
 
The Cabinet met irregularly to discuss measures to place before the King in Privy Council. The 
first recorded meeting is dated March 3, 1846. Attending were:  
 
Kuhina Nui    - Keoni Ana Young 
Minister of Foreign Relations  - Robert C. Wyllie 
Minister of Finance   - Gerrit P. Judd 
Minister of Public Instruction  - William Richards (d. 07 Nov 1847) 














                                                 
1 Official title comes from “Olelo Mua a Ka Mea Nana i Kakau [Compiler’s Preface],” Statute Laws of 





THE PRIVY COUNCIL (Ka Poe Kukakuka Malu)1 
Established by the 1845 Act 
 
 






Honorary Members as appointed by the King 
Governors of the Islands of Hawaiʻi, Maui, Oʻahu and Kauaʻi 
 
Ioane ʻĪʻī (John Papa ʻĪʻī) 






William P. Leleiōhoku 
Abner Pākī 
 John Ricord 












                                                 
1 The title comes from “First Act Kamehameha III,” Statute Laws of Kamehameha III, 1:11, in the Hawaiian text 
with that page number. 





ʻahaʻōlelo  chiefsʼ council 
aliʻi   chief 
aliʻi nui  ruling chief 
ʻelele   courier 
ʻōlelo waha  spoken command 
hānai   adopted 
haole   white person 
hewa   wrong, error 
kauoha malu  secret instructions, secret order 
kahu   a chief’s attendant 
kānaka maoli  native Hawaiians 
kapu  forbidden, prohibited, and a general name for the traditional system of  
religion  
kuhina nui  chief advisor, premier 
kūkini   long distance runners 
kuleana  a property right, a small homesite 
māhele   division 
makaʻāinana  commoners, Hawaiians without rank 
makaʻāinana maoli native Hawaiian commoners 
mamaki  a small native tree; also refers to the kapa made from the tree bark 
palapala  literacy 
pono   benefit, right 
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